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Rationale for the Study 
There is continual evidence that society has a fasci-
nation with defining human development by measures of cer-
tainty. Spodek (1988) remarks that "ther~ is no universal 
agreement about what constitutes human development" 
(p. 204), yet state departments of education and local dis-
tricts institute mandates and policies that are founded on 
inconclusive, and even contradictory, viewpoints of human 
development. Issues of grade placement and retention par-
ticularly spawn controversy and confusion among members of 
the field and the general public as well. 
The epistemological base of developmental theory, for 
the most part, has been established through scientific 
activity. Capra (1982) notes that the Newtonian-Descartes 
vision of absolute certainty and determinism "is still 
widespread today" despite the fact that: "Twentieth-century 
physics has shown us very forcefully that there is no abso-
lute truth in science, that all our concepts and theories 
are limited and approximate" (p. 57) . Nonetheless, soci-
ety's cultural mindset of Western thought, according to 
Clark (1988), has been to maintain the Newtonian-Descartes 
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"technological world view" that the universe functions with 
clockwork cause-effect precision. Translated into the con-
text of human d~velopment, this means that a child can be 
expected to develop and behave according to the patterns and 
predictions that have been laid out by developmental theo-
rists who uphold the laws of the Newtonian-Descartes 
paradigm, or old science. 
Using old science, theorists reduce the human to 
his/her smallest component parts to arrive at an under-
standing of the whole being. In this way old science puts 
forth a building-blocks rationale for defining the human's 
development. Clark (1988) asserts that the "empirical 
logic" of old science "discounts intuition and value-based 
perceptions and forces us into an 'either/or' problem solv-
ing and decision making mode" (p. 18). As a result, devel-
opmental strategies are "fragmenting, linear and sequen-
tial." 
In affirmation, Lucas (1985) acknowledges that the New-
tonian paradigm is unquestionably the dominant thought of 
the day. Even though "abandonment of Newtonian mechanics as 
a paradigm for understanding reality is relatively well 
advanced" (p. 165), society is not ready to relinquish its 
hold on this causal-predictive mode of defining reality. 
But new scientific discoveries have been made, Lucas adds, 
which disclaim this Newtonian "metaphysical view of the, 
world" (p. 165). 
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According to Lucas, the earliest challenge to old sci-
ence came "at the beginning of the twentieth century" with 
revolutionary discoveries by Einstein, Heisenberg, and Bohr 
(among others) who founded the theories of relativity, 
uncertainty, and complementarity as they formed the genesis 
of quantum mechanics. Schopen (1989) notes that, taken 
together, these discoveries refute the "mechanical model" of 
old science "with the recognition that the physical world 
could not be separated into independently existing elements 
or isolated entities." Schopen elaborates with the follow-
ing: 
These, once regarded as physical (e.g., so-called 
particles of atomic physics), on closer inspection 
scarcely seemed to retain the essential character-
istics of matter at all. Instead, these suppos-
edly fundamental building-blocks dissolved into 
wave-like probability patterns (p. 12). 
By the same token, it can be seen that new science 
(instituted by quantum mechanics) would abandon the deter-
ministic building-blocks method of defining human develop-
ment for an alternate approach that contributes to under-
standing. As of yet, however, a direct application of new 
science to human development has not been made. One of the 
purposes of this study is to bridge that gap. 
CHAOS: New Science's Emergent 
Paradigm 
In Chaos: Making A New Science, Gleick (1987) promul-
gates the emergence of a new paradigm, the science of 
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Chaos. Throughout the book Gleick describes how the 
paradigm's emergence follows Kuhn's (1970) explanation of 
the paradigm process. 
Kuhn (1970) asserts that the scientific community has 
as its goal the practice of normal science, a rule-bound 
mode of investigation that seeks to validate theory. But 
according to Kuhn, "normal science repeatedly goes astray" 
(p. 6). This happens because the normative principles are 
invaded from time to time by anomalies (irregularities) 
which deviate from the rule and challenge the rational 
explanation. 
The paradigm concept was introduced by Kuhn as the 
metaphysic that guides the aims and activities (research) of 
the scientific community. Rather than being a logical, 
restrictive statement of beliefs about a phenomenon, a 
paradigm presents a sketch, or portrait, of a field's pat-
tern (framework) of thought. A paradigm thus "stands for 
the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and 
so on shared by the members of a given community" (p. 173). 
According to Kuhn, there is a process by which a 
paradigm emerges in a field. During a pre-paradigm era, a 
scientist will attempt to suppress the anomalies which arise 
in a study. This is because the researcher of normal sci-
ence has a stake in the outcome. The purpose of the study 
is, in fact, to validate that which is already known. This 
occurs during the era of normal science. 
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When, however, anomalies appear to the degree that they 
can no longer be ignored by the scientific community, a 
paradigm emerges into what is described as a scientific rev-
elution. At this point research deals "more with the quali-
tative than with the quantitative aspects of nature's regu-
larity" (p. 30). Manipulations of theory need no longer to 
be undertaken by the scientist. 
In sum, when a paradigm can no longer stand up to the 
weight of the anomalies, the scientific community goes 
through a period of crisis. At such a time, divergent theo-
ries are created to resolve the state of unrest within the 
field, most of which die out due to inherent anomalies of 
their own. Eventually, a particular body of beliefs emerges 
which seems to better end the "interschool debate" and the 
"constant reiteration of fundamentals" (p. 18). Thus, as 
scientists are able to transform a set of extraordinary 
investigations into a "shift of professional commitments" 
(p. 6), a new paradigm is born. 
Actual domination of a new paradigm may not occur 
rapidly because older scientists tend to be reluctant to 
reject the studies of their lifetime for a new professional 
belief. For this reason numerous paradigms are able to 
exist simultaneously within a scientific community, even 
though a particular paradigm can better resolve the crisis 
of the field. Kuhn (1970) submits: 
To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem 
better than its competitors, but it need not, and 
in fact never does, explain all the facts with 
which it can be confronted (pp. 17-18). 
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The scientific community is, therefore, subjected to an 
era of unrest as the proponents of the competing paradigms 
seek to advance their respective interests. Ultimately, 
however, a triumphant paradigm prevails to establish the 
dominant thought of the field. Once the paradigm becomes 
accepted by the professional community, normal science 
resumes. 
According to Gleick (1987) the Chaos paradigm has not 
triumphed as the dominant paradigm: however, the new 
science--combining the revolution of quantum mechanics with 
even more recent discoveries--is emerging with increased 
momentum. And in contrast to the Newtonian paradigm of 
determinism, these discoveries hold that the universe is 
comprised of randomness, nonlinearity, irreversibility, and 
uncertainty. Therefore, the phenomena of nature are unpre-
dictable. 
As Gleick describes the emergence of the Chaos 
paradigm, he notes that even the processes which bring a 
paradigm to the fore encompass the assumptions of random-
ness, nonlinearity, irreversibility, and uncertainty. And 
in turn, these same assumptions encompass the processes of 
transformation. 
The science of Chaos promulgates transformational 
theory. In a nutshell, chaos represents the randomness of 
fluctuations which perturb a system, or organism. Many per-
turbations go unnoticed by the system, but on those occa-
sions when the system chooses to respond, its entities 
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(component parts) become stirred up, or chaotic. A physi-
cist will measure the entropy, or messiness, of a system to 
approximate the.degree to which the system is perturbed 
(Pagels, 1982). The response to an initial fluctuation may 
trigger the. system into subsequent bifurcations, or jumps, 
into differentiated states of increased entropy, or messi-
ness. Thus as the system continues to bifurcate, it becomes 
increasingly complex. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) note, 
however, that in the quantum leaps that lead a system to 
transform, the system finds "order out of chaos" 
(p. 292). 
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Nonlinearity enters into the process by the fact that 
transformations do not occur as a result of a sequential, 
building-blocks pattern. The bifurcation paths are encoun-
tered both randomly and in a nonlinear fashion. Because it 
cannot be known when, or how, a system might choose to 
respond to a fluctuation--or whether it even will respond--
the theory incorporates the assumption of uncertainty. 
Finally, in accordance with the principle of entropy, all 
changes (bifurcations and transformations) are one-direc-
tional. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) thus associate the 
law of entropy (the second law of thermodynamics) with the 
"arrow of time" (p. 8). The law of entropy states that all 
changes are irreversible; once perturbed, a system can never 
return to its former state. 
In the following section it will be shown how these 
assumptions of Chaos (transformational theory) enter into 
the process by which a paradigm comes to be recognized. 
Gleick's (1987) pronouncement of the Chaos paradigm's emer-
gence illustrates how the assumptions can be universally 
applied. 
The Paradigm Process 
According to Gleick, the Chaos paradigm began to form 
as a few rebel scientists from across the fields attended to 
the anomalies that were being ignored by the majority of 
scientists who were practicing normal science (i.e., the 
Newtonian-classical,. old science). These rebels comprised 
only a random sprinkling of scientists from across the globe 
who perturbed the macro-system. 
Because the rebels attended to the anomalies, or irreg-
ularities that are ignored by those who practice normal sci-
ence, the studies of these rebels could not be approached in 
a building-blocks manner. Their research could not incre-
mentally add on to what was already known. Thus the Chaos 
scientists chose nonlinear paths to develop their scientific 
knowledge. 
Once discoveries were made, the rebel scientists became 
irreversibly changed. Kuhn (1970) notes that the road to a 
paradigm shift leads the field(s), and the scientists 
therein, to a state of transformation. For this reason Kuhn 
states: "The conversion experience that I have likened to a 
gestalt switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revo-
lutionary process" (p. 204). Once these scientists became 
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converted to the revolutionary insights that were gleaned 
from their respective discoveries, the transformations that 
they experienced became irreversible. These scientists 
would never be able to return to their former ways of think-
ing! Kuhn further acknowledges the irreversibility of 
transformation with the following: 
What were ducks in the scientist's world before 
the revolution are rabbits afterwards. The man 
who first saw the exterior of the box from above 
later sees its interior from below. Transforma-
tions like these . . . (are) almost always irre-
versible . (p. 11). 
Finally, the road to paradigm emergence still left the 
scientists with a sense of uncertainty. Gleick discussed 
how these individuals originally came upon their discoveries 
in isolated points across the globe. As these scientists 
from an array of different fields came upon each other's 
work through such means as papers/publications, conference 
presentations, and by word-of-mouth, they came to recognize 
a widespread commonality of their multi-field discoveries. 
But these scientists also encountered points of disagreement 
and argumentation. It came to be seen that while the rebel 
scientists could agree on the general assumptions of random-
ness, nonlinearity, irreversibility, and uncertainty, they 
would remain at odds on some particulars. Because absolute 
consensus could never be reached, the Chaos scientists vali-
dated the assumption of uncertainty. 
The assumption of uncertainty has led proponents of 
transformational theory to the recognition that much of the 
universe is paradoxical. While the assumptions lead to a 
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global, or holistic, frame of thought, the particulars 
remain debatable. These paradoxes allude to the fact that 
unknowns may have to remain as such. This study will pre-
sent two such paradoxes: 1) between Feigenbaum and Prigogine 
and Stengers who argue over the universality of bifurca-
tions, and 2) between the humanistic psychologists who tend 
to agree, and yet disagree, over the nature of human trans-
formation. 
Having discussed old science and introduced the new 
(i.e., the science of Chaos and transformational theory), 
the rationale will look at human development from the lens 
of educational practice. It should be noted that, by and 
large, educational practice is approached from old science's 
Newtonian-mechanistic rationale. Because the issue of 
placement and retention tends to be the area of concern in 
the context of human development as it relates to schooling, 
the researcher has chosen to explore educational practice in 
light of the promotion/retention, or placement, question. 
Developmental Placement: Promotion 
or Retention 
Bjorklund (1986) undertook a study of the research on 
student placement and retention to see if research has sup-
ported the contention that repeating a grade benefits the 
child's learning and development. In the study, she found 
as much support for retaining children as she found for 
passing them on. Bjorklund adds, however, that most of the 
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research favors children not being enrolled in kindergarten 
until they have reached the age of five. Pain's (1981) 
study counters this claim noting that in Edmonton, Alberta 
little difference was found in the child's school success 
when the entrance age was increased. 
Pennsylvania's (1985) handbook on promotion/retention 
policies notes that even though findings on the benefits of 
retaining a child are inconclusive, the 423 districts of the 
state are being required to tighten their "district promo-
tion and retention policies and standards" (p. 7). The 
writers of the handbook state: 
There is no reliable body of evidence to indicate 
that grade retention is more beneficial than grade 
promotion for students with serious academic dif-
ficulties (p. 8). 
Yet the issuance of mandates on promotion/retention stan-
dards leads to decisions being applied to masses of children 
who match up to the established criteria without considering 
the children as unique human beings. 
Other states which have also required the establishment 
of such policies include Connecticut (1984) and Oregon 
(1985). These offer alternate kinds of programs (e.g., 
transitional pre-first grades) which tend to be translated 
into spending two years in a first grade. 
Cross' {1984) study of a local district's promotion/ 
retention policy found teachers tending to ignore standard-
ized test scores, and other criteria, to base their reten-
tion recommendations solely on the child's reading perfor-
mance. Cross finds this to be a weak basis for making such 
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determinations. The standardized test scores revealed that 
children who were retained scored comparably in reading with 
others passed on to the next grade. It appears that a 
child's oral reading can be used to determine his/her school 
placement. 
In contrast to the district of Cross' study, Austin 
(1983) relies heavily on standardized tests for making 
placement determinations. Using the Iowa Test·of Basic 
Skills (ITPA), the child's performance on measurable skills 
is compared against the normed performance standards. Here 
it is the test that is used to determine whether the child 
will be allowed to promote. 
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Schuyler's (1983) follow-up study on Austin's promo-
tion/retention plan suggests that in the year after reten-
tion, the formerly retained students tend to remain below 
the average. Schuyler urges, therefore, that student needs 
be considered beyond the year of retention. 
The above illustrations of state/district policies 
reveal two conditions of our educational society: 1) that 
human development is an issue of concern, particularly where 
grade placement or retention is concerned, and 2) that after 
all the centuries of grade-level structured miss education, 
the value of retention is still debatable. Though most of 
the above apples to primary/elementary situations, the prob-
lem is no less critical for students in secondary education. 
Holloway (1985) discusses an unnamed district's pro-
posed policy on the retention of students in grades 7-12 who 
make D's or F's on their report cards. In fact, any grade 
below c- would require that the "course be repeated until a 
passing grade and credit was earned" (p. 3). The goal is to 
cause students to become more serious about their academic 
efforts. 
Holloway's conclusions propose that many unintended 
outcomes would result from the adoption of this proposed 
plan. For one thing, the district's adherence to the bell 
curve philosophy would continually perpetuate the condition 
of some students remaining on the lower end of the curve. 
These students would never have a chance to complete high 
school. Organizationally, the model would prove to be 
deficient as students continued to repeat courses, thus cre-
ating an over-load of class size where the number of incom-
ing students would become disproportional to those gradu-
ating. 
Of most importance, however, is the fact that many stu-
dents would perceive this as a "no win" affair. These 
students: "· .. could be expected to respond in the only 
legitimate way they can and that would be to 'withdraw'" 
(p. 13). Not only would the students be greatly discour-
aged, Holloway cautions that "their behavior might become 
even less manageable than is presently the case" (p. 13). 
This alert to the bad behavior of young people trying 
to cope with failure leads the issue of development back to 
a societal problem. As emphasized by Clark (1988), society 
tends to handle such problems by resorting to methods of 
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normal science. It is traditionally proposed--since the 
time of Newton and Descartes--that the phenomenon be reduced 
to something that can be isolated, observed and measured. 
Only then can a cure be found. 
Many states and districts have now gone to a format of 
"high-stakes testing" to determine the readiness of children 
to begin schooling. Meisels (1988) describes Georgia's 1986 
legislation, the Quality Basic Education (QBE) Act, as the 
greatest "abrogation of instructional authority" ever 
imposed upon children in testing. Meisels explains the bill 
with the following: 
This bill required all children seeking to enter 
first and fourth grades to pass a test that would 
demonstrate their academic readiness. Students 
who did not pass such tests and, in kindergarten, 
whose teachers confirmed the results of the readi-
ness assessment, would be required to repeat 
kindergarten or third grade (p. 37). 
This test used to demonstrate this academic readiness is the 
California Achievement Test (CAT), a standardized instrument 
which utilizes normal science methods to measure all the 
complexities of the human which are deemed pertinent to 
school success. Here the potential for school success is 
defined by demonstrated (paper and pencil) mastery of lan-
guage and mathematics skills. Meisels adds that the CAT is 
designed to: 
. render decisions about student classifica-
tion, retention, and promotion; it is intended to 
guide instructional decisions; and it is perceived 
as carrying out the state's mandate to establish 
quality education programs. Unfortunately, the 
test and the testing program fall far short of 
achieving these goals (p. 37). 
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In a report by O'Neil (1988), of the 90,000 kinder-
gartners tested in Georgia under the new law, "more than 
7,000" were not able to "attain passing scores" (p. 1). 
O'Neil notes that many are protesting the Georgia plan for 
setting a "· .. bad precedent and (being) symptomatic of a 
nationwide over-emphasis on academic skills in kindergarten 
programs" (p. 3). But Weiss (1988) in the NEA Today asserts 
that: 
Kindergarten testing is, of course, only the be-
ginning of students' long careers as test takers. 
The National Center for Fair & Open Testing 
(FairTest) estimates that at the very least, pub-
lic schools administered over 100 million stan-
dardized tests last year. That's an average of 
more than two-and-a-half tests per year (p. 5). 
The article suggests that it is a misuse of tests to deter-
mine placement, retention, or tracking by a single test 
score. 
A number of districts employ developmental tests to 
determine placement decisions. Though also standardized, 
tests such as the Gesell School Readiness test propose an 
activity (or paper and pencil drawing) orientation to deter-
mining one's level of development. Still Meisels (1988) 
asserts: "The problems with the Gesell are extensive . 
(p. 34). The primary fault of the Gesell, according to 
Meisels, is that: 
. it promises to identify children who are at 
high-risk for school failure, and it asserts that 
it can be used to determine when children should 
begin school, which children should be promoted, 
and which should be retained in grade. Unfortu-
nately, there are no data to support these asser-
tions (p. 34). 
II 
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In sum, even a test designed specifically for developmental 
purposes is suspect to invalidity. 
It appears that the methods of normal science have not 
been successful at describing and alleviating problems which 
tend to be identified as developmental: specifically, grade 
placement and retention. Criticisms of the standardized 
paper and pencil measures (e.g., CAT testing), and those 
which are deemed developmental (e.g., the Gesell test) 
indicate that the normal science approach of reducing data 
for prediction has been ineffective and, possibly, harmful. 
The Developmental Paradigm 
Many policies and practices that are implemented in 
American schools are derived from the theories of develop-
mentalists Arnold Gesell, Jean Piaget, and Maria Montessori. 
Gesell's work is most notable through the developmental 
tests which are used to determine children's readiness for 
starting school (Ames, 1967). Montessori is most known for 
the preschools that have been established nationwide to 
advance children's academic readiness for school (Goodlad, 
Klein, & Novotney, 1973). It has been the works of biolo-
gist Jean Piaget, however, which have increasingly met with 
acceptance by the members of the educational community. 
Since the late 1970s Piaget has been revered as the 
leading developmental theorist (Brennan, 1982). The liter-
ature is inundated with Piaget's writings, and the works of 
his proponents who continue to carry on with their creations 
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of a Piagetian curriculum. The National Association for the 
Education of Young Children (NAYEC) manual for 
"developmentally appropriate practice" (Bredekamp, 1987) is 
written in accordance with Piaget's theory. 
In sum, the developmentalists have gained recognition 
in the literature, and support for the establishment of: 1) 
tests that indicate a child's development level, 2) schools 
(i.e., the Montessori preschools) for enhancing academic 
readiness, and 3) instructional programs (e.g., the Piage-
tian and Montessori curricula). Furthermore, state and 
local policy makers have drawn from the theories of these 
developmentalists to formulate promotion/retention policies. 
(It should be noted that Piaget did not address matters of 
education, but his constituents have developed programs that 
extend Piaget's theory into practice. The active learning 
model that the Piagetian and Montessori curricula espouse 
are considered in the formulation of, for example, transi-
tional pre-first grades that are used as options in the pro-
motion/retention handbooks developed by state departments.) 
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The Humanistic Paradigm 
Humanistic psychology attempted to combat the deter-
ministic rationale of the Newtonian paradigm in the 1960s 
and 70s. Humanism was only moderately received by the psy-
chologists and educators of that time; consequently, the 
humanistic paradigm never attained a status of dominance in 
the social sciences. Nonetheless, Schopen (1989) holds that 
the humanistic movement laid the foundation for the 
"wholistic world view" espoused today. According to 
Schopen: "Humanistic psychologists such as Carl Rogers and 
Abraham Maslow, and their stress on seeing the person as a 
whole being, shaped our world view, then and now" (p. 13). 
The "wholistic world view" to which Schopen refers is 
the underpinning philosophy of those who propose transf or-
mational theory. Both Ferguson (1980) and Leonard {1972), 
author of The Transformation, advocate the need for viewing 
the person in a holistic context as opposed to dissecting 
aspects of the human for measurement or analysis. Leonard 
criticizes the educational community for reducing children 
to their "reading and mathematics achievement scores" 
(p. 235). And Ferguson adds that: "Where they need to find 
meaning, the schools ask memorization; discipline is 
divorced from intuition, pattern from parts" (p. 284). 
Clearly the call is for transformation! Finally, in the 
context of human development, Ferguson (1980) proposes: 
Mind, in fact, is its own transformative vehicle, 
inherently prepared to shift into new dimensions 
if only we let it. Conflict, contradiction, mixed 
feelings, all the elusive material that usually 
swirls around the edges of awareness, can be 
reordered at higher and higher levels. Each new 
integration makes the next easier (p. 69). 
As a holistic thinker, Ferguson alludes to the messiness of 
life, and the bifurcation (shifting) processes, that encom-
pass transformation. 
In accordance with Schopen's assertion that the human-
istic psychologists (i.e., Rogers, Maslow) tend to be in 
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congruence with the 11 wholistic world view," Lucas (1985) 
notes that Maslow views the human: "· .. as an active, 
dynamic initiator of action, selecting and responding to 
certain features in the surrounding phenomenological 
'field'" (p. 169). This active responding to the fluctua-
tions of life in a dynamic manner also seems compatible with 
transformational theory. 
But whether the humanistic paradigm is, in fact, con-
gruent with transformational theory, as suggested by Schopen 
and Lucas, is a matter that will be explored in the study. 
One of the main goals for this research is to arrive at an 
understanding of the assumptions that underlie both the 
developmental and humanistic paradigms. 
Purpose of the Study 
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This study is an attempt to explore new science to see 
if it offers an alternate paradigm that can be used to cri-
tique selected developmental theories. If so, the 
researcher will seek to demonstrate in this dissertation how 
the emergent paradigm of Chaos--transformational theory--can 
be used to critique the dominant paradigm of development as 
guided by old science, and an alternate paradigm that 
espouses development according to the humanistic psycholo-
gists. Because this is a theoretical study, no hypothesis 
is proposed. The purpose is to come to understand. 
Basic Assumptions 
In this study, the basic assumptions are: 
1. Human development approximates the development of new 
science in accordance with the premise that change in 
the organism is the result of anomalies, or fluctua-
tions, which perturb, and ultimately, transform the 
human, or the field(s). 
2. Viewed as a dissipative (open, biological) structure, 
the constituents of human development are randomness, 
nonlinearity, irreversibility and uncertainty (or 
unpredictability) . 
3. The linear and sequential nature of stage theories pos-
tulate development as a process of rational and logical 
order which directly opposes the assumptions of the new 
paradigm of Chaos. 
4. Perceptual orientations to development, as propounded 
by humanistic psychologists, offer philosophic congru-
ence to the assumptions of Chaos and transformational 
theory. 
5. Human development can only be understood with the 
recognition that no description can adequately define 
the present, or predict the future, of the human in the 
universe. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is presented according to the following chap-
ters. A brief description is provided for each. 
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Chapter 2: 
The developmental paradigm is rooted in old science. 
Each of its founding leaders was a scientist in his/her own 
right: Piaget, a biologist, and Gesell and Montessori, med-
ical doctors. 
For these individuals a biographical perspective is 
provided so that the reader can understand how their respec-
tive theories of development happened to evolve from a sci-
entific orientation. Clearly for these developmentalists 




In Chapter 3 the reader will be introduced to the new 
science of Chaos and transformational theory. A survey of 
scientists from the fields of chemistry, physics and mathe-
matics, astronomy, and biology will enable the reader to see 
why the emergence of the Chaos paradigm is beginning to gain 
attention. Additionally, reference will be made to scien-
tists of the past who subtly, in their respective fields, 
paved the way for this revolution suddenly to emerge to the 
forefront in the 1970s and 80s. 
Chapter 4: 
The fourth chapter will present a brief description of 
the humanistic paradigm's roots, followed by a discussion of 
its opposition to the Newtonian deterministic rationale of 
normal (old) science. From here Chapter 4 will propose a 
new science that accords with the assumptions of Chaos; the 
humanistic paradigm will propose the acceptance of transf or-
mational theory as a viable way of understanding the devel-
oping and transforming human being. 
Chapter 5: 
The final chapter of the study will present a synthesis 
relating transformational theory to the general philosophies 
of development as postulated by the leading developmental 
and humanistic theorists. In response to recent issues over 
the child's placement in school, Chapter 5 considers such 
decision-making only in light of the findings gleaned from 
new science. Therefore, questions related to developmental 
issues of schooling (grade placement/retention) are viewed 
from the lens of the emergent paradigm of Chaos, or trans-
formational theory. 
Limitations of the Study 
The findings of this research can only be applied with 
recognition of the study's limitations. Although the intro-
duction addresses problems associ~ted with the developing 
child in regard to grade placement and retention, concrete 
solutions to these issues are not sought in this study.· 
The human inherently possesses a multitude of unknown 
complexities, and because the human is a dynamic being, 
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forever open and in flux with things in the world, it is not 
feasible, according to transformational theory, to offer 
generalizable predictions. The study will, hopefully, 
enhance the reader's understanding of the limitations that 
impede a scientist's ability to prescribe solutions to prob-
lems that bear upon the uncertainties of the developing--
transf orming--human being. 
Another limitation of the study exists in regard to the 
researcher's interpretation of the reviewed literature as 
prior knowledge was integrated with the new information. 
Every effort was made to understand and discuss the 
literature in accord with the theorists' intentions. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of bias, though unintentional 
on the part of the author, is a limitation that must be 
acknowledged. 
Additionally, the study was also met with the 
limitation that the science of Chaos--transformational 
theory--is a relatively new area that touches all of 
science's fields. Yet this newness carries with it the 
limitation that books and publications are scarce; and for 
some fields, difficult to come by. Specifically, the 
literature on transformational theory is limited. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM 
Developmental psychology is rooted in many of the 
natural sciences. Munn (1965) describes the field as "the 
most complex phenomenon known to science" because it deals 
with the "behavior of living organisms" (p. 9). 
According to Munn, it is from physics and chemistry 
that developmental psychology knows of organic functions 
(e.g., nervous and glandular activity, cellular differenti-
ation) . Branches of zoology contribute with related infor-
mation. The "protozoologist" provides the developmentalist 
a glimpse into the structure and functions of even the 
smallest living organism. Through genetics, the develop-
mental psychologist is able to consider factors of inheri-
tance and evolution which bear upon development. The natu-
ralist then brings to light the animal's sense of adapta-
tion, life in its habitat. Finally, the embryologist opens 
up, for understanding, the infant's early stages of life. 
Munn further notes that the social sciences (i.e., so-
ciology and anthropology) are also "closely affiliated" with 
developmental psychology because the human being is studied 
from the era of savagery to the age of modern civilization. 
24 
In this way the developmentalist comes to consider the 
cultural milieu from which personality develops. 
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The developmental paradigm has combined the above into 
two broad areas of focus: phylogenetic and ontogenetic prob-
lems. Phylogenesis focuses on the nature of the organism's 
"unlearned and intelligent behavior . . . ranging from the 
unicellular organisms to man" (p. 11). Here the developmen-
talist is most concerned with the evolution and heredity of 
the organism, including its "mode of transmission, and adap-
tive significance of unlearned relations" (p. 10) . Ontogen-
esis, then, studies the "nature and bases of behavioral 
development from conception until birth; the subsequent 
development of sensory, motor, symbolic, and emotional pro-
cesses" (p. 11), on to the development of the personality. 
In essence, the phylogenetic activities are those which all 
humans have in common (e.g., grasping, crawling, running, 
speaking). The ontogenetic activities, on the other hand, 
comprise those aspects of the human (habits) which one may, 
or may not, acquire (e.g., swimming, skating). 
Munn suggests that historically, phylogenetic psychol-
ogy originated with the work of Charles Darwin in the latter 
nineteenth century. Darwin's studies probed into the possi-
bility that the human's behavioral traits could have prehu-
man origins. Developmentalists who supported Darwin's the-
ory began to consider human development in relation to the 
behavior of animals. Among others, Munn lists Thorndike's 
1898 investigations of "animal learning at Columbia 
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University" (p. 3) as an early phylogenetic study of devel-
opment. But Munn notes that subsequent behavioral studies 
of the rat led American behavioralists "away from 
comparative and phylogenetic research" (pp. 3-4). Thus 
phylogenetic research is not equivalent to studies which 
investigate "neural and physiological mechanisms" (p. 4). 
Ontogenetic psychology shares with phylogenesis the 
concern for biological implications in development. The 
ontogenetic psychologist agrees with the doctrine of 
recapitulation, that the "structural characteristics of 
animals lower in the scale of evolution are exhibited in the 
prenatal development of the human infant" (pp. 4-5). As a 
result, the individual "mirrors" the "biological history" of 
his/her race. However, ontogenetic psychology submits that 
development encompasses more than just a passing down of the 
race's "structural characters" (p. 5). Environmental and 
cultural influences also affect development. 
Munn further notes that this ontogenetic theory of 
development was initiated in the late 1800s by G. Stanley 
Hall who combined recapitulation (phylogenesis) with a con-
cern for causal, environmental factors. In so doing, Hall 
created a theory of "cultural recapitulation," or ontoge-
netic psychology. 
Through ontogenesis, psychology is able, for example, 
to understand why children "manifest different types of play 
as they grow older" (p. 5). A pure phylogenetic perspective 
would limit play to the types of activities that a dog might 
exhibit (e.g., fetching the ball), which do not tend to 
change (heighten in complexity) as the dog increases in age. 
Ontogenesis all9ws for such growth. 
It is important to note that a developmental psycholo-
gist will not be purely phylogenetic, neither will his/her 
orientation be so directed to the environmental/cultural 
side of ontogenesis that the phylogenetic implications are 
ignored. A developmental psychologist must encompass both 
perspectives in his/her theory. Otherwise, the theoretician 
is perhaps a behavioralist, or a humanist, but not a devel-
opmentalist (Munn, 1965). On the other hand, the develop-
mentalist may tend to lean more to a phylogenetic or ontoge-
netic orientation. It is important, therefore, to be knowl-
edgeable of these distinctions upon studying the proponents 
of the developmental paradigm. 
Arnold Gesell, Jean Piaget, and Maria Montessori are 
three developmental theorists whose work has impacted edu-
cational practices in the United States. Across the nation 
efforts are made to actualize the ideals of these develop-
mentalists in public and private school settings, early 
childhood philosophies, and state and local policies; par-
ticularly, these developmentalists are looked to where poli-
cies on grade placement and retention are concerned. After 
discusing the application of these developmentalists' thee-
ries in preschool settings, Goodlad, Klein and Novotney. 
(1973) state: 
Although forward-looking and well-conceived, then, 
the California report, like so many others, does 
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not quite come to grips with the vital question of 
what early education and schooling are for. The 
more the report gets into specifics, the more we 
see the seemingly inescapable academically ori-
ented activities of an early school p~eparing for 
a later school instead of activities designed with 
the goal of each child's discovering and expanding 
himself as a person (p. 155). 
The point is not that these theorists espouse the use of 
preschools to ready the child for subsequent grade place-
ments, but that the educational community tends to use the 
theories of Gesell, Piaget, and Montessori with such pur-
poses in mind. It is for this reason that a study of these 
theorists' beliefs should be undertaken. An investigation 
of what each of these individuals espouse, as opposed to how 
their theories are used, is warranted. 
Arnold Gesell, Jean Piaget, and Maria Montessori were 
each a scientist in his/her own right, and each has made a 
substantial contribution to developmental thought. For this 
reason, the three theorists are presented individually in 
hopes that the reader will become acquainted with both the 
scientific and the developmental implications of their 
respective theories. 
Gesell: A Developmental Leader 
Arnold Gesell's acclaim as being a founding leader of 
child development research in the United States is reaf-
firmed by Crain (1985). After receiving his Ph.D. in psy-
chology, Gesell embarked upon his career so painstakingly 
that, at the age of thirty, he returned to graduate school 
to receive a medical degree. 
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According to Crain, Gesell is known for having "· .. 
developed one of the first tests of infant intelligence 
. and was one of the first researchers to make exten-
sive use of film observations" (p. 15) . Before the publica-
tion of Spock's famous books in the early forties which 
dealt with the care of infants, Gesell was heralded as the 
nation's leading baby doctor. In fact, Crain notes that 
even Dr. Spock was influenced by Gesell's work. 
A Man of Science 
In his autobiography, Gesell (1968) notes that he stud-
ied at Clark University under the "genius" G. Stanley Hall 
"whose outlook embraced the total phylum, and lifted psy-
chology above the sterilities of excessive analysis and 
pedantry'' (p. 127). Gesell refers to Hall as "a naturalist 
Darwin of the mind" whose psychology influenced the direc-
tion that his own studies would take. 
Upon receiving his doctorate in medicine Gesell was 
awarded a full professorship in the graduate school of Yale. 
He concurrently accepted a position as a psychologist for 
the Connecticut State Board of Education to study actively 
the handicapped children in schools. During these years 
Gesell's interest in clinical child psychology heightened. 
Public attention came to Gesell when a publication on the 
preschool child met with wide acceptance. Gesell followed 
this with other such books. Recognition for these efforts 
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brought Gesell a series of grants which set his child stud-
ies research into motion. 
Gesell sought to analyze the morphology of development, 
how the organism functions as a whole. His research was an 
attempt to study the functions--the morphology--of organis-
mic development. Gesell blended his backgrounds of medicine 
and psychology to arrive at an understanding of how the 
organism, the child, evolves from birth to adulthood. From 
his affiliation with G. Stanley Hall, Gesell incorporated a 
strong phylogenetic perspective in his research undertak-
ings. 
Philosophy of Science 
As a progeny of Hall, and a proponent of Darwin, Gesell 
describes his scientific viewpoint as a theory of recapitu-
lation (Gesell and Gesell, 1912). Holding that human devel-
opment cannot be understood without going back to the begin-
ning of life, the Gesell's assert that "animals, in their 
individual unfoldment . . . recapitulate the phases of their 
phyletic or racial development" (p. 20). 
The Gesells track the evolution of man from the pri-
mordial sea with its complex substance (protoplasm) of 
molecules, through their changing forms (which resemble the 
amoeba of today), to the evolution of lizards, and then 
other animals. According to the Gesells, the process of 
evolution involves a multiplication of cells, along with a 
differentiation in cell structure and function. Differing 
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forms of a higher order occur as a result of "variation and 
mutation, through natural selection and through other means 
only poorlr known" (p. 33). 
The Gesells further explain how humans have evolved 
from lower animal life. The differing human parts, partic-
ularly the muscle system, are likely to have originated in 
some type of worm. Similarly, the human shoulders and 
thighs appear to be derivatives of the fish species. The 
arboreal mammals furnished the beginnings of human arms and 
legs. Finally, Gesell and his wife propose that in ancient 
times, the central portions of the human body were all that 
existed. More recent periods of history, however, brought 
about the peripheral features (i.e., the arms and legs). 
The Gesells hold that the nervous system evolved on an 
"installment plan, from fundamental to accessory" (p. 42). 
In sum, Gesell's philosophy of science implies that 
development encompasses a sequential building on of cells, 
tissues, organs, body parts--capacities. Nature appears to 
organize itself for the purpose of attaining a higher level 
of intelligence. An implicit notion of linearity regarding 
how living things evolve to a higher order is conveyed in 
Gesell's theorizing. 
Developmental Theory 
According to Gesell {1945), morphology as a study is 
concerned with the form and structure of an organism as a 
whole. Embryology is the study of genesis (beginnings) and 
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form. Gesell's goal is to combine these perspectives to 
study the life cycle. 
By starting with the point of conception and following 
the organism on through its stages of development the sched-
ule or "patterning process" of the life cycle can be under-
stood. According to Gesell, the genes lay down the ground 
plan which provides them the "capacity to propagate them-
selves and to reorganize surrounding molecules"· (p. 93). 
From this embryological state, the fetal scale of develop-
ment emerges to set the life cycle in motion. 
Gesell and Ilg (1946) propose that the life cycle can 
be characterized by stages which denote the changes that 
occur from time to time in the human's development. To 
describe these changes, the authors have identified "growth 
gradients" which embrace "some seventeen age levels, and ten 
major fields of behavior" (p. 2). Herein growth is defined 
as: "· .. a concrete process which produces patterns of 
behavior" (p. 4). The growth gradients thus depict the 
child's maturation as his/her behavioral patterns change in 
character. 
The authors add that the "maturity traits" are meant to 
represent typical behaviors which tend to occur at particu-
lar age listings. In this way, an observer should be able 
to derive some inclination of the child's behavior in 
relation to his/her expected maturity level. The charts are 
intended to impart to parents and educators the trends that 
are common in a child's development. Therefore Gesell and 
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Ilg propose: "We should be mainly concerned with the posi-
tion of a child in a forward moving cycle" (p. 5). 
The Development of Cognition 
According to Gesell and Ilg (1946), the child cannot be 
defined by the distinct parts of his/her structure. The 
child is, after all: " .. bound up with his nervous sys-
tem, and indeed with his entire organism" (p. 19). There-
fore, the mind should not be viewed as a separate entity. 
It is the nervous system which makes the child a sin-
gular unit. The mind grows and develops as part of that 
vast network of sensory, motor and associative neurons. The 
authors suggest that: "The mind grows because the tissue 
grows" (p. 19), and the neurons also are empowered to grow. 
In fact, the neurons multiply at an unfathomable rate in 
even the embryonic and fetal periods "when the foundations 
of behavior are laid." A five-month old fetus may have 
twelve billion or more nerve cells which will continue to 
multiply throughout his/her cycles of development. 
Intelligence, then, is a function of growth. Gesell 
and Ilg contend that the mind functionally consists of 
"propensities and patterns of behavior" (p. 20) which are 
only apparent through the child's external behavior pat-
terns. Moreover, the patterns of thought are "lawfully 
related to each other" in such a way that an analogy can be 
drawn between the vast networks of the mind and a cloth 
richly woven in threads. However, the organic fabric--the 
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mind--has the capacity to grow, and it creates new patterns 
as it grows. On the matter of learning, Gesell and Ilg sug-
gest: 
Parents and teachers who think that a child is so 
plastic that he can be made over by strenuous out-
side pressure, have failed to grasp the true na-
ture of the mind. The mind may be likened to a 
plant, but not to clay. For clay does not grow. 
Clay is moulded entirely from without .. A plant 
is primarily moulded from within through the 
forces of growth (p. 20). 
The growth gradients can be used by parents and teachers so 
that the unfolding of a child's development might be ascer-
tained. 
Because Gesell and Ilg adhere to the phylogenetic view 
of development, it is their contention that one's develop-
ment of cognition is innately predetermined. As a conse-
quence, the characteristics listed on the growth gradients 
are based on the assumption that cognitive development is an 
inherent aspect of the child's nature. 
One then might ask: If the child's actions stem from 
his/her innate nature, how is that behavior affected by the 
culture? Gesell and Ilg contend that the child's nature is 
maintained in his/her acculturation as the child partici-
pates through a process of "self-projectiveness" which 
enables the child to incidentally suggest his/her own 
uniqueness while assimilating the culture. 
The authors suggest that acculturation is the universal 
task of the school. The teacher's task is to "induct" the 
child into society's heritage through schooling. However, 
the induction cannot be socially transmitted; rather, it 
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"must be lived into" (p. ·375) by the child. The real task, 
then, is for the educator to consider the psychological and 
growth needs which arise in the child's progression through 
the growth gradients. The curriculum can, according to 
these authors, facilitate healthy development for the child 
by being footed on the assumption that the "mechanisms of 
development • . • do not change; and the child remains true 
to his own unique patterns of growth and of adaptation" 
(p. 23). 
Implications for Schooling 
The colleagues and followers of Gesell at the Gesell 
Institute of Child Development, particularly Frances L. Ilg 
and Louise Bates Ames, believe that school success has more 
to do with the child's readiness to grasp the teaching than 
with the standards per se. Ames, Gillespie, and Streff 
(1972) contend that the school cannot bear the total respon-
sibility for the child's failure or success because "the 
answer more often than not lies in the organism, not in the 
environment" (p. 82). However, it is acknowledged by these 
authors that the school does have its influence over the 
child. For this reason Ames et al. suggest that the child 
be protected from harmful influences through careful consid-
eration of his/her grade placement. Ilg, Ames, and Baker 
(1981) explicate the Gesellian philosophy even further: 
It is the Gesell Institute position that at least 
half of the school failures now experienced in the 
early grades could be prevented or cured if chil-
dren started school only when they were fully 
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ready. We recommend starting all children in 
school, and subsequently promoting them, on the 
basis of their behavior age rather than their 
birthday (chronological) age or their level of in-
telligence (p. 237). 
The rationale which supports this position is presented be-
low. 
Physical Structure. The build of the child's body has 
much to do with the way he/she interacts with the world. 
Ilg et al. (1981) propose that even when children "grow up 
in the same environment" (p. 3), the differences in the 
structural builds affects each child's personality. A child 
may have deep-seated feelings about his/her physical appear-
ance for this is the "raw material out of which personality 
is formed" (p. 49) • 
An aspect related to one's physical structure is one's 
size. In school the size of a child may be a positive or 
negative factor, depending upon how the child's size com-
pares to his/her classmates. Ames (1967) asserts that not 
all children of a particular physiological age (size) match 
the level that is associated by the same chronological age. 
Because physical size is not a dependable measure of the 
child's maturational age, "a careful behavior examination to 
see just where he is behaving" (p. 43) is in order. 
Diagnosis. It is the policy at the ~esell Institute to 
diagnose every child so that a determination of his/her 
readiness to enter school can be made. Ames (1967) con-
tends: "Such an examination would indicate whether or not 
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he is ready for the work of the grade to which his legal age 
assigns him" (p. 11) . Two specific reasons are explicated 
for the evaluation in Ames et al. (1972): "(1) it is easily 
accomplished; (2) when it comes at the beginning of the 
school career it can, if made in time, prevent the school 
failure that might occur without it" (p. 13). It is added 
by the authors that intelligence testing, the I.Q. quotient, 
be included in the evaluation although it does not serve as 
the primary criterion for basing a placement determination. 
Ames et al. propose that when "planning for any child's 
school experience, one of the most useful measures we have 
is that child's intelligence quotient" (p. 207). 
Ilg et al. (1981) express that the intelligence aspect 
should not influence the diagnostician to prescribe cures. 
The biological reality is such that careful attention to 
specific factors may cause the educator to ignore "the rest 
of the web" (p. 333). Nonetheless, these authors propose 
that "individual behaviors develop predictably" (p. vii). 
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If that is the case, then the Gesell diagnosticians, at 
least implicitly, predict the child's future performance 
because empirical data are obtained for determining appro-
priate grade placement. These prescriptions are based upon 
the criteria for maturation described in Gesell's growth 
gradients, or stages. 
The Gesellian Stages. Ilg et al. state that the stages 
of development are like steps. They note that children 
develop in remarkably similar ways. The steps are "pretty 
much the same for everybody" and, to "get to the top, the 
child has to climb all the steps" (p. 4). 
It is explained by the authors that development pro-
ceeds in a line which spirals in an upward formation. The 
child shifts, as he/she matures, from alternate stages of 
equilibrium to disequilibrium. Though the stages of dise-
quilibrium cause the child to be somewhat difficult to live 
with (as his/her personality reveals signs of frustration 
and rebellion), these phases must be met in order for the 
child to grow. The following diagram of the stages is de-






6 1/2 years 
5 1/2 years 
5 years 
4 1/2 years 
4 years 
3 1/2 years 
3 years 
2 1/2 years 
2 years 
18 months 
Figure 1. Gesellian Stages 
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Ilg et al. suggest that the parent and the educator 
attend to "the order in which these stages follow each 
other," for they hold that this line of order is "far more 
important than exact age at which any certain child reaches 
any one of these stages" (p. 15). Moreover, to prevent 
further setbacks in the child's development the authors 
propose that the parent and educator: "Know what to expect 
from your child at each stage of development and match your 
expectations to his or her skills" (p. 330). 
Grade Placement or Retention. In her book, Is Your 
Child in the WRONG Grade?, Ames (1967) reports findings from 
the Gesell Institute which support holding back, retaining, 
the immature child. She proposes that a "tremendous amount 
of overplacement" occurs in the schools of today. Further-
more, "nearly all of the children brought to us because of 
school problems were overplaced . placed in a grade 
above that which their maturity level suited them for" 
(p. 5) • 
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Ames asserts that age alone is not a sufficient crite-
rion for predicting a child's performance at school. More-
over, repeating a grade can offer the unsuccessful child 
hope for a brighter school future. In fact, Ames' research 
suggests that for those children who were retained, "almost 
without exception" their school performance was 
"conspicuously improved." She adds that retaining the child 
"is no magic formula which will cure everything" (p. 30), 
but if the child's intelligence is not lacking, retention 
"can lighten the load" (p. 31). Specifically, if the 
child's poor performance is due to a lack of maturity, or 
readiness, "repeating will in most cases work wonders" 
(p. 31). 
Social promotion, on the other hand, is strongly 
opposed by Ames. She views social promotion to be an unwar-
ranted decision which is used in the schools to keep from 
hurting children's feelings. The Gesell Institute finds 
this to be a senseless and even harmful practice. Ames 
expresses: "social promotion is like staying away from the 
doctor and pretending you are not ill in a case of serious 
illness. . If unready for promotion, a child needs to be 
kept back" (p. 124). 
In support of this position, Ames et al. (1972) 
acknowledge that some psychologists propose that grade 
retention is psychologically damaging to the child; that the 
emotional damage of the retention would do the child more 
harm than the educational opportunity would afford him/her 
in repeating the grade. The authors argue that "new 
research evidence . . . put repeating in favor in an 
increasing number of schools" (p. 69). The research of the 
Gesell Institute finds that "nearly every child who is in 
serious trouble in school is overplaced" (p. 33), and for 
the child, living in such a threatening and frustrating 
environment is far more harmful than experiencing a degree 
of embarrassment over being held back. Any negative 
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feelings that might initially be present are soon displaced 
by the relief that an appropriate placement promises. 
Finally, even the Gesell Institute researchers of the 
1980s uphold the position that favors grade placement and 
retention. Ilg et al. (1981) again recall the older psy-
chological perspective which cautions educators about the 
harmful effects of grade repetition. The authors maintain 
however, that "such fears are largely groundless." They add 
that, assuming immaturity is the problem, in "nearly every 
instance •.. repeating does bring success" (p. 240). 
It can be surmised that the Gesellian program supports 
having a child wait until he/she is developmentally ready to 
step into the academic arena that society establishes as 
schooling. Should the child emerge on to that scene before 
his/her innate capabilities have evolved (matured), then re-
peating the grade is the prescribed solution. 
Patterns and Predictions. The current researchers at 
the Gesell Institute of Child Development contend that de-
velopment occurs in the human in clearly predictable ways. 
As a result, "early tests are predictive" (Ames et al., 
1972, p. 185). These authors assert that: II our own 
research shows great stability in test scores from the very 
earliest ages on." 
Among other things, the Gesell findings support the 
contention that girls mature faster than boys. Therefore, 
Ames (1967) submits "that it's an unusual boy who is ready 
for first grade before he is fully six" (p. 10). However, 
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an explanation for the phenomenon cannot be found. Science 
has not discovered whether the cause is physical or cul-
tural. Nonetheless, by virtue of the grade classification 
scheme, a young boy is expected to be able to compete with 
his female counterpart in school performance. 
Ames et al. (1972) add that the ratio of boys to girls 
seen at the Gesell Institute for problems related to 
immaturity is 5:1 in favor of the boys. The authors blame 
this dilemma on the school for setting an arbitrary entrance 
age which has no regard for the developmental-gender differ-
ences. The significant point is, however, that this problem 
is predictable, and it can be greatly remedied by raising 
the entrance age for boys by one year. 
Aside from the pattern of boys lagging behind girls in 
their early development, Ilg et al. (1981) note the exis-
tence of other peculiarities which can be predicted. There 
are, in the progressive line of "'improvement' in behavior" 
(p. 6), fluctuations which interrupt the steady flow of 
development with setbacks. As a result, development "does 
not go forward consistently." In describing the advantages 
and disadvantages of each level, the authors submit: 
Fortunately, all of these changes do not occur 
simply at random. Rather, they take place in a 
lawful and patterned way (p. 7). 
It appears that the better and worse behaviors unfold in 
alternate stages "in a fairly lawful sequence." 
A fluctuation to the difficult types of behavior indi-
cates that a child has reached a stage of disequilibrium. 
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While the better behaviors which can be found in the stages 
of equilibrium are preferable to parents.and teachers alike, 
the authors encourage the adults to have patience for "the 
child seems to grow through these opposite extremes. One 
kind of behavior appears to be as necessary to growth as the 
other" (p. 9) • 
The importance of these fluctuations in understanding 
Gesell's developmental theory can be found in the following 
statements: 1) a fluctuation is vital to one's growth, and 
2) the fluctuations occur in a "lawful sequence." There-
fore, it is these two assumptions which predicate Gesell's 
developmental theory. 
Development is the progression of behaviors which occur 
in an ordered pattern of stages. As the child moves up-
wardly through the stages, his/her growth requires that 
he/she alternately shift from equilibrium to disequilibrium 
in a sequential, nonvariant way. According to Ilg et al., 
(1981), this process is not only patterned, but it is also 
highly predictable. Thus the Gesellian position on 
development as an ordered phenomenon of nature is 
articulated. Ilg et al. assert: 
Clearly our basic thesis remains the same. We 
continue to affirm that behavior is a function of 
structure. People behave as they do to a large 
extent because of the way their bodies are built. 
And behavior to a large extent develops in a pat-
terned, predictable way. Not only do individual 
behaviors develop predictably, but the ages them-
selves have their own patterned, predictable char-
acteristics (p. vii). 
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Conclusion 
Gesell and his colleagues suggest that because devel-
opment is primarily phylogenetic, the educator's role is to 
allow the child's inherent tendencies to unfold. Because 
society's grade level constraints interfere with the natural 
order of development, the Gesellian theorists propose that 
the child be placed in a setting that is non-antagonistic to 
his/her developmental level. Grade placements and reten-
tions are deemed to off er viable solutions to the unnatural 
conditions which are imposed upon children by the organiza-
tional structure of schooling. 
A further note of importance rests in the fact that 
because development is primarily phylogenetic, it proceeds 
in essentially the same manner for all, even though rates of 
development might differ. For this reason, growth can be 
predicted. Similarly, the same curricula; that is, pro-
grams, teaching, materials, and the like, should be appli-
cable for all who share in these natural stages of develop-
ment. 
However, not all developmentalists lean so strongly 
toward phylogenesis. swiss psychologist Jean Piaget offers 
a somewhat different perspective on the nature of human de-
velopment. 
Piaget: A Developmental Leader 
Jean Piaget is often lauded as the authority on cogni-
tive psychology. Phillips (1975) attributes Piaget and his 
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associates as having accumulated, since 1927, the largest 
body of "factual and theoretical observations extant today" 
(p. 3). Greenspan (1979) declares that: "Piaget's cogni-
tive developmental psychology has given us our most complete 
model for understanding the unfolding of human intellect" 
(p. 1). And Brennan (1982) concurs, noting that Piaget's 
influence has rivaled even the reputation of Freud "in terms 
of individual contributions to psychology during this cen-
tury" (p. 326). 
Cognitive psychology is described by Phillips as being 
a field concerned with structure over content, "with how the 
mind works rather than with what it does" (p. 6). Since the 
brain's functions can never be known in a confirmed or true 
sense, cognitive psychology seeks to infer the central pro-
cesses which are organized by the brain. According to 
Zwingmann (1976), the human is distinguishable from the ani-
mal as a higher form of life because of the capacity for 
abstract reasoning which is available to the human being. 
The human can use "complex symbolic processes" to 
communicate knowledge. Therefore Zwingmann declares: "What 
is called 'humanity' and progress is to a large degree a 
measure of his consciousness and the development of his 
creative potentials" (p. vii). 
Piaget has sought to understand how it is that the 
human is able to think abstractly. Brennan states that 
Piaget's studies have "shaped the direction of developmental 
research," making him the "dominant figure in this field" 
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(p. 326). But prior to attaining such approbation in the 
field, Piaget was first, and foremost, a man of science. 
A Man of Science 
In his autobiography, Piaget (1968) attributes his 
critical mind of scientific thinking to the influence of his 
father who "taught (young Piaget) the value of systematic 
work, even in small matters" (p. 237). In contrast, 
Piaget's mother had a "neurotic temperament" (p. 238) which 
created for all in the family a troubled home life. 
To escape the pain that his mother's imaginings brought 
on the rest of the family, Piaget "started to forego playing 
for serious work very early." Additionally, he sought to 
emulate his father's critical mind and quest for truth. For 
Piaget, science opened up new possibilities. 
Upon seeing an albino sparrow in the park, ten-year-old 
Piaget wrote a "one-page article" which he then sent to Paul 
Godet, director of the nearby museum. Godet invited the lad 
to spend two hours a week at the museum learning about 
"land-and-soft-water shells." This led to a four-year 
tutorage in which Godet taught Piaget to classify hundreds 
of mollusks. By the time Godet died (at the end of their 
fourth year together), Piaget had come to know: 
. . . enough about this field to begin publishing 
without help (specialists in this branch are rare) 
a series of articles on the mollusks of Switzer-
land, of Savoy, of Brittany and even of Colombia 
(pp • 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 ) . 
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Amazingly, foreign colleagues of the field wanted to 
meet this expert on mollusks who had been publishing in the 
major journals,.not knowing that the scientist was only a 
schoolboy in his early teens. Concerning the attention that 
he received at the time, Piaget confesses that the writings 
were "far from being accomplished feats" (p. 239). He 
acknowledges that it was not until 1929 that his writings on 
the mollusks offered legitimate contributions to the field 
of biology. 
In sum, Piaget's quest for scientific thinking devel-
oped from early roots. The young Piaget was found to be: 
1) emulating his father's example of scientific reasoning, 
2) seeking an alternative mode of behavior to his mother's 
irrationality, and 3) serving as an apprentice to Director 
Paul Godet at the Musee d'histoire naturelle. These condi-
tions predisposed Piaget to become a man of science. 
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Though Piaget received a doctorate "with a thesis on 
the mollusks of Valais", his interests probed into the realm 
of psychology. Piaget sought to understand the rela-
tionships inherent in "the problem of the whole and the 
parts" (p. 243). Formulating a theoretical system related 
to the problem, Piaget integrated his knowledge of science 
into his beliefs about human development. In reference to 
this integration of zoology-biology with psychology, Piaget 
notes: "I never believed in a system without precise exper-
imental control" (p. 243). Subsequent work at the Binet 
laboratory in Paris enabled Piaget to initiate this scien-
tific inquiry concerning the nature and origin of the human 
intellect. 
Philosophy of Science 
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Piaget (1977) asserts that the general forms of knowl-
edge must be in agreement across the scientific fields if 
they are to be knowledge at all. Above all, knowledge is 
"constructed and acquired by a continuous and laborious 
effort" (p. 31). As knowledge is constructed, its approxi-
mations are passed down through the ages to be revised by 
subsequent scientists who also use "deductive construction" 
(p. 36). Specifically, Piaget asserts that a field is his-
torically developed through a succession of stages. In each 
distinct stage a new body of knowledge is constructed by the 
scientists who elaborate on findings of the past. Just as a 
field of study is constructed through historic stages, a 
human is developed through stages which also involve active 
construction: The subject (human) reconstructs an object 
(the world) via cognitive processes (i.e., adaptation and 
organization). 
Piaget (198la) illustrates how the broad fields of 
mathematics evolved through a succession of stages. Accord-
ing to Piaget, the first period of mathematics is marked by 
the works of the ancient Egyptians and the Greeks. The 
early Egyptians had only empirical forms of mathematics to 
meet their surveying needs. Higher mathematics were 
unavailable to the Egyptians because they had no conscious 
awareness of how their computations were conceived. 
At the same time, the Greeks also had no understanding 
of the underpinning concepts that founded their mathematics. 
Even when Euclid developed geometric figures which provided 
"ways of describing real figures," the early Greeks would 
not allow any mathematics which "touched algebra" into the 
field. This was because they viewed algebra as "· .. just 
some sort of recipe dealing with a subject's reasoning; it 
was not part of mathematics" (p. 227). Piaget suggests that 
this limited perspective caused the first era of mathema-
tics, Euclidean geometry, to fall at the end of the 
Alexandrian Period. Creativity wore out because of "the 
absence of any cognizance or any conscious awareness of 
one's own activity in mathematics" (p. 227). 
In the second period, the human became conscious of 
having an active role in mathematics, largely as a result of 
Descartes' introduction of algebra. Descartes had been able 
to outline the algebraic operations in such a way as to 
"make a general statement that brings together what is com-
mon in the two fields of algebra and geometry" (p. 227). 
Thus there was a kind of building on as Descartes drew from 
Euclid's discovery to construct a new and higher level of 
mathematics. Newton then generalized the operations "to 
infinity" through his taking the algebra even higher to 
calculus. 
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Piaget notes how the succession illustrates that the 
field of mathematics began from a physical knowledge of per-
ceiving and doing, to an operational mode of progressed 
thought. At last mathematicians were becoming conscious of 
the conceptual processes. Piaget submits that "these were 
all examples of becoming consciously aware of the operations 
that are involved in doing mathematics" (p. 227), but the 
mathematicians of that period "were still not aware of the 
structures." The mathematicians viewed each operation as "a 
free product" of the will. Piaget adds: "They were not yet 
aware that operations were tied to one another in structured 
groups" (p. 227) . 
Pointing to the third and present era of mathematics, 
Piaget heralds the works of nineteenth century Galois whose 
mathematics introduced the field to group structures and 
lattices. Through the group structures mathematicians are 
now able to see the interrelatedness of the knowledge they 
construct. Piaget sees this as a major breakthrough in the 
development of mathematics. 
The evolution of mathematics through the ages is anal-
ogous, according to Piaget, to how knowledge evolves in the 
human from a construction of knowledge about physical 
objects to abstractions which can be highly complex. The 
development of these processes for the human is described 
below. 
According to Piaget (1981a), human development begins 
with a kind of physical knowledge in which the infant 
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utilizes sensory-motor capacities to come to understand the 
world. Cognition gradually develops to the degree that 
complex processes of abstract reasoning become available. 
The first stage exhibits an infant being totally unaware of 
his/her own role in the constructive processes; the same 
holds true with the early mathematician. In the second 
stage, the child (and the mathematician) begins to conceive 
of his/her role, but only in relation to discovering that 
role in the operations. Concrete objects are necessary to 
make this awareness complete. Finally, the third stage 
enables the child--and the mathematician--to put the 
operations "together into structures" (p. 227) of abstract 
reasoning. At this level, both the child, and the mathe-
matician, have reached the stage of formal operations. 
Piaget concludes by proposing that each stage requires 
a reflection upon the knowledge that was discovered in the 
past. Without some kind of building on, new knowledge would 
be impossible. Therefore, Piaget (1981a) proposes that 
progress was made because the individuals used "reflexive 
abstraction--on the advances that had been made at the pre-
vious stage" (p. 228). 
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Through this analogy, Piaget applies his belief about 
the logic of scientific reasoning to his theory of human 
development. For either the development of a broad field of 
study, or the human, it is the growth of logic that Piaget 
emphasizes. The premise for this theory, the development 
of cognitive structures through stages, is presented as 
Piaget (1981a) promulgates: 
The development of intelligence is a continuous 
creation. Each stage in the development produces 
something radically new, totally different from 
what was there before. And the whole development 
is characterized by these appearances of totally 
new structures (p. 223). 
In sum, Piaget suggests that there is a universal 
nature about the way things happen; that is, whether it be 
the growth of logic evolving over centuries for the con-
struction of a field such as mathematics, or the growth of 
logic within an individual being, the process is the same. 
Because Piaget views nature in accordance with this princi-
ple of construction, he postulates with colleague Barbel 
Inhelder the rationale that guides their scientific pur-
suits. Piaget and Inhelder (1976) state: 
We maintain . . . that it is one of the duties of 
psychology to try and find the links between be-
havior and organic life in general and those be-
tween man's cognitive development and his impor-
tant scientific creations (p. 35). 
This section has focused on the scientific implications of 
Piaget's philosophy regarding the development of knowledge. 
In the following part Piaget's theory is discussed in the 
context of human development. 
Developmental Theory 
Piaget's developmental theory rests on the assumption 
that intelligence is neither innate, nor is it hereditary. 
To Piaget (198la), inherited traits do not necessarily man-
ifest themselves at birth. He notes that "· .. there is 
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always a fixed time scale to maturational development." For 
example, puberty comes at a relatively confined period of 
time in the human's life. But "in the development of intel-
lectual stages there are very great variations" (p. 224). 
Piaget notes that great differences have been found in 
the studies his colleagues have conducted throughout the 
world among individuals' varying rates of development. 
These findings indicate that cultural and environmental cir-
cumstances have much to do with both the rate and the ulti-
mate level of one's intellectual growth. Maturation and 
innate tendencies have little to do with the development of 
logic. Hence, for Piaget, human development is not a pro-
cess of phylogenesis, or natural unfolding. Piaget (1981a), 
states that: 
. . . the structures are not preformed, for it is 
not just a matter of unfolding according to an in-
ternal clock. There really is a construction for 
each individual, for it is a matter of his cre-
ation of something new (p. 224). 
Knowledge is thus acquired through action. It is a 
matter of individual construction. Furth (1981) notes that 
Piaget's concept of action "is not limited to external 
action," for it is also an "internal structure" that "leads 
to a structuring of the environment" (p. 291). 
This developmental theory based on construction pro-
vides for the identification of one's development through 
stage classifications. In Piaget and Inhelder (1971), the 
authors insist that: 1) "the operations of intelligence" 
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take the individual through "clearly defined stages" and 2) 
''the process is entirely autonomous" (p. 356) . 
Inherent in Piaget's stage theory are the properties of 
logic and linearity, both of which stem from his adherence 
to the scientific method. The aspect of logic is derived 
from Piaget's assumption of formality. As one logically 
employs inductive and deductive reasoning in the construc-
tive processes, the development of formal operations can be 
realized. Linearity describes the sequential framework of 
the stages which, according to Piaget, must be met in an 
ordinal, nonvariant fashion. 
The logical (formal) and linear (sequential) features 
of Piaget's (1981b) stage theory are presented below in a 
biological context. Here Piaget contends that: "· .. these 
structures have essentially a biological meaning, in the 
sense that the order of the stages is constant and sequen-
tial. Each stage is necessary for the following one'' 
(p. 205). Piaget adds, however, that children vary in the 
ages at which they reach particular stages. Thus chrono-
logical age does not necessarily match one's developmental 
level. Furthermore, in some cultures the stages are accel-
erated whereas in others they are more or less systemati-
cally retarded. Development is thus not a maturation of the 
nervous system as Gesell would suggest, but a process of 
interacting with one's environment. Piaget reiterates: "The 
order, however, remains constant" (p. 205). 
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In sum, the ultimate level of development cannot be 
predetermined on an individual basis, but the manner by 
which one proceeds through the stages can. It can thus be 
surmised that Piaget offers a linear, ordered, and certain--
predetermined--route to development, at least in the context 
of his stage theory. 
The Theory of Equilibration. According to Furth 
(1981), the theory of equilibration is the most significant 
of all of Piaget's concepts. Borrowed from biology, the 
word implies a "deep functional continuity . . . between 
organic and rational life" (p. 253). It took Piaget fifty 
years in the refinement of his theory to complete this 
theory. According to Furth, Piaget's equilibration has a 
fundamental equivalence to Newton's theory of a self-
regulated system. Thus Furth suggests: 
. . . the role of equilibration for the develop-
ment of knowledge is comparable to the theory of 
mutual attraction of physical masses with which 
Newton established the movements of the planets as 
a self-regulated system and eliminated the need to 
look for external causes. Similarly, if Piaget's 
concept of equilibration is adequately designed, 
many puzzling questions about the 'causes' of de-
velopment should simply fall by the wayside. In 
short, equilibration is described as the self-
regulation of human knowing. It regulates the 
network of cognitive 'cycles' and keeps them in 
more or less permanent balance (equilibrium) 
(pp. 2 5 3 - 2 5 4 ) . 
In sum, the equilibration theory is an explanatory 
principle that governs Piaget's entire theory. It suggests 
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that human development is as precise as the earth's rotation 
around the sun. Just as it can be predicted that the sun 
will rise and set each day, so can it be predicted that 
human will construct knowledge through processes of adapta-
tion as they pr9ceed through stages of development. For 
according to Furth, the theory of equilibration "regulates 
the networks of cognitive 'cycles'" and provides for a bal-
ance in the system through its intermittent occurrences of 
equilibrium. 
Piaget (1981c) describes equilibration in terms of 
three factors: 1) the physical environment (which involves 
both physical and logical knowledge), 2) innateness (which 
includes one's hereditary program), and 3) social knowledge 
(which includes social transmission). 
The physical environment is constructed through the 
adaptive processes of assimilation and accommodation. Adap-
tation is the combined processes of assimilating and accom-
modating for the structuring of cognitive schemes. (One 
uses the functions of adaptation when thinking about 
things.) Phillips notes that a scheme is a "kind of mini-
system; it is that property of action which can be general-
ized to other contents" (p. 11). Organization, the other 
primary function, occurs when one thinks about his/her 
thoughts. 
It is through the adaptive processes of assimilation 
and accommodation that one constructs knowledge from the 
physical environment. At the same time that one is assimi-
lating, taking in new information, the person's schemes 
are being accommodated, or modified, to fit the special 
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characteristics of that which is being assimilated. Piaget 
contends that assimilation involves integration. Until the 
age of about nine, a child's system of structuration does 
not allow him/her to fully utilize the complexity of assim-
ilation, which is an active, not passive, act of construe-
tion. 
Upon constructing knowledge of things or objects in the 
physical environment, Piaget proposes that information is 
not drawn from the objects themselves. Rather, knowledge is 
gleaned from the person's actions on the objects. This is 
logico-mathematical experience. It involves a coordination 
of the person's actions (operations) and his/her own 
thoughts about those actions. 
In regard to Piaget's (198lc) second concern for the 
biological-hereditary aspect of the equilibration theory, he 
holds that innateness, or heredity, is not an important part 
of development "since it is variable and it cannot lead to 
the kind of necessity"that we feel" (p. 216). It is self-
regulation that enables us to develop. Both our conduct and 
our logical operational thinking are self-regulated. The 
entire system of regulation is fundamentally that of equili-
bration. 
The third aspect of equilibration, the social factor, 
appears in language and education. However, both are sub-
ordinated to assimilating. Piaget (1981c) contends: 
There can be no effect of social or linguistic ex-
perience unless the child is ready to assimilate 
and integrate this experience into his own struc-
tures (p. 216). 
On Social Development and Affect. The social aspect of 
a child's life is noted in Piaget (1928). Here Piaget in-
troduces the child's use of transductive reasoning. When 
the child thinks transductively, his/her assimilations 
deform the objectivity of things perceived. This is because 
the child is ego-centric, and can only perceive the world 
from his/her own point of view. However, as the 
"antagonistic characters of assimilation and imitation" 
(which distort reality to the child's ego-centric view) are 
removed, the child can both assimilate and imitate as 
"mutually dependent processes" (p. 180). 
The mutual dependencies of the child's cognitive pro-
cesses are analogous with Piaget's earlier description of 
equilibrium as movement in flux. Reciprocity is the ability 
to perceive from both perspectives; the other person's and 
one's own point of view. The notions of circularity and 
reversibility are implied. Equilibrium occurs for the child 
when his reasoning can float reciprocally between the two 
points of view. 
As the child leaves transductivity--reasoning from par-
ticular to particular and not seeing the universal--a 
reciprocity of relations can be developed. Piaget's concern 
is not with the relationship per se (e.g., the child's rela-
tion to a peer); rather, it is the child's intellectual 
capacity to think about his/her relation to others that is 
important to Piaget's theory. 
58 
The assumption is that once the child can overcome 
his/her transductive (ego-centric) reasoning in regard to 
others, and come to view them with the logic of reciprocity 
of relations, then the child can have access to relations 
that exist in equilibrium and harmony, as opposed to dis-
equilibrium and disharmony. The focal point, then, is on 
the child's capacity to think about relations in a recipro-
cal, nonego-centric way. 
As reciprocity develops, and assimilation and imitation 
become mutually dependent, social relations are enhanced. 
Furthermore, as social relations attain more reciprocity, 
transductivity diminishes and the capacity for logical 
thinking increases. Piaget (1928) proposes: 
Social life therefore helps to make our mental 
processes reversible, and in this way prepares the 
path for logical reasoning (p. 180). 
Social development is critical to the growth of logic. 
The road that leads to logical thought requires that 
the child overcome the obstacles of: 1) transductivity 
(being conscious of only one's own point of view), and 2) 
pseudo-deduction (the assumption that one's own conception 
of reality is true). To these important concerns, Piaget 
submits: "The essence of thought is the attempt to make 
reality itself reversible" (p. 189). Furthermore, Piaget 
contends that when the child becomes able to detach him/her 
self from his/her own beliefs and "enter into any foreign 
point of view" (p. 72), he/she will be cognizant of the 
meaning of hypothesis. 
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The Bringuier Interview. In an interview with Jean-
Claude Bringuier (1980), Piaget was asked how he stood in 
regard to the affective level of development which certainly 
has a part in social relationships. Bringuier asked, "Now, 
your approach to the problem of human evolution and stages, 
is strictly from the point of view of intelligence, isn't 
it?" 
Piaget responded, "Yes." 
Then Bringuier asked, "You don't deal with the affec-
tive level at all?" 
Piaget stated, "Only because I'm not interested in it . 
. Because I want facts." 
Bringuier responded, "And you don't find facts at the 
level of affect?" 
Piaget answered, "The problem doesn't interest me as a 
scientific inquiry because it isn't a problem of knowledge 
·" (p. 49). 
To illustrate his position, Piaget went on to describe 
the differing affective natures of two boys regarding the 
learning of mathematics. One boy likes the arithmetic 
lessons so he forges on ahead. The other boy does not care 
for mathematics so he convinces himself that he does not 
understand and grows to develop an inferiority complex. 
Piaget noted: 
The first boy will learn more quickly, the second 
more slowly. But, for both, two and two are four. 
Affectivity doesn't modify the structure at all. 
If the problem at hand is the construction 
of structures, affectivity is essential as a 
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motivation, of course, but it doesn't explain the 
structures (p. 50) . 
Bringuier replied, "It's strange that affectivity 
doesn't appear at the level of structures, regardless! An 
individual is a whole" (p. 50). 
Piaget concluded this part of the discussion by 
explaining that his emphasis on development rests with the 
cognitive structuration of knowledge. Even feelings, to 
Piaget, are relative to cognition. In this way, Piaget's 
theory maintains a linear track; that is, development is not 
holistic or multi-faceted. Rather, it is singularly focused 
on the development of the intellect. Piaget closed the dis-
cussion with: 
... in the s~udy of feelings, when you find 
structures, they are structures of knowledge. For 
example, in feelings of mutual affection there's 
an element of comprehension and an element of per-
ception. That's all cognitive (p. 50). 
As previously stated, social development is intricately 
woven into Piaget's global theory of equilibration. The 
equilibration theory describes all of the human's systems 
for: 1) constructing knowledge from one's perceptions of the 
physical world, 2) regulating the biological/hereditary 
functions, and 3) assimilating the social context, all of 
which is founded on the principle of self-regulation. From 
the interview with Bringuier it can be seen, therefore, that 
to Piaget, social development is more a function of logic 
than it is of feeling, or affect. 
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Language Versus Logic. In Piaget (1981a) it is noted 
that one's social development occurs through the use of lan-
guage, and through one's education. In these ways the child 
encounters the experiences to outgrow transductivity and to 
develop reciprocity of relations, the ability to reason 
beyond one's own point of view. Piaget adds, however, that 
logic does not develop from language. Piaget (1981a) 
asserts: " . linguistic progress is not responsible for 
logical or operational progress. It is rather the other way 
around" (p. 217). 
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In other words, as one develops on to higher opera-
tional levels, the individual's language becomes more 
sophisticated. Thus logic precedes language; and as a con-
sequence, language is enhanced by the growth of logical 
thinking. 
Theory Summation. In sum, it is the development of 
logic which is central to Piaget's theory. The generaliza-
tion of equilibration is an attempt to describe how the 
individual continually constructs knowledge (advances in the 
development of logic) through processes of self-regulation. 
These are the processes of adaptation and organization. 
Piaget (1981c) refers to equilibration as the self-
regulation which exists in all levels of cognition from the 
most minute perception to the highest form of problem-
sol ving. It describes the means by which one can move from 
a pre-operational stage, through many occurrences of trial 
and error, to the concrete operational stage of development. 
Human development is to scientist (biologist) Jean 
Piaget all that encompasses equilibration. It is, according 
to Furth, the "episodic adjustment" between the processes of 
assimilation and accommodation "of the same scheme to the 
constantly changing contents to which it is applied" 
(p. 256). For as the human assimilates, objects and events 
of the world assume an inward direction which define the 
person as a knower of the world. At the same time, the 
person's accommodation assumes an outward direction which 
defines for the person the object or event to be known. 
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Knowledge, then, becomes a "relational concept" which 
relates the person to the world he/she encounters, whether 
that world be physical or social. Specifically, knowledge 
is "an interaction between innate intelligence and a given 
environment" (p. 256). It is "a constructive interaction" 
(p. 256) which incorporates: 1) the physical environment, 
2) innateness/heredity, and 3) the social context--
equilibration! 
Finally, the three factors of equilibration (cited 
above) enable the human to construct knowledge internally. 
Piaget refutes theories which suggest that knowledge rests 
within the objects and events that are external to the human 
and must be socially transmitted. Instead, Piaget suggests 
that knowledge evolves within the person the same way that 
the knowledge of a field of study (e.g., mathematics) is 
constructed and evolves down through the ages. 
Piaget (1981a) describes the stages that have led math-
ematics from the works of the early Egyptians to the mathe-
matics of today. He identifies the construction of the 
field in three primary stages: 1) the early Egyptians' sur-
veying, along with the Greeks' unconscious mathematical 
operations and Euclid's geometry; 2) Descartes' algebra 
heightened by Newton's calculus; and finally, 3) Galois' 
group structures and lattices. It is then pointed out by 
Piaget that the individual constructs knowledge in the same 
way that scientists have for centuries: through inductive-
deductive processes of logical reasoning; and from reflexive 
abstraction, thinking back on what has been done. According 
to Piaget, both the scientist and the child construct knowl-
edge through the processes of equilibration. 
Inherent in Piaget's theory is the linear progression 
of knowledge which occurs as one evolves through stages from 
a physical (perceptual) knowledge of the world, structured 
by imaginal schemas (Piaget, 1951), to the logical 
(operational) knowledge that is structured by action schemes 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). In regard to imaginal schemas, 
it should be noted that children's games are often symbolic 
representations of both conscious and unconscious 
"tendencies and feelings" (Piaget, 1951). A child may play 
with only one of two dolls and pretend that the smaller doll 
has gone away, leaving the larger doll to stay with "Mommy." 
Unknown to the child, the game may represent the child's 
jealousy of a baby brother/sister. Piaget (1951) asserts 
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that the "whole thought of the child" (p. 170) lies between 
unconscious and rational thought. For the young child there 
is no separation between the two. 
Imaginal schemas turn into action schemes as the child 
progresses from the preoperational stage to that of concrete 
operations. Piaget and Inhelder (1969) define a scheme as 
"the st~ucture or organization of actions as they are trans-
ferred or generalized by repetition in similar or analogous 
circumstances" (p. 4). As the child approaches the stage of 
concrete operations, he/she is directly relating to objects 
and classes of objects. Through trial and error the child 
"becomes capable of reasoning correctly about propositions 
he does not believe, or at least not yet ... " (p. 132). 
With the development of action schemes, the child can now 
construct knowledge as he/she acts upon objects through 
"hypothetico-deductive" processes. 
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In sum, the imaginal schemas of the preoperational 
child (who constructs knowledge from his/her perceptions of 
the physical world), become action schemes for the concrete 
operational child (who applies "logico-mathematical" opera-
tions to arrive at rational deductions from the objects or 
events which require problem-solving). Linearity becomes an 
inherent aspect of the theory in regard to the means by 
which the child moves from one stage to the next. Piaget 
(1981b) describes this process as both sequential and 
invariant. The theory further implies linearity as it 
focuses on the construction of knowledge that is logical and 
rational to the neglect of other aspects of development 
(i.e., social and affective). Piaget affirms this con-
tention in Bringuier (1980). 
Finally, Piaget (1981a) strongly opposes the 
phylogenetic theory of development, noting that the rela-
tively fixed time scale of maturation is far too limiting to 
account for the autonomous differences which encompass 
development. Rather than being a biological process of 
evolution (in the Darwinian sense), development is the con-
struction of knowledge (Piaget and Inhelder, 1971). 
Implications for Schooling 
Devries (1978) notes the difficulty that educators face 
as they attempt to translate Piaget's theory into a Piage-
tian curriculum. Two reasons that problems are encountered 
are: 1) Piaget does not espouse a theory of teaching, and 
2) his theory is dynamic in the sense that one aspect is 
meaningless without knowing how a particular aspect fits 
into the theory as a whole. Teachers are not always aware 
of the need for coming to know the broader implications of 
Piaget's theory and, as a result, their efforts at applica-
tion are often contradictory. Devries continues: 
Preoccupation with the stages has led to the 
preschool objective of moving children from the 
preoperational level to the stage of concrete 
operations (p. 76). 
When Piaget's entire work is reduced to a stage theory, the 
focus turns to a mastery of "scientific knowledge." 
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A second difficulty is in educators trying to reduce 
Piaget's theory to its "structural aspects" (p. 76). 
Whereas the stages depict the organizational format of how 
development occurs, they offer no information as to how one 
progresses from stage to stage. Piaget's purpose for dis-
cussing the stages is: "· .• to show that knowledge, espe-
cially logic, is not innate, but develops itself little by 
little" (p. 76). It took Piaget's construction theory to 
describe the dynamic processes and the "continuity between 
stages" (p. 77). 
Devries proposes that Piaget's overriding theme of con-
structivism is what educators tend to miss. Constructivism 
describes how operations develop through logico-mathematical 
structures. Here educators tend to try to get preopera-
tional children on to the concrete stage by making them 
"more logical on the tasks" used by Piaget in his research 
studies. Devries asserts: "· .• this application reduces 
the theory to the content of the tasks" (p. 77). She adds 
that while the task content can be taught, there is no guar-
antee that the child's structure of thought can be changed, 
for the development of logic is an internal process which 
cannot be externally imposed. 
Similarly, Kamii and Declark (1985) propose that teach-
ers who implement the Socratic method of dialogue to get 
children thinking about content may be successful at fueling 
the child's mind into wanting to know. However: 
People . . . are not the source of feedback for 
logico-mathematical knowledge. That source is 
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wholly internal to the child. It is the internal 
coherence of his system of thought that is the 
source of feedback in logico-mathematical knowl-
edge (p. 31). 
In other words, the only feedback that Piaget would support 
as being effective for learning is that which is internal to 
the child. As a result, trial and error practices are crit-
ical to cognitive growth. 
Reflective abstraction facilitates the child's devel-
opment of knowledge, but this again is internal. In reflec-
tive abstraction, a child will think back over the wholes 
and the parts of the concepts (relationships) which he/she 
has previously observed. (This need not happen on the same 
day. A time lapse is possible.) As the child reflects back 
on the situation, he/she coordinates his/her thoughts with 
the relationships and organizes them into hierarchies until 
he/she is "able to say with the force of logical necessity" 
(p. 32) what the resolution should be. 
The authors add that it is possible to facilitate this 
process with an exchange of viewpoints so long as the 
attempt to transmit the information socially to the child is 
not made. The only viable route to knowledge is through 
internal construction; therefore, offering feedback to a 
child through the format of red-marking the incorrect 
answers on a paper is an effort in futility. 
Because Kamii and Declark see the futility in attempt-
ing to transmit knowledge socially to children, they argue 
for doing away with all traditional instruction in the 
first grade and building a curriculum around "two kinds of 
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activities: situations in daily living (such as voting) and 
group games" (p. xi). Instead of reserving games for rainy 
days or rewards, these authors suggest that the entire year 
of first grade mathematics be devoted to the playing of 
games. These are to replace, not supplement, "lessons and 
worksheets." 
An inherent aspect of Kamii and DeClark's proposal for 
the use of games is the support for social interaction among 
the children, and the children with teacher, in the learn-
ing. Again, the authors are not suggesting that knowledge 
can be socially transmitted, only that opportunities for 
dialogue encourage young learners to probe into possible 
solutions as they become confronted by verbal challenges. 
In regard to social development per se, Furth (1970) 
reminds the reader that the emotional aspect of social liv-
ing is hardly addressed by Piaget. However, the assumption 
is made that once the child's knowledge is enhanced, so are 
his/her emotions. The key to social development, then, is 
to "link operative thinking with contact in the social envi-
ronment" (p. 132). The following guidelines are offered by 
Furth: 
First, we help him grow intellectually by giving 
him occasions to which his knowing structures can 
be applied. Second, we introduce the child into 
social realities as an active participant. We 
give him to understand that, like physical real-
ity, social realities are not simply given, but 
result from and require the intelligent contribu-
tion of individual persons (p. 132). 
Specifically, Furth urges teachers to take children 
on excursions outside of the school building and, when 
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possible, bring the outside world into the school. This can 
be done in concrete ways by bringing in guests, for example, 
but it can also be done in conceptual ways by building units 
with the children that create imitative situations of real 
life. Such projects incorporate group activities. Simi-
larly, Furth encourages the use of role play and drama. 
Finally, Furth attends to the "'hidden' environment" 
and its implications for children's social development. 
Here Furth refers to the kinds of implicit messages which 
teachers convey to children and the values which are trans-
parently transmitted. He adds that messages of love and 
warmth are not enough. 
Furth (1970) holds that the social and emotional 
adjustment go hand-in-hand, but intellectual development is 
also required. Therefore: 
A school system whose goal is geared toward 
healthy intellectual growth cannot but be con-
ducive to healthy emotional and social growth. 
For this reason alone, my professional advice on 
problems of educational adjustment or motivation 
would be first to check the objective program that 
is offered to the child (p. 137). 
Furth's contention is thus that the key to psychological 
health is through the building of a sound objective program. 
Social and psychological difficulties seem to be at a mini-
mum when children's intellectual needs are met. Furth adds 
that there is a "close organic connection between intelli-
gence and social reality" (p. 187). 
Kamii and Devries (1980) note that an intellectually 
stimulating environment need not be boring. They assert 
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that adults who believe "that school is made for work" 
(p. 26), are still operating from an egocentric frame of 
reference! The?e authors suggest that children do not 
distinguish work from play, and neither should school be a 
joyless place. Unfortunately, though, the child's intrinsic 
desire for play, which is work for the child, is destroyed 
in the typical school curriculum. Schools are, instead, 
"imposing lessons and exercises that do not mesh with the 
learner's way of thinking" (p. 27). 
In Kamii and Devries (1978), the authors propose that 
"Piaget's constructivism does not imply a cookbook curricu-
lum that can be used to educate all children in the same 
way" (p. xi). It is, therefore, important that the teacher 
be sensitive to the uniqueness of each child. The children 
should be encouraged to ask questions and to engage in 
experimentation as they search for solutions. In this way, 
young children are encouraged to decenter and to think 
beyond their own points of view so that other perspectives 
can be considered. 
In regard to the social interaction aspect of using 
games to teach the concepts, Karnii (1982) suggests the fol-
lowing: "Figure out how the child is thinking-, and inter-
vene according to what seems to be going on in his head" 
(p. 41) . Here Kamii cautions the teacher to correct only 
the thought processes that the child seems to be using, not 
the incorrect answer. 
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The teacher can use the error to determine how the 
child must be thinking. Also the child's behavior provides 
an indicator as to whether the nature of his/her difficulty 
is intuitive, spatial, or logical. By intervening into the 
child's thinking process, the teacher may be able to avoid 
calling attention to the wrongness so as not to stifle the 
child's initiative; while at the same time, provide the 
child with insight regarding the problem. In accordance 
with Furth, social development in a Piagetian model is 
viewed as cooperative, nonthreatening interactions that lead 




The Piagetian curriculum poses a paradox in which both 
flexibility and rigidity are implied. On the one hand, the 
Piagetian curriculum leaves room for student choice and 
active processes through both learning games and general 
play (e.g., role play, clay). Moreover, peer learning is 
encouraged so that the children might develop in autonomy as 
opposed to a dependence upon the teacher's judgment (Kamii, 
1982; Kamii & Devries, 1978). 
But on the other hand, the games and activities of the 
Piagetian classroom are designed to lead the child toward 
the development of operational thought (Kamii, 1982; Furth, 
1970). Rigidity enters into the picture as the Piagetian 
teacher makes available to the children activities that will 
facilitate the child's progression through the stages 
(Devries, 1978). Little is said about the aspect for self-
selection for the sole purpose of seeking out knowledge for 
the intrinsic desire to know. Self-selection thus rests 
within the parameters of that which will lead toward opera-
tional (stage) development. 
As Devries (1978) points out, no true Piagetian cur-
riculum exists; therefore, the attempt to push children on 
to higher stages contradicts the crux of Piaget's theory. 
Activities are intended to facilitate the child's construe-
tion of knowledge, but this can only occur according to the 
child's internal processes of structuration. And it is pos-
sible for a child to mimic processes observed through social 
transmission and still not have constructed the knowledge 
internally (Kamii, 1982). 
Nonetheless, an educator of the Piagetian model is 
mindful of the purpose of the curriculum, to foster the 
child's conservation of tasks. For this reason, the Piage-
tian activities focus on the carrying out of logical opera-
tions, all of which is to, implicitly, lead toward the goal 
of stage development. In Piaget and Inhelder (1971) the 
conditions for stage development are stipulated: 
There are three necessary conditions for a system 
of stages. The stages must follow one another in 
a constant order in all subjects; each one must 
have a characteristic overall structure (not just 
one dominant characteristic); and these structures 
must be integrated into one another according to 
the order of their formation (p. 356). 
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It is because stage development is sequential and 
ordered that the Piagetian tasks are also sequential and 
ordered in regard to task conservation and meeting the cri-
teria for the growth of logic. And as it becomes determined 
by the educator which activities to select for the facilita-
tion of the growth of logic, the Piagetian curriculum 
appears to paradoxical: freedom is encouraged through the 
active manner of learning, yet freedom has more of a physi-
cal reality in regard to freedom of movement and expression, 
than an affective reality. For intrinsic motivation and de-
sire for learning is disregarded except as it conforms to 
the environment centered on the construction of knowledge 
through tasks based upon logic. 
The systematic nature of the Piagetian curriculum coin-
cides with Piaget's biological perspective of organismic 
systems and how organisms evolve through processes of con-
struction (Piaget, 1976). According to Piaget, children 
progress from the preoperational stage to the stage of con-
crete operations when they can conserve tasks. He notes 
that conservation "is closely related to operative 
reversibility" (p. 54). 
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In this way, Piaget is relating the principle of 
reversibility to his theory of cognitive operations, noting 
that both organic and cognitive systems seek homeostasis, or 
equilibrium. Reversibility is fundamental to both systems. 
The open organismic system requires movement back and forth 
as it (internally and externally) interacts with the 
environment. By the same token, a child in the process of 
learning engages in a "general interplay of reflective 
abstractions and reconstructions converging with this 
evolution" (p. 54). 
In other words, the child reflects on his/her prior 
actions upon things in the environment. In so doing, the 
child is able cognitively to reconstruct these interactions 
as he/she evolves into higher stages. Once the child can 
cognitively reverse the operations (conserve), operational 
thought is at hand. 
It is important to note Piaget's emphasis on the envi-
ronment for it is here that Piaget parts company with 
Gesell. Rather than to view development as being an abso-
lute maturational process of unfolding (phylogenesis), 
Piaget sees the child's development within the context of 
the environment (ontogenesis). The focus of the curriculum, 
then, is on how the child constructs knowledge from that 
environment. 
As Piaget was beginning to develop his theory along 
this line, Maria Montessori was revolutionizing Europe with 
a compatible view of development. A discussion of Montes-
sori's scientific orientation and philosophy of development 
follows. 
Montessori: A Development Leader 
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Maria Montessori is well known for her work with impov-
erished children in the early 1900s at San Lorenzo, Italy. 
Hiring a young servant girl to assist with the 60+ children, 
Montessori initiated one of education's earliest known pro-
grams for individualized instruction. 
The Casa dei Bambini was set up in a spare room in the 
children's housing project; barely furnished, and offering 
only "pieces of sensorial apparatus" to serve as the educa-
tional equipment. Lillard (1972) states that Montessori 
wanted "only to compare the reactions of normal children to 
her special equipment" (p. 3) which she had formerly devised 
for work with the severely mentally retarded of an institu-
tion. Having found that the handicapped were responsive to 
her teaching technique, Montessori had hopes of the equip-
ment being even more useful for normal education. 
The success of the children of Montessori's Casa dei 
Bambini was so phenomenal, according to Crain (1985), that 
"by 1913 she was one of the most famous women in the news" 
(p. 49). As Montessori's recognition flourished, she was 
brought to America to meet with such people as Thomas 
Edison, Mrs. Alexander Graham Bell, and President Woodrow 
Wilson's wife, Margaret. She was asked in 1912 to give a 
lecture at Carnegie Hall "to overflowing crowds" (Lillard, 
p. 8), and was so pleased with the American response that 
she returned to the states in 1915. 
On this trip Montessori demonstrated her teaching at 
the San Francisco World's Fair. A number of Montessori 
schools subsequently emerged across the nation, the first 
being in the home of Alexander Graham Bell. The press and 
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educational journals became flooded with Montessori's peda-
gogy. Montessori was undoubtedly the developmental leader 
of the day! 
But the renowned Montessori fell from grace in the 
American eye almost as quickly as she ascended to her 
throne. A "torrent of criticism" by psychological and edu-
cational theorists of the day clearly evoked an alarming 
sense of distrust over Montessori's methods. Lillard notes 
that the criticism of William Kilpatrick, a "leading expo-
nent of John Dewey's philosophy" (p. 9), were instrumental 
in the collapse of Montessori's work in America. Thus by 
1913 only sporadic references were made to Montessori in the 
literature. 
Because of her sudden downfall, Montessori never 
returned to the United States. Her work continued to flour-
ish, however, in Europe and other parts of the world. But 
forty years later a new spark of interest in Montessori's 
work arose in the United States as a result of a young 
mother's finding out about Montessori's work while traveling 
in Europe. 
As it turned out, five years after Montessori's death, 
her works were granted a revival, particularly because of 
the young mother who brought interest in Montessori back to 
America. Thus a new generation of Americans sought to actu-
alize the ideals which Montessori espoused. At the time 
of Lillard's (1972) writing, over a thousand Montessori 
schools had sprung up nationwide with the number increasing 
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annually. Americans were now not only receptive of the 
Montessorian ideas, but "actively seeking them" (p. 17). 
A Woman of Science 
Crain (1985) notes that Montessori became, at the age 
of twenty-six, the first female physician in Italy's his-
tory. In this pursuit, Montessori first demonstrated her 
preference for a scientific mode of inquiry. She used the 
scientific method of observation throughout the remainder of 
her life as she systematically studied the learning behavior 
of children at school, or preschool. (In Europe, Montessori 
schools extended throughout the grades.) 
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Montessori's son, Mario (Montessori, Jr., 1976), 
asserts that his mother sought to study, beyond the surface 
level of behavioral manifestations, the underlying meaning 
behind children's actions. Her goal was to integrate the 
findings "into a comprehensive and coherent vision of man 
that took into account the full complexity of his existence 
on earth" (p. 5). Mario adds that his mother's aim had been 
from the start to "contribute to a comprehensive science of 
man." Moreover, the science should not be representative of 
only one discipline of thought, for human beings should be 
studied "from whatever angles modern science permitted" with 
the integration providing a more accurate description of the 
human nature. 
Mario further notes that the integration was not 
intended (by his mother) to be eclectic, for that would only 
"confuse the issues." Instead, the integration should 
provide a "tentative blueprint encompassing the different 
fundamental asp~cts of the human situation" (p. 5). In sum, 
Montessori sought a global model in which the differing 
branches of science could be included for uncovering a more 
comprehensive (versus restrictive) philosophy of human 
development. 
Philosophy of Science 
Like Gesell and Piaget, Montessori (1967) seeks knowl-
edge of the human species through a biological lens. She 
notes that when one investigates a living being (whether 
human or not) through a study of its cell life (organic ori-
gin), then one has surpassed the realm of philosophy "which 
is far from being wholly theoretical" (p. 29) and entered 
into the natural sciences. According to Montessori, one 
need not delve into "abstract" philosophical thinking about 
the human when science can cast a new light on the child. 
Montessori continues by stating that although Darwin 
presented the scientific community a theory of explanation 
regarding how the human has evolved over a vast amount of 
time, his theory "can no longer be entertained in. its old 
linear form" (p. 55). Montessori contends that the pro-
gressive steps of evolution as described by Darwin offer an 
inadequate description of the developmental processes .. The 
following rationale is thus presented by Montessori (1967): 
Today, the vision of evolution has broadened; it 
has become spread over a bi-dimensional field, 
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wherein are included many functional relation-
ships, near and distant, which link up the activ-
ities of different forms of life. Those links are 
not to be interpreted just as simple examples of 
mutual aid, but as being related to a universal 
end concerning the total world environment--to a 
kind of oneness of nature. From the order which 
results, all receive the elements necessary for 
their own existence (p. 55). 
Montessori thereby proposes an alternate view of the 
evolutionary theory, suggesting that each agent of creation, 
as well as each living being on the earth, is charged with a 
particular task which is to complement the functions of 
nature as a whole. This perspective opposes the notion of 
survival of the fittest. Additionally, rather than to 
support the contention that the perpetuation of a species 
occurs through a linearity of building on, nature--
organismic life on earth--is sustained as each agent of 
being (from cell to fully created being) interacts with the 
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other elements of nature. Montessori asserts: 
Life is not present on earth merely to preserve 
its own existence, but to carry on a process vital 
to all creation, and therefore necessary for every 
thing that lives (p. 56). 
According to Montessori, it is the quality of interac-
tion among the elements of nature which prevents the accep-
tance of a linear explanation of development. Her philoso-
phy thus leans toward an ecological perspective which she 
describes in terms of the cosmos. In discusing this cosmic 
perspective, Mario, her son, surmises: "The idea then is to 
give a dynamic global view of how human life on earth has 
evolved, eventually forming what Maria Montessori called the 
'Supra Nature'" (Montessori Jr., p. 104). 
Mario continues, however, with a description of his 
mother's philosophy which reveals that order is an inherent 
property of her theory. Mario explains that: 
The inner order of the personality must be con-
structed through experiences in a structured 
world. Thus the child must have a coherent pic-
ture, on the broadest scale possible, of the ambi-
ence in which he is growing. Chaos will never 
stimulate it to real participation (p. 103). 
All of the above suggests that Montessori herself views 
Darwin's theory as a narrow and linear description of 
nature's evolution. She proposes that development is not 
linear because the organic elements that sustain life do not 
function in a progressive series of change. Nature inter.-
acts in accordance with "another force" to unite "the 
efforts of all, so that they work toward a common end" 
(Montessori, 1967, p. 57). 
There exists, therefore, an order to Montessori's con-
ception of the cosmos which prevents the occurrence of 
chaos. To Montessori, Darwin's theory is not incorrect; it 
simply is not broad enough to describe the ecological manner 
by which all the elements of nature interact to create har-
mony in the cosmos. Montessori (1967) reiterates the inade-
quacy of Darwin's theory in relation to the child with the 
following: 
. . . the linear concept of evolution, which tries 
to explain descent by adaptation, by heredity and 
by the impulse toward perfection, is no longer 
enough. . • . So, in the child, besides the vital 
impulse to create himself, and to become perfect, 
there must be yet another purpose, a duty to 
fulfill in harmony, something he has to do in the 
service of a united whole (p. 57). 
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Just as nature does not simply improve over time, 
neither does the child develop through mere processes of 
unfolding. Montessori asserts that "the child, at birth, 
bears within him constructive possibilities, which must 
unfold by activity in his environment" (p. 57). Construc-
tion is only possible through the child's active interac-
tions with the environment. 
Montessori's constructivism parallels Piaget's theory. 
Unlike Gesell's theory of development which, borrowing from 
Darwin, views development as a natural evolutionary unfold-
ing of innate tendencies, Montessori and Piaget adhere to 
the belief that the environment has much to do with the eve-
lutionary processes. Their ontological perspective of 
development finds both Montessori and Piaget in agreement on 
the point that development entails evolution to some degree. 
But it is the convergence of the child's innate nature with 
the environment that steers the child on to higher manif es-
tations. Montessori (1949) thus expresses the philosophy of 
science that, in turn, substantiates her theory of develop-
ment: 
This is the vision of reality of our time: we the 
last earthbound men, must make the great effort of 
lifting up our eyes and hearts to understand it. 
We are undergoing a crisis, torn between an old 
world that is coming to an end and a new world 
that has already begun and already given proof of 
all the constructive elements it has to offer 
(p. 25). 
It is being suggested by Montessori that the old world 
of progressive evolution must die so that a new vision of 
constructivism can be given birth in the biological epochs 
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of science. This was Montessori's wish for the fifties; by 
the seventies, Piaget's theory of development through con-
struction began to dominate the field of cognitive psychol-
ogy. Piaget thus inadvertently led Montessori's philosophy 
of science to become an American realization. 
Developmental Theory 
Montessori (1967} proposes that one's development is 
related not to his/her "embryonic past," but to the indi-
vidual's construction of knowledge as it relates to his/her 
interactions with the environment. Using the analogy of 
constructing buildings with stones and bricks, Montessori 
suggests that the reasons buildings differ "both in shape 
and in ornamentation" is not because of the "materials from 
which they are made but the different purposes they are 
designed to serve" (p. 49}. It is the purposeful interac-
tion with the stones and bricks which allows the building to 
be constructed in the particular way by the builder. Pur-
poseful action is requisite to construction! 
In applying the concept of construction to human devel-
opment, Montessori acknowledges that the method of develop-
ment does follow a plan of "natural unfolding"; however, 
development is also determined by the child's "spontaneous 
manifestations." Indeed, the child's tranquility and hap-
piness, the intensity of his efforts and the constancy of 
his freely chosen responses ... " (p. 75} have much to do 
with his/her progress through the "phases of growth." 
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Mario (Montessori Jr., 1976) affirms his mother's 
theory stating that: 11 ••• human development is the result 
of an unconscioµs creative activity of the individual, and 
. . . this process is only possible in association with 
others" (p. 6). According to Mario, the child's development 
--cognitive growth--is marked by his/her significant sparks 
of learning which are manifested through special sensiti-
vities from within. These sensitivities inherently appear 
in each of the developmental stages. 
Montessori {1967) refers to these stages as sensitive 
periods for growth and "psychic development" (p. 96). The 
following sensitive periods (stages) are identified: 1) 
birth to six, with two substages (birth to three, and three 
to six), 2) six to twelve, and 3) twelve to eighteen, with 
two substages (twelve to fifteen, and fifteen to eighteen). 
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The Sensitive Periods. In the sensitive period of 
birth to three, Montessori asserts that the adult cannot 
directly influence the child. This basically holds true for 
the three to six year old as well, except "in some ways the 
child begins to become susceptible to adult influence ..•. 
the personality undergoes great change" (p. 19). For this 
reason, many countries decide that the six-year-old is ready 
to begin school. 
The second sensitive period (six to twelve) can be 
characterized as the time of relatively few changes. This 
child is calm, assured and stable. 
But the third period (twelve to eighteen) marks such 
great changes that development here is almost as drastic as 
the changes which occur in the first period (from birth to 
six). In this third period both physical and emotional 
development undergo such significant changes that by the end 
of this period, the child is fully developed. Montessori 
notes that "· .. no further marked changes occur in him. 
He grows only in age" (p. 20). 
It is pointed out that the above three periods also 
mark the child's structure of schooling: elementary, middle 
school and secondary school. Montessori notes: "This hap-
pens in all countries of the world, so it cannot be a 
haphaza.rd matter of pure inspiration" that such commonality 
in school organization exists world-wide. Therefore, 
whether conscious or not, issues of child development are 
fundamental to schooling. 
The Construction of Knowledge. According to Montessori 
(1967), the child assimilates the environment through 
absorption. During the sensitive periods the child is 
highly sensitive to learning certain things. For example, 
when the child is in the first sensitive period, he/she is 
particularly adept at learning language. This does not mean 
that the child is not able to learn a second language at an 
older age, only that the effort to learn the language when 
older is much more strenuous. Montessori explains this 
process of language absorption by stating that the child 
absorbs words and their meanings from the environment. 
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Because he/she has not acquired a store of experiences in 
memory, the sensorial impressions which are absorbed with 
language must be integrally constructed by the child. In 
the first sensitive period this simultaneous integrating of 
language with sensorial experiences is more easily 
accomplished. 
In continuation, Montessori notes that the impressions 
which form learning during the sensitive periods are so 
strong that intense emotion on the part of the child is 
aroused. In the learning of language, for example, there is 
"so deep an enthusiasm as to set in motion visible fibers of 
his body, fibers which start vibrating in the effort to 
reproduce those sounds" (p. 24). 
Finally, Montessori asserts that without freedom to 
move about and interact physically with the environment, 
absorption--real learning--would not be possible. She 
insists that learning "· .. can only be fulfilled through 
the experience of free activity conducted on the environ-
ment" (p. 96). On this premise Montessori's pedagogy is 
founded. 
Implications for Schooling 
The ability to concentrate is a thread that runs 
throughout Montessori's philosophy of learning. Montessori 
(1956) notes that a child absorbed in the learning is so 
concentrated, or focused, that he/she is oblivious to 
occurrences in the surrounding environment. An analogy is 
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used by Montessori to compare a child's learning with the 
intensity of a scientist becoming "so deeply involved in 
thought" that he feels "removed from the world itself" 
(p. 51). 
A story is told by Montessori about a four-year-old 
child who so engrossed herself in an activity that she 
repeated the task fourteen times without stopping. When the 
child was finished, rather than appearing to be tired, she 
seemed to have a renewed burst of energy. Montessori 
reports that the child "seemed happy, rested and smiling, as 
children do when they awake to the beneficent sun" (p. 54). 
This type of concentration was observed by Montessori over 
and over again, suggesting that: 11 ••• the concept of 
order and the development of character, of the intellectual 
and emotional life, must derive from this veiled source" 
(p. 56). 
Montessori's pedagogy is thus based on the concept of 
concentration. She asserts that by tapping this inherent 
resource the "deepest interest" of the child can be sus-
tained. 
In regard to the level of the task, Montessori suggests 
that the teacher respect the child's intuition in such mat-
ters by allowing him/her to select whatever captures his/her 
attention regardless of the task's difficulty level. For 
the child is "agitated until he seeks something within the 
depths of his mind that he has not yet found for himself" 
(p. 61). Great work will come from a child left to find 
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his/her own way with the tasks. It is essential, therefore, 
that the child not be coerced into doing an activity that is 
more difficult than one he/she has mastered through concen-
trated effort. The goal, then, is for nonintervention so 
that the child may select and pace the learning according to 
his/her need for absorption. 
Order Versus Disorder: Work Before Play. Montessori 
(1956) asserts that teachers sometimes misunderstand the 
concept of nonintervention. Upon seeing that a classroom of 
children's "energies are dispersed in disorder," a teacher 
may be prone to quietly stand by and allow the confusion. 
Montessori states that "using the materials completely 
wrongly" (p. 106) deters opportunities for concentration and 
learning. At such times the teacher should intervene to 
establish order. 
In this discussion Montessori suggests that using the 
materials for socializing (play) opposes the goal for con-
centration. She contends that the Montessori method: 
. • . is essentially based on the ability to 
recognize the difference among the physical states 
of the child, encouraging those conducive to his 
spiritual health (these we can call the good), and 
discouraging the others, which are neither 
constructive nor formative and lead to the 
destruction of his development and the useless 
scattering of his energies (we call these states 
evil) (p. 107) . 
In essence, Montessori is asserting that play reduces 
the environment to a state of evil in regard to having any 
usefulness toward the goal of learning. Her proposed 
"science of education" (p. 115) framework requires that the 
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material things, "objects scientifically selected" (p. 116), 
be put at the child's disposal for "step-by-step" accumula-
tive experience. which can be clarified through adult-child 
interaction. Child-to-child socializing can only provide a 
hindrance to this pedagogical process. In sum, Montessori 
(1949) proposes: "We think the child is happiest when he is 
playing; but the truth is that the child is happiest when he 
is working" (p. 93). 
Readiness for Learning. According to Mario (Montessori 
Jr., 1976), a child can be taught any subject at any stage 
of his/her life. There is, therefore, no need to wait until 
a child is developmentally ready before attempting to teach 
him/her. He continues by stating that this thesis of his 
mother's should no longer be considered a hypothesis for it 
has been validated by teachers and children using the 
Montessori method across the world. Affirming these 
validations, Mario adds that it is a "hopeful sign that 
scientists have started to take (the thesis) seriously at 
last" (p. 63). 
The reason that the very young child can be taught 
mathematics or reading, for example, is because of the young 
child's keen ability to concentrate. Mario proposes that 
children: 
•.. derive satisfaction from their own activity, 
which is highly meaningful to them, not from the 
teacher's appreciation of their work or grades. 
The acquisition of information is felt to be a 
discovery. The formation of a new function is 
experienced as a conquest. The children's egos 
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are strengthened, and they develop a love of work 
.•• (p. 67). 
It is because of this great zeal for learning that even very 
young children can be taught mathematics and reading. 
Piaget (1976) directly opposes this contention stating 
that concepts cannot be understood by a child until the cog-
nitive structures have evolved to the degree, or stage, that 
such comprehension is possible. As one of three principles 
listed by Piaget to describe his overall theory, Piaget 
notes that intelligence can adapt to new learning 
"· •. in the course of construction of its own structures, 
which depends as much on progressive internal coordinations 
as on information acquired through experience" (p. 11). 
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In other words, experience with new concepts cannot 
bring about learning for a young child who has not con-
structed the internal coordinations necessary for making, at 
the preoperational stage, comprehension possible. As a 
result, it is futile to teach the preoperational child a 
concept that requires logical, operational thought. 
As stated above, Mario asserts that his mother's 
method, validated across the world, refutes this claim. The 
very young child can be taught any subject (i.e., reading or 
mathematics) which meets his/her interest because of the 
child's keen capacity for concentration. Indeed, on this 
point, the two fairly compatible theories of development 
meet in opposition. 
The Montessori Materials. In order to captivate the 
youngster's attention as he/she encounters learning experi-
ences, Montessori developed specific teaching materials. 
Each activity is constructed so that a particular learning 
is met. Mario (Montessori Jr., (1976) notes that the 
"built-in controls" (p. 69) provide the child on-the-spot 
feedback so that he/she can know when the procedures are in 
error. He adds that children "· .. will repeat an exercise 
time and again with great concentration until they have 
fully absorbed the principle or concept it illustrates" 
(p. 69) 
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A pedagogy which supports waiting for the teaching of 
reading and writing until the child has reached a particular 
stage suggests an unnecessary restriction. Four-year-olds 
can learn to read and write almost effortlessly through a 
tracing of letters on white paper. Montessori (1966) re-
calls that when children copied her example of the tracing, 
and then traced their own letters for sentence making, they 
would then go off to a corner and try to read what had been 
written. She adds: "They did this mentally without pro-
nouncing the words" (p. 162). Books were not introduced to 
the children until many words could be read. 
In sum, because of the children's intense concentration 
on the tasks, and because the tasks led to the attainment of 
specific skills, children as young as four were able to 
become proficient readers. The tasks were not only 
programmed to offer on-the-spot feedback, but they were 
presented in an order of meaningful sequence. Above all, 
the tasks were intended for use by silent workers. Montes-
sori (1956) notes: "These lessons may appear strange, 
because they are carried out in almost complete silence" 
(p. 103), but the quietness of the lesson signifies that, in 
fact, it is meeting its instructive purpose. 
The implications for schooling, therefore, are that 
children attending a Montessori school are to work silently 
on tasks that are specially designed to promote learning. 
Though the materials have a sequential plan in regard to the 
level of the task, the children are freely allowed to select 
from an array of displayed activities. The teacher thus 
determines what is to be put out for use based on the ascer-
tained level of the children's capabilities. (With the 
exception of the need for silence, the aspect of selecting 
one's own tasks to work on is Piagetian in nature.) 
It is then proposed that the children will absorb and 
construct knowledge through their interactions with the 
things--the materials--in the environment. Through this 
quiet atmosphere, which provides for student interest with 
the opportunity for self-selection, it is presumed that con-
centration will ensue. In concentration, the child will 
continually repeat the activity until satisfaction, or 
knowledge, is attained. 
Because the goal is for children to be highly absorbed 
with the learning tasks, social interaction (play) is dis-
couraged. To Montessori, the work is as gratifying as the 
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child could want; evidence of this is apparent in watching a 
child concentrating on a task. Play in the classroom is 
thus viewed by Montessori as detrimental, and consequently, 
evil. Work, on the other hand, is good! 
Imagination and Fantasy. Montessori (1966) notes that 
the child has an inherent unspoiled plan for normal devel-
opment; that is, to be in the natural state of concentration 
so that things encountered in the environment can lead the 
child to cognitive growth. When things in the environment 
interfere with the child's ability to concentrate, the mind 
deviates into "aimless wanderings," which, in turn, lead 
him/her to take "refuge in fantasies" (p. 189). Because the 
fugitive mind cannot contribute to concentrated learning, 
things which influence the child to fantasize should be 
eliminated from the classroom. Montessori states: 
A flight into play or into a world of fancy often 
conceals an energy that has been divided. It rep-
resents a subconscious defense of the ego which 
flees from suffering or danger and hides behind a 
mask (p. 191). 
It is for this reason that, according to Montessori, 
the highly imaginative child is not as successful in school 
as those who are less creative. She continues by stating 
that "· .. great creative intellects cannot apply them-
selves to practical matters" (p. 192). The implication, 
therefore, is that activities which encourage fantasy and 
daydreaming are detrimental to the growth of children; par-
ticularly, to those who tend to show creative tendencies. 
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Psychic Barriers. It is further noted in Montessori 
(1966) that children often find learning repugnant when a 
"psychic barrie!", or defense mechanism, is unconsciously 
acquired by the child. This happens when the child is 
led to feel incapable by the teacher or his/her peers. 
Montessori adds that: "Very frequently individuals carry 
with them through life a psychic barrier that was erected in 
childhood" (p. 192). This obstacle impedes the child's 
ability to concentrate and, ultimately, to construct knowl-
edge. The educator is, therefore, cautioned by Montessori 
about the power of words and what they can do to children. 
Montessori describes the harmful effects of the psychic 
barrier with the following: 
There is first a repugnance for a particular sub-
ject, then for studies in general, then for the 
school, the teacher, and the child's companions. 
There is no longer room for love and cordiality, 
and the child finally fears school and becomes 
completely alienated from it (p. 193). 
In regard to personal development, the teacher is held 
responsible for attending to the child's spirit as well as 
his/her cognitive capabilities. Montessori (1956) asserts 
that the use of praise and rewards are two ways that teach-
ers trigger unhealthy aspects of development. Indeed, the 
use of praise and correction lead a child to an unnatural 
state of dependency. 
The child's spirit should not be broken by correction, 
but neither should it be inflated by praise. A child's 
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response to a situation should originate from internal feel-
ings about the event. Once the teacher has demonstrated the 
intended use of the materials, it should fall to the child 
to determine whether the activity proved useful. Indepen-
dence can, thereby, be fostered. 
It is important, therefore, that both the educator and 
the parent "respect all the reasonable forms of activity" 
that are undertaken by the child so that his/her energies in 
all areas can be developed. Montessori adds: "We must 
believe in all the good that lies hidden in the child . 
" (p. 88). 
Herein lies Montessori's concern over children's infer-
ence of mistrust. The child's development is not enhanced 
by manipulations of praise or coercion. The principle of 
"correcting their inadequacies" (p. 78), for example, 
instills in the child the need for "being perfect" (p. 79). 
Discovering that he/she is not trusted by the adult, the 
child paradoxically looks to the adult for approval in 
"passive submission" (p. 83). As a result, the child 
becomes confused; thus, any "opportunity for a tranquil 
inner development" (p. 83) is defeated. The child's natural 
tendency for independence is replaced by "passive imitative-
ness." Finally, the "deepest and most compelling necessi-
ties" are left "unfulfilled." 
Conclusion 
For the Montessorian curriculum, unpurposeful talk, 
small talk or even praise by the teacher, is avoided. The 
teacher speaks only when necessary. When first introducing 
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an activity to a child, talk may be appropriate. Even so, 
it is the physical demonstration of the task that is most 
meaningful, for inner tranquility is never derived from 
words. It is paramount, therefore, that the child not be 
made to rely on feedback in the form of reprimands or 
praise. 
In all, the child's positive response to learning is 
not won through manipulative words. Real learning must come 
from the child's exercise of freedom. That freedom, how-
ever, is restricted to the parameters of the quiet and 
orderly conditions that are established for learning. 
Activity is then self-initiated and self-evaluated and nei-
ther praise, nor correction, are used. Such is the Montes-
sori method for fostering the development of young children. 
Chapter Conclusions 
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In this chapter the developmental paradigm has been 
presented in accordance with the theories of three leading 
developmentalists: Arnold Gesell, Jean Piaget, and Maria 
Montessori. Because each of the above became an established 
member of the natural science community (by way of achieving 
a doctorate in the fields of biology or medicine), the sci-
entific background of each developmentalist was explored. 
It was hoped that through such a study, greater insight 
could be gleaned as to how, or why, each came to propound 
his/her respective philosophy of development as a finding of 
natural science. 
Beginning with a discussion on the two basic orienta-
tions of development (i.e., phylogenetic and ontogenetic), 
it was stated that a developmentalist will lean more heavily 
in his/her philosophy to one or the other. In any case, 
however, both phylogenesis (innate tendencies, heredity) and 
ontogenesis (a combination of environmental influences and 
phylogenesis) must have a place in the developmental theory. 
Otherwise, the theory is not developmental (Munn, 1965). 
It can be concluded from the study that of the three, 
only Gesell holds to a strong phylogenetic philosophy. 
Piaget and Montessori emphasize the ontogenetic aspect 
asserting that the human's development hinges largely on the 
construction of knowledge which is attained through 
sensorial (physical) interactions with the environment. 
With each of the theorists, development is an internal 
building on of knowledge. Gesell describes this growth 
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in maturational stages (growth gradients), Piaget and 
Montessori in stages or sensitive periods, respectively. 
Gesell follows a Darwinian approach to evolution in his 
theory, Montessori complains that Darwin's theory is too 
linear. Yet she and Piaget describe development in terms of 
sequential construction which implies linearity. Further-
more, both Piaget and Montessori reduce their definitions of 
development to activities that focus on the intellect. 
Areas of affect (i.e., social development, imagination, fan-
tasies, etc.) are either ignored by these theorists, or dis-
favored. 
The dimension of implications for schooling was added 
to the discussion of each theorist so that a connection 
could be made between each of the developmental theories and 
the manner by which they have been, or are intended to be, 
carried out into the arena of education. It is of par-
ticular importance in this study to explore how these devel-
opmental theories have been translated by policy-makers 
and/or educators for organizational or pedagogical decision-
making. Issues of grade placement and retention, self-
selectiori, physical manipulation of objects (as opposed to 
the receptive processes of merely hearing and seeing), for 
example, continue on as enigmas of the 1980s! 
It was found that while each of the three theorists 
share common beliefs about the course of development, par-
ticularly Piaget and Montessori, significant differences 
exist among their respective concerns. These differences 
will be further discussed in the final chapter of this 
study. 
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In the next chapter, the reader will be introduced to 
the transformational theory as espoused by modern physicists 
and scientists such as 1977 Nobel Prize laureate Ilya 
Prigogine from the field of chemistry, and physicists Heinz 
R. Pagels and Fritjof Capra. The reader will also be intro-
duced to the science of Chaos, a paradigm that is emerging 
across the fields of science. It will be shown that trans-
formational theory is derived from the revolutionary discov-
eries of Einstein, Heisenberg, and other leaders of quantum 
mechanics as well as from the science of Chaos. At a later 
point in the study, transformational theory, rooted in the 




THE MAKING OF NEW SCIENCE 
According to Gleick {1987), scientists from the broad 
fields are converging to favor a paradigm shift called 
Chaos. Its roots, however, stem back to the works of Henri 
Poincare and the introduction of quantum physics •. 
Gleick credits Poincare as being "the first to under-
stand the possibility of chaos" (p. 46). In studying the 
laws of motion on geometric forms, Poincare was the first to 
consider dynamical possibilities. After his death, however, 
the concept of dynamical systems "atrophied" to the degree 
that even Poincare's name "fell to disuse." Poincare's work 
was revived in the 1960s by a .qualitative geometrist 
(topologist) named Stephen Smale. 
Like Poincare, Smale sought a global understanding of 
the entire realm of geometric possibilities. Turning to 
dynamical systems, Smale conceived of a range of possibili-
ties that a trajectory, or point, might travel in an oscil-
lator. (An oscillator is a devise which allows the scien-
tist to observe the swings of an oscillating body in phase 
space; a trajectory that moves from one extreme position to 
another.) 
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According to Gleick (1987), Smale combined Poincare's 
non-Euclidean geometry with the oscillating screen to create 
a visual reproduction of the theory in action. Smale's 
"phase space" used a point to describe the system's as if 
frozen in time. All of the information about the velocity 
of the system's movement is contained in the point's 
position. Thus, in phase space, a change of the system can 
be ascertained by a movement of the point. As the system 
makes continuous changes, the point traces a path called a 
trajectory. 
In continuation, Gleick (1987) explains that the 
trajectory oscillates back and forth on a screen, revealing 
the dissipation processes. A system dissipates as it takes 
in, or releases, energy. Smale found that the movement of 
the trajectory created friction which, in turn, caused the 
system to lose energy. The trajectory line began to 
contract "like a balloon losing air" until the point no 
longer moved. 
Discontented with this result, Smale set about to cre-
ate a pattern that would undergo multiple transformations. 
He created a structure that ultimately became known as the 
horseshoe. Through this creation, Smale was able to illus-
trate the effects of "sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions" (pp. 51-52). This concept became the crux of the 
transformational theory. In essence, sensitive dependence 
acknowledges that minute fluctuations, or disturbances to a 
localized part of the system, can lead to macroscopic 
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changes in the entire system. Smale's geometrical shapes 
thus opened for physicists and mathematicians "a new 
intuition about the possibilities of motion" (Gleick, 1987, 
p. 52) . 
The above serves to illustrate how the works of a 
"rebel" scientist of the early 1900s have come to fruition 
with the emergence of Chaos. There was no cumulative pro-
cess, however, for Smale had to rethink and revise not only 
Poincare's theory, but also many theories of his own. What 
the illustration does reveal is that this seemingly new sci-
ence is not so new at all. Just as Smale drew his theory 
from the works of Poincare, the assumptions of Chaos have 
been derived from a number of science's ghosts: Planck's 
quantum physics, Einstein's relativity theory, Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle, and, of course, Poincare's non-
Euclidean geometry. 
Concepts of Chaos 
Gleick (1987) introduces the science of Chaos with a 
discussion of Edward Lorenz's study of weather. Lorenz is 
described as "a mathematician in meteorologist's clothing" 
(p. 22). After initiating a computer program designed to 
illustrate patterns of weather, Lorenz discovered that the 
trajectory (in the computer screen) followed the course as 
anticipated, but after awhile, the line began to go off 
course. In time the movements became even more exaggerated. 
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The technical name for what appeared became known as 
The Butterfly Effect. It was so named because the trajec-
tory began to move in and out in such a way as to create the 
illusion of butterfly wings on the computer screen. Addi-
tionally, the concept of "sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions" entered into the creation of that name with the 
idea that a butterfly's flapping of wings--creating a tiny 
perturbation in the air--can ultimately lead to a major 
thunderstorm in another part of the country. 
The trajectory's path is dependent upon the formula 
that is put into the computer. Lorenz discovered that the 
trajectory's movement off course was due to the particular 
formula that he had used. Unexpected rounding of the deci-
mal began to transform the numeral, and ultimately, the path 
of the trajectory across the screen. In sum, the series of 
unpredicted roundings led the trajectory to uncharted 
courses! 
Gleick explains that when studying phase space, all 
knowledge about a dynamical system is collapsed to a single 
point, the trajectory. The point thus becomes the dynamical 
system. The value of using phase space lies with the fact 
that it is easy to detect a change in the system. A system 
continually comes back to its original state until a fluctu-
ation causes it to move into a loop. Then patterns of 
motion and details are exposed to the scientist which were 
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formerly undetectable with linear processes. It is, there-
fore, possible to trace the history of a system using phase 
space. 
Gleick adds that phase space offers scientists the 
knowledge that "systems with infinitely many degrees of 
freedom" (p. 137) can never be made known in a precise and 
definable way. Therefore, absolute predictions will never 
be available for such systems as turbulent waterfalls, the 
weather, or the human brain. 
Mitchell Feigenbaum's discovery of universality is then 
introduced by Gleick (1987). Mathematician Feigenbaum's 
concern was with distortion of perception. At greater 
distances images lose their meaning and become distorted, 
blurred, and even lost. The distortions--noise--overrun any 
details that might provide precise information. This noise 
alludes to the chaotic messiness of a system. Feigenbaum 
sought a mathematical formula that might provide the 
perceiver with those precise details that are, otherwise, 
muddled with the turbulence. 
Feigenbaum ultimately discovered "geometric convergence 
or scaling." He had expected different formulas to provide 
different information about the respective entities being 
studied. Gleick states that such phenomena would include: 
Rolling streams, swinging pendulums, electronic 
oscillators--many physical systems (that) went 
through a transition on the way to chaos. . . 
(p. 114). 
According to Gleick, the mechanics of these kinds of 
systems seemed "perfectly well understood" by the physicists 
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of today; that is, equations had been discovered that pro-
vided useful information. Gleick continues: 11 ••• yet mov-
ing from the equations to an understanding of global, long-
term behavior seemed impossible" (p. 174). Feigenbaum's 
scaling theory brought to light that varied entities being 
studied, with their differing kinds of information, can all 
be mathematically computed to equal the scaling formula. 
There is thus a universal formula for describing the 
nonlinearities of turbulent systems. For unruly systems, 
the scaling revealed that "some quality was being preserved 
while everything else changed. Some regularity lay beneath 
the turbulent surface of the equation" (p. 172). 
The most important implication of Feigenbaum's theory 
was that the equations that physicists and mathematicians 
used were irrelevant. Once order emerged, the original 
equation was no longer valid anyway. "Quadratic or trigono-
metric, the result was the same" (p. 174). 
What also seemed to be the same was the manner by which 
systems emerged: order, to a change of state, to possibly 
other changes of state--of disorder--to a higher order, and 
so on. It was the universality of these processes which 
Feigenbaum's scaling theory detected. In sum, it was mathe-
matically discovered that systems erupt into turbulence in 
like manner, regardless of the physical type of system 
(solid, liquid, gas). 
The term "period-doubling" is used to identify the sys-
tem's scaling. At equilibrium a system will reveal a fixed 
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point. Here the trajectory bounces steadily toward the 
attractor. With the first period-doubling, the trajectory 
splits apart (bifurcates) into the creation of two fixed 
points. Though they at first remain together, the two tra-
jectories gradually float apart. At the second period-
doubling, each of the two trajectories divide, or bifurcate, 
so that now the system has four. The bifurcation of the two 
into the four occurs at exactly the same time! · Again, the 
four trajectories gradually float apart. Upon the third 
period-doubling, the process repeats itself, and so on. 
Feigenbaum's universality revealed that unlike systems 
have a commonality of behavior, despite the differences that 
exist among the systems. Gleick (1987) notes, however, that 
Feigenbaum only studied simple functions. still: "· •• he 
believed that his theory expressed a natural law about sys-
tems at the point of transition between orderly and turbu-
lent" (p. 180). Gleick refers to Feigenbaum's discovery as 
being qualitative, quantitative, and structural because it 
extends from the quality of an observed system to both pat-
terns and precise numbers. 
The concept was then applied by Gleick (1987) to Harry 
swinney's studies of fluid motion. Here liquid was placed 
in a spinning cylinder. It was found that at a steady state 
of equilibrium a speck placed in the fluid moved 
(oscillated) east and west. When the system picked up . 
speed, donut-shaped rolls formed on the outer edges with the 
speck moving up, down, out and around the donut 
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configurations. As more speed was encountered, the donuts 
were losing their shapes and the fluid was turning into 
chaotic turbulence. At a higher level the system jumped to 
such a high state of turbulence that no rolls were 
distinguishable. The system had emerged into a new order. 
These fluid transformations emerged in the same manner that 
Lorenz's Butterfly Effect, and Feigenbaum's period-
doublings, had illustrated. 
Nature was revealing its universal processes in a vari-
ety of scientific experiments. In ways such as these, sci-
entists from across the fields are demonstrating that they 
are coming to be of one accord. It appears that Chaos will, 
one day, emerge as the triumphant paradigm! 
The Terms Defined 
In recapitulation, the basic concepts of Chaos are 
defined below. Along with the ones mentioned above, other 
concepts presented by Prigogine and Stengers (1984) are 
included here, but will be further discussed under the 
section entitled "Chemistry." The primary terms are: 
1) equilibrium - the steady state of a system; 
2) dissipative structure - an organism, or system, 
that both takes in and gives off energy, an open system; 
3) sensitive dependence on initial conditions - the 
system's response to initial fluctuations; 
4) fluctuations - random movements that disturb the 
system, perturbations; 
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5) bifurcation point - the point at which the system 
splits (bifurcates) or changes into a differentiated state; 
6) entropy - noise or messiness that encompasses a 
system that has been perturbed. Prigogine and Stengers 
associate entropy with the "arrow of time"; meaning that 
once a state has been made entropic--changed--it can never 
return to its former state. The particles and elements do 
not find their former positions. For this reason, all 
transformations into differentiated states are irreversible; 
7) period-doublings - the manner by which the system 
scales to differentiated states. Prigogine and Stengers 
refer to these differentiated states as: equilibrium, near-
to-equilibrium, and far-from-equilibrium; 
8) scaling (geometric convergence) - the mathematical 
description of how systems emerge into differentiated states 
(from equilibrium to chaos); and 
9) instability - the result of a fluctuation that is 
at first localized in a small part of the system, but can 
also spread to permeate an entire macro-system. 
It should be noted that Feigenbaum's scaling theory is 
in opposition to that of Prigogine and Stengers. These 
authors assert that the universe is perpetually in a state 
of nonequilibrium. Theories of universality are, thereby, 
inadequate descriptions of nature. Prigogine and Stengers 
(1984) assert that universal constants "destroy the homo-
geneity of the universe by introducing physical scales in 
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terms of which various behaviors become qualitatively dif-
ferent" (pp. 217-218). These authors add that "· .• 'most' 
dynamic systems behave in a quite unstable way" (p. 263). 
It has previously been noted that Feigenbaum is a math-
ematician; therefore, approaching the universe quantita-
tively is his primary occupation. At any rate, it has been 
suggested that the scaling theory only proves that formula-
tions are unnecessary. For once a system leaves its equi-
libriated state, the original equation loses its validity. 
The universality implies, therefore, that the earth's turbu-
lence holds some degree of regularity. That regularity can 
be described as the processes by which systems emerge into 
differentiated states. 
The most important fact about these two opposing theo-
ries is that while they disagree as to the matter of quanti-
fying universality, they agree on the assumptions of Chaos, 
that the universe is random, nonlinear, irreversible, and 
uncertain. Kuhn (1970) notes that the umbrella of a 
paradigm will cover divergent theories, and while there may 
be points of disagreement, the basic assumptions find 
congruence. Herein is an example of the difference between 
a theory (which finds contention between Prigogine and 
Stengers and Feigenbaum) and a paradigm (upon which they all 
agree)! 
The remaining parts of this chapter present both a 
field interpretation and a historical perspective on the 
emergence of the Chaos paradigm. Through this discussion of 
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the founding fathers, alongside the introductions of some 
contemporaries of the fields, the reader should be able to 
glean insight into the theoretical underpinnings and impli-
cations of the science of Chaos. For it is these discover-
ies of modern science, which not only comprise the assump-
tions of the Chaos paradigm, but which also found the trans-
formational theory. In this way, the findings of modern 
science's collective fields about the nature of the universe 
are made applicable to the nature of humankind. 
A Concurrence in the Fields 
According to Prigogine and Stengers, the study of chem-
ical instabilities has crossed the boundaries of chemistry 
for both "theoretical and experimental work." Institutions 
and laboratories are conducting, worldwide, research about 
the random, nonlinear, entropic, characteristics of the uni-
verse. The authors contend that the investigations are of 
interest "not only to mathematicians, physicists, chemists, 
and biologists, but also to economists and sociologists" 
(p. 146). A global perspective of Chaos is presented below 
using scientists from the broad fields. In this way, the 
processes of transformation in physical systems (e.g., 
chemical, fluid) can be unveiled. 
Chemistry 
Ilya Prigogine was awarded the 1977 Nobel Prize for his 
work on nonequilibrium systems, particularly dissipative 
structures. These structures are described as open systems 
which take in, and expel, elements of the environment. Any 
such system, frpm a city to a human being, can be considered 
a dissipative structure. 
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) describe the system at 
rest as being comprised of "hypnons," or independent 
particles, which "ignore one another" (p. 180) during 
equilibrium. Because the system is open, its entities 
dynamically move about in a random fashion. Slight 
fluctuations are likely to occur within the system at any 
time. During equilibrium, fluctuations are typically 
ignored by the hypnons. But on the other hand, it is 
possible for a single random fluctuation to, ultimately, 
lead the entire macro-system into disorder. Initially, 
though, the perturbation is either ignored or restricted to 
the locality of the fluctuation. 
The system could choose to respond to a fluctuation in 
a more dramatic way. In such a case, the system would 
undergo a transition into a differentiated state. Should 
this take place, the new phase would be identified as near-
to-equilibrium. The system would thus shift, or bifurcate, 
into a less coherent, yet still relatively stable, order. 
The point at which this shift occurs is referred to as the 
bifurcation point. This point is likened to Feigenbaum's 
first period-doubling. 
The near-to-equilibrium state finds the system in 
greater flux with increased random occurrences. The 
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hypnons, or "sleepwalkers," have thus been awakened. This 
near-to-equilibrium phase is important because it paves the 
way for subsequent transitions, leading the system 
(organism) on to an irreversible transformation. The 
authors explicate the process by stating that a "finite per-
turbation . . . cannot possibly overrun the initial state in 
a single move" (p. 187). Instead, the fluctuation perturbs 
the limited region which, in turn, spreads to outside 
regions. Eventually the entire system becomes invaded as 
the result of the finite perturbation. 
This is desciribed by the authors as a "nucleation" pro-
cess in which the initial perturbation forces the system to 
make a choice. The perturbation either crosses the thres-
hold and "spreads to the whole system," or it is ignored by 
the hypnons and the system. It is only by random action 
that the system chooses whether or not to transform. At any 
rate, a return to equilibrium does not bring the system back 
to its former state. Even in equilibrium, the hypnons 
"behave as essentially independent entities;" thus they move 
about dynamically. Once disturbed into a differentiated 
state though near-to-equilibrium, a return to equilibrium 
could never bring those dynamic entities back to their 
former routes or positions. 
Whereas the primary bifurcation introduces only a mini-
mal amount of disturbance to a localized area within the 
system, it bears significance for two reasons: 1) it forces 
the system to choose its future direction, and 2) it paves 
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the way for a transformation. But how the system will 
choose cannot be predicted. Prigogine and Stengers note: 
"There is an irreducible random element; the macroscopic 
equation cannot predict the path the system will take" 
(p. 162). Thus, once the "original bifurcation has disap-
peared," a structure may emerge "continuously as the bifur-
cation parameter grows," or it may "be attained only through 
a finite perturbation" (p. 164). 
It is here that Prigogine and Stengers disagree with 
Feigenbaum; it cannot be universally predicted that a 
perturbed system will emerge into chaos. However, Prigogine 
and Stengers refer to Feigenbaum's theory as a way to 
describe how a system does emerge into chaos, once that path 
has been chosen. The authors describe the "Feigenbaum 
sequence" as a "remarkably simple road to 'chaos'" that 
describes a range of parameters that exist between bifurc~­
tion jumps for systems demonstrating periodic behavior. 
Prigogine and Stengers contend, however, that systems 
are free to choose their future states, and this aspect can-
not be predetermined. Thus the authors assert: "There is 
no longer any universally valid law from which the overall 
behavior of the system can be deduced" (pp. 144-145). 
Because each system is a unique case, an investigation of a 
system's behavior may show qualitative differences from that 
which might be universally expected. 
In accordance with the transformational theory, there-
fore, the behavior of dissipative (organismic) structures 
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cannot be predicted. But once the system has elected to by-
pass the threshold and jump into a more differentiated state 
(i.e., perform the second period-doubling), a higher level 
of entropy, or messiness, is thereby attained. 
Pagels {1982) defines entropy as: "· .. a quantitative 
measure of how disorganized a physical system is, a measure 
of its messiness" (p. 101). The concept is explained by 
Pagels with the following illustration. A blending of the 
right amounts of salt and pepper into a container of water 
will, at equilibrium, present an organized state of water 
and particles. Shaking the container will increase the 
level of entropy, or messiness, within the container. Pro-
fuse shaking will, on the other hand, increase the entropy 
to such a degree that the solution turns gray. 
Prigogine and Stengers concur with Pagels that once the 
entropy has increased, the transformed state will never be 
able to return to its original organization of segregated 
salt and pepper particles. Even at mild entropic levels, 
systems are irreversible; the salt and pepper particles can 
never return to their original positions once shaken. 
Prigogine and Stengers refer to this concept as the 
"arrow of time" with the inference that time--entropy--is 
only one-directional. Though history is incorporated into 
the present and future, it can never reappear. The authors 
state that the past and future play different roles, and 
even with the inclusion of the past into the present, "the 
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future remains uncertain" (p. 289). Systems are not only 
irreversible, they are also uncertain and unpredictable! 
The authors note the nonlinearities of a system: "· 
life seems to express in a specific way the very conditions 
in which our biosphere is embedded, incorporating the non-
linearities of chemical reactions and the far-from-equilib-
rium conditions imposed" (p. 14). Once the system has 
bifurcated to a state of far-from-equilibrium, it has, 
through possibly multiple period-doublings, transformed 
itself into a significantly differentiated state. Further-
more, the system has "self-organized" itself into a higher, 
more refined level of coherence. 
Now that these processes have been uncovered by modern 
science, the scientist has a more complete knowledge of 
"life and evolution." It is understood that the fluxes of 
randomness allow the system to burst forth into limitless 
opportunities for growth. Because the decision to choose 
rests with the system itself, its paths are not predictable 
and, consequently, they turn out to be nonlinear. 
The far-from-equilibrium state is organized because: 
" . the amplification of a microscopic fluctuation 
occurring at the 'right moment' result(s) in favoring one 
reaction path over a number of other equally possible paths" 
(p. 176). And given a choice, a system (organism) will 
always seek growth and improvement, higher organization. 
When applied to the human as an organismic system, it 
can be surmised that the person has a decisive role in 
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leading to his/her transformation. Because the transformed 
state is a higher form of self-organization, the human is 
provided, by the science of Chaos, hope for a brighter 
future! 
Physics and Mathematics 
According to Hillner {1984), eighteenth century German 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant, is "credited with initiating the 
modern phase of metaphysics" (p. 85). Nonetheless, Kant's 
philosophy has met with wide controversy in the emergence of 
quantum theory. 
Kant distinguished between the noumenal {objects and 
things/events of human experience), holding that the con-
tents of the noumenal world are unknowable because they have 
not been experienced or acted upon. Space, time and causal-
ity are phenomenal because they do not exist in the noumenal 
realm of concrete objects; instead, they exist in reference 
to one's experience. Even so, space, time and causality are 
"a priori" because they must, at least intuitively, exist 
prior to the person's experience. Thus, according to Kant, 
the phenomenal categories of space, time and causality are 
"logically and temporally prior to experience." Hillner 
adds: "We cannot have experience or structure without them" 
{p. 86). 
Hillner continues by stating that the space and time 
categories were defined by Kant according to Newton's laws 
and Euclidean geometry. With the discovery of Einstein's 
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"probabilistic" relativity theory, Kant's philosophy came 
under wide dispute among the scientists. 
In his autobiography, Heisenberg (1971) states that the 
impact of Kant's philosophy on quantum physics was an issue 
for discussion at a Leipzig conference in the early 1930s. 
Among the scientists who were there, Kant's philosophy was 
debatable to the degree that no consensus could ever be 
reached. Some asserted that Kant's interpretation of the 
causal laws could not be shaken; that the new quantum theory 
was opposing Kant's laws, and that they intended to "fight 
the matter out" with the quantum theorists. The scientists 
opposing the quantum theorists suggested that Kant's causal 
"a priori" is vital to the future of science, and that all 
research must be guided by the causal laws. Heisenberg con-
sidered their position as food for thought. 
Modern physics became severed from its classical ties 
of Newton's causal laws and Kant's "a priori" philosophy 
by such discoveries as Einstein's relativity theory and 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It was the findings of 
these and other quantum physicists in the early 1900s, and 
Poincare's theory of bifurcation processes, that ultimately 
paved the way for the emergence of Chaos and the transforma-
tional theory. 
Interestingly, one of the founding fathers of this new 
anti-causal science, Werner Heisenberg, was a proponent of 
Kant, despite Kant's adherence to Newtonian ideas. Addi-
tionally, the new science's most heralded founder, Albert 
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Einstein, never relinquished his hold on the classical phi-
losophy. It is thus paradoxical that these two far-sighted 
revolutionaries held on to their classical orientations, 
particularly in the case of Einstein who never recognized 
how his discoveries shattered classical science (Capra, 
1982). Because of their significant contributions to modern 
science, the following discussion focuses on Heisenberg, 
Einstein, and others whose early discoveries transformed the 
field of physics. 
Heelan's (1965) study on the philosophy and work of 
Heisenberg suggests that Heisenberg was largely influenced 
by "Kant's transcendental method of philosophy," despite the 
fact that Kant was "sympathetically disposed" to the 
"acceptance of universal and necessary scientific laws." 
Heelan expresses concern over Heisenberg's "peculiar depen-
dence" on the "Kantian philosophy of classical physics." 
Because of Heisenberg's leadership in the field of 
quantum mechanics, his deference to Kant seems contradic-
tory. Heelan thus speculates: "If the Kantian starting 
point is mistaken, if science presupposes no universal or 
necessary principles then there is no problematic •.. " 
(p. 140). But Heelan continues by stating that Kant's 
emphasis on causality, a category of "substance," fails on 
the quantum level. He suggests that Heisenberg implicitly 
held on to Kant's theory of causality even after the 
discovery of quantum mechanics. As a result, Heisenberg 
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"was dominated uneasily by an idealistic (or positivistic) 
empiricism" (p. 141). 
By the late 1950s Heisenberg showed a change of direc-
tion in how he interpreted the Newtonian nature of Kant's 
philosophy. Contrasting Kant's theory with the quantum dis-
coveries, Heisenberg (1958) notes that space and time have 
come to be regarded as uncertain and unpredictable, largely 
as a result of Einstein's relativity theory and his own 
principle of uncertainty. The relativity theory revealed to 
the world that the "hidden parameters" of space and time 
"can never be observed" (p. 135). 
Having worked for Heisenberg as "an unpaid 'post-doc"' 
student, Weisskopf (1972) recalls the remarkable era of the 
early 1900s when Planck gave birth to the quantum theory, 
and then Einstein announced, in 1905, his "special relativ-
ity theory," followed by his "general relativity theory in 
1916. 11 Weisskopf adds: "Among the great systems of ideas 
which were created in that period (from 1900 to 1930), rela-
tivity theory--special and general--has a place somewhat 
different from the others" (p. 72). 
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Capra (1982) provides clarification of both Einstein's 
relativity theory and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. A 
third principle, the notion of complementarity introduced by 
Niels Bohr, also impacted the quantum movement. Each is 
discussed below. 
Einstein's theory of relativity focused on the behavior 
of subatomic particles which float about the nucleus of an 
atom. The major finding of Einstein's work is that the sub-
atomic particles can have a dual nature. They can behave 
like waves, or they can behave as particles, depending upon 
how the scientist chooses to observe them. As a particle, 
the entity is confined to a small space whereas, when looked 
upon as a wave, the entity may be spread across a vast 
region of space. 
Einstein referred to the particles of light as quanta, 
hence the name quantum theory arose. The term photon is now 
used in place of quanta. Capra (1982) further explains that 
the electron is neither particle, nor wave; rather, it takes 
on the properties of either a particle or wave when defined 
as such by the scientist doing the observation. This means 
that the entity undergoes "continual transformations from 
particle to wave and from wave to particle" without having 
"any intrinsic properties independent of its environment" 
(p. 79). 
It should be added.here that this moving back and forth 
from wave to particle, and then from particle to wave, does 
not imply reversibility. Capra (1982) explains, for 
example, that the movement of a particle can cover a four-
dimensional space-time continuum. The mathematical 
expression of this process using "four-dimensional maps" or 
"space-time diagrams" reveals that these movements "have no 
definite direction to them." Therefore Capra states: 
. there is no 'before' and 'after' in the pro-
cesses they picture, and thus no linear relation 
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of cause and effect. All events are intercon-
nected, but the connections are not causal in the 
classical sense (p. 89). 
It can be seen that the wave-particle question does not 
allow for a deterministic conclusion since the entities are 
relative to the conceptions of the scientist, the one doing 
the perceiving. 
While the formula remains the same, it is the problem 
and the interpretation that differ; thus, it is the human 
doing the perceiving that actually makes the difference. 
Therefore, Einstein (1950) asserts: "· .. we must make up 
our mind to accept the fact that the logical basis departs 
more and more from the facts of experience" (p. 96). 
This dual nature of the quanta, as being relative to 
the perceiver, leads Einstein to address the issue of simul-
taneity. According to Einstein, the theory of relativity 
demonstrated that "simultaneity was relative and depended 
upon the frame of reference" (p. 105) of the perceiver. 
Specifically, the quanta is both--a wave and a particle--at 
the same time. This new discovery was able to free physics, 
according to Einstein, from the classical notion that 
"independent physical properties" had to be concealed in "an 
inertial system" (p. 106), a system at rest, in order to be 
studied. 
Specifically, Einstein (1955) notes that Newton's laws 
presumed systems to be physically objective and inertial, 
or, at rest. This was objectionable to Einstein for two 
reasons: 1) inertial systems "conceive of a thing (the 
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space-time continuum) which acts itself, but which cannot be 
acted on," and 2) "classical mechanics exhibits a deficiency 
. . . to spaces of reference which are not in uniform motion 
relatively to each other" (p. 56). Rather than having to 
move about with clockwork precision, Einstein suggests that 
the entities of time and space move about in a nonlinear 
manner that is neither uniform, nor predictable. 
In describing his special relativity theory, Einstein 
explains that material particles are able to move about 
freely within a finite region. The general relativity 
theory then postulates a sequel, that the "symmetric" and 
the "anti-symmetric" constituents that reside within a sub-
atomic, "infinitesimal displacement field" are able to 
"transform independently of each other, i.e., without mix-
ing" (p. 145). Again the transformation is relative to the 
perceiver and whether the person chooses to view the enti-
ties as particles or waves. Hence, to Einstein, the law of 
the universe is relativity; that is, phenomena (that which 
is observed) are relative to the intent of the observer. 
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Capra (1982) notes that Einstein was striving to create 
a unified theory that could serve as a bridge between quan-
tum and classical physics. Thus, rather than to build a new 
science, Einstein sought to correct and refine the old. 
Capra adds that despite the many compatible studies that 
supported Einstein's rejection of classical mechanics, 
Einstein reserved allegiance for that day when classical and 
modern ties would bind the two as one. That day never came. 
In fact, Einstein's wish met with defeat in 1965 by John 
Bell who found that classical science cannot account for the 
hidden variables of the universe (Pagels, 1982). Ironi-
cally, it was Einstein's own relativity theory that pre-
vented the merger from taking place. Thus, without even his 
knowledge, it was Einstein who paved the way for the science 
of Chaos. 
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According to Weisskopf (1979) the greatest value of 
Einstein's theory rests with the fact that the quantum state 
forms an "indivisible whole" until it is "attacked by pene-
trating means of observation" (p. 120). The quantum state 
is the state of the system at equilibrium where the atom 
"adjust(s) itself to the conditions at low energies." Here 
the atom's movement spreads throughout the region in the 
form of a wave. Because the atom cannot be observed in its 
precise movements, the quantum state reveals only an approx-
imate location of the atom, either at rest as a particle, or 
in flux as a wave moving about the spread of the region. 
Since "the exact point cannot be predicted with accuracy" 
(p. 121), Heisenberg's uncertainty principle becomes impor-
tant. 
The uncertainty principle formulates the velocity and 
position measurements of the electron. The scientist may be 
studying a million atoms in the same quantum state, the 
ground state of equilibrium. Even if the velocity of each 
atom were measured, one could not arrive at the same result, 
although "the atoms are supposed to be in identical quantum 
states." Weisskopf explains that the uncertainty principle 
says that no matter what state the atoms are in, the 
"product of the spreads" must be greater than Planck's 
famous constant for the mass of the electron. This numeri-
cal value is a "probabilistic spread" that is relative. It 
is big enough to let the scientist know whether to "decide 
between the wave and the particle picture of the electron" 
(p. 121). To use the formula, the scientist must be dealing 
with a large number of systems that are in the quantum 
state. 
Because dynamical entities cannot be isolated and mea-
sured with precision (as classical science would have it), 
the scientist must deal with probability spreads and obtain 
only an approximation of reality. It is for this reason 
that the universe is uncertain and cannot be determined as 
predictable. 
Heisenberg (1971) recalls how, in the late 1920s, he 
and Bohr spent a great deal of time discussing magnitudes of 
"time averages of energy, momentum, fluctuations, etc." (p. 
76). Neither of the scientists could reconcile with a math-
ematical formula the "trajectory of an electron in a cloud 
chamber" (p. 77). Finally, in February of 1927, Bohn went 
skiing in Norway leaving Heisenberg to tackle the problem 
alone. Both men had previously believed that "the path of 
an electron in the cloud chamber could be observed," bu1;: the 
problem was not being solved because, Heisenberg came to 
realize, they had been asking the wrong question. Thinking 
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back on some prior discussions with Einstein, Heisenberg 
came to see that what he and Bohr had been observing had not 
been what they thought, it had been something else. They 
had been observing individual water droplets which were too 
large to be electrons. Heisenberg recognized that the ques-
tion should have been: 
Can quantum mechanics represent the fact that the 
electron finds itself approximately in a given 
place and that it moves approximately with a given 
velocity, and can we make these approximations so 
close that they do not cause experimental diff i-
culties (p. 78). 
A brief calculation found that Heisenberg could resolve 
the dilemma through the conceptualization of approximations. 
In this way he applied Einstein's theory of relativity to a 
mathematical formula--the uncertainty principle--which sup-
ported the thesis that if one directly observes the electron 
by casting light on it, the true course of the electron's 
path becomes distorted. But by calculating its path through 
the uncertainty principle, the electron's path can be found 
through approximations without distorting the truth. 
Neils Bohr described the relation between the particle 
and the wave as "complementarity." Capra notes that, 
according to Bohr, both conceptions--the wave and the 
particle--are needed to account for the full reality of the 
atom. Weisskopf (1972) adds that Bohr was so fascinated by 
the wave/particle paradox "that he tried to apply it to some 
other aspects of human thought" (p. 59). 
One of Bohr's examples dealt with the problem of free 
will and the awareness of freedom in decision-making. Bohr 
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saw a complementary relationship between freedom and deci-
sion-making; they are separate, and yet vital to complete 
the whole of human autonomy. A causal connection exists 
only in that one can decide because the person has freedom, 
and because the person has freedom, he/she can decide. Just 
as the particles and waves are the same phenomena seen from 
two distinct perspectives, freedom and decision-making are 
also two distinct functions, but of the same phenomenon. 
One cannot e~ist without the other; freedom and ·decision-
making go hand in hand! 
To recapitulate, up to this point it has been pointed 
out that mathematician-physicists Einstein, Heisenberg, and 
Bohr have laid the foundation for the emergence of Chaos 
through the theories of relativity (special and general), 
and the principles of uncertainty and complementarity. Par-
ticularly through the revolution of relativity, and its 
counterparts of uncertainty and complementarity, modern sci-
ence has come to recognize that nature does not function in 
linear, sequential ways. Instead, nature tends to comprise 
random occurrences on nonlinear and uncertain paths. 
Because this is the case, much of the future cannot be pre-
dicted with precision, though the scientists have derived 
means of arriving at some degree of anticipation through 
statistical approximation. Finally, the existence of 
entropy, and its relation to emergent transformations, has 
led modern science to realize that the nature of the uni-
verse, and all that it encompasses, is irreversible. 
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Three additional mathematicians have played a signifi-
cant role in the founding of these assumptions. In his 1913 
response to Planck's paper on quantum theory, Poincare 
(1963) affirms the contention that systems emerge suddenly 
into differentiated states as opposed to going through slow 
evolutions. According to Poincare: 
• • • we are thus led to the following statement, 
more precise than that of Mr. Planck and not, I 
believe, contrary to his idea. 
A physical system is capable of only a finite 
number of distinct states; it jumps from one of 
these states to another without going through a 
continuous series of intermediate states (p. 85). 
Poincare notes that a system behaves in equilibrium 
until a fluctuation causes it to bifurcate, or "jump," from 
one trajectory to another "under the influence of neighbor-
ing points .. 11 (p. 86). But he adds that it is also pos-
sible for the system to remain unaffected by the perturba-
tion and, thus, to remain in its only finite number of pos-
sible states" such as that described in 1984 by Prigogine 
and Stengers as a state near-to-equilibrium. With this 
description of the bifurcation processes, Poincare does, as 
Gleick suggests, surpass Einstein and the other early 
quantum theorists in explicating the transformational 
theory. 
Also in 1913, Poincare published The Foundations of 
Science (Poincare, 1946) in which he questions the proposi-
tions of analytic logic which are filled with 11 antinomies, 11 
or contradictions. These laws of science have "a very pre-
cise meaning when it is a question of a finite number of 
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objects" {p. 484). But, Poincare asks: What about the 
infinite unknown entities of nature that cannot be observed? 
He proposes: "The old logistic is dead" {p. 485). 
As it actually happens, systems transform because the 
unseen, "innumerable multitude of molecules ... at high 
speeds, cross and crisscross in every direction." Poincare 
describes the law of deviation causing non-touching entities 
to jump, or bifurcate, with the following: The molecules 
probably respond to one another even at great distances, but 
because of the space that exists between two entities far 
apart, whatever impact might occur is not detectable by the 
scientist, thus "their trajectories remain sensibly 
straight." When, however, two molecules happen to pass 
nearby each other, then "in this case, their mutual attrac-
tion or repulsion makes them deviate to right or left" 
(p. 523). In this sense, the impact need not be a coming 
into contact; only that the two molecules' mutual attrac-
tions "become sensible." The law of deviation thus applies 
to molecules that "approach sufficiently near to each other" 
to reveal a bifurcation of the trajectory. At such a time 
the scientist can observe an unexpected jump off the course 
of the anticipated, charted, path. 
Poincare insists that these "disorderly impacts" (which 
may, or may not, come into physical contact) can emerge into 
an inescapable chaos of extreme disorder before re-estab-
lishing "a sort of mean order" where the system can recover. 
In conclusion, Poincare acknowledges the impossibility of 
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obtaining an "exact calculation according to this theory" 
(p. 526). It is necessary, therefore, to arrive at an 
approximate cal~ulation. 
Another mathematician who paved the way for the science 
of Chaos was Hermann Weyl. Physicists such as Heisenberg 
.. 
(1971) were fascinated by the writings of Weyl. Heisen-
berg's mentor, Arnold Sommerfeld, encouraged Heisenberg to 
begin his studies on a more basic level before ·embarking 
upon the theories of Weyl, which Sommerfeld referred to as 
"the most difficult part" (p. 16) of a mathematical pursuit! 
Later, friend Wolfgang Pauli told Heisenberg that Weyl 
"really does know a lot about relativity theory" (p. 25). 
One of the impressive aspects of Weyl's writings is his 
emphasis on the transformational theory, particularly in 
regard to entropy and the influence of chance, or random, 
factors. These bear upon the irreversible changes that 
befall a system or organism. 
In Weyl (1949), the state of thermodynamic equilibrium 
is discussed in a macroscopic context. Weyl acknowledges 
that although spontaneous occurrences to a system might be 
improbable, they can quickly disrupt the system's equilib-
rium and produce an irreversible change. For example, the 
"spontaneous density fluctuations of the air," diffract the 
sunlight to the degree that the sky is made to appear blue 
instead of black. Thus, however "minute" those fluctuations 
might be, "they still have an observable global effect." 
Weyl adds that "chance appears to prevail whenever 'little 
causes lead to big effects'" (p. 200). 
Specifically, Weyl cautions that minute deviations can 
perturb a system beyond human control by gradually penetrat-
ing a global area. Furthermore, some transformations can 
"lead to fatefully different results" (p. 200). And entropy 
is a condition that, as it increases, the system is led to 
further transformations. Weyl notes, for example, how the 
stirring of coffee and milk leads, at first, to a state of 
disorder, followed by a differentiated state that is both 
ordered and irreversible. This new and ordered state would 
never have been created had the original particles not been 
stirred by a perturbation. 
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In contrasting quantum mechanics from classical physics 
Weyl (1932) notes that in the classical era, physicists 
defined the nature of something by the quantity that could 
be derived from its measurement. Attributes were then 
assigned to the object on the basis of laws that had been 
postulated. In fact, it came to be such that attributes 
were assigned to an object "independently of whether or not 
the measurements necessary to establish them were actually 
carried out" (p. 54). Logical formulations using connectors 
such as if, then, and and allowed the classical scientist to 
methodically postulate assumptions and conceal attributes of 
the phenomena under study. 
The new insight of quantum mechanics enables the scien-
tist to determine the probability of a system's taking on a 
particular quantity when those values that are possible are 
known. However, "knowledge of the states of two parts of a 
system by no means fixes the state of the whole system" 
(p. 55). A system is too dynamic to be defined by a local-
ized segment. In fact, a system has far-reaching possibili-
ties beyond what can be seen in the classical sense, for 
"the whole is more than the sum of its parts" (p. 55). 
Weyl is suggesting that "the concepts of Gestalt of the 
Whole" (p. 56) offer the scientist an opportunity to see 
beyond the reductionistic functions of the Newtonian 
machine-works to transformative functions which are "not 
additive." These assumptions parallel the philosophy of 
humanistic psychology which seeks to understand through the 
Gestalt (Heider, 1973; Mahrer, 1978). 
In sum, Weyl (1932) is suggesting that a system, 
whether it be inorganic or organic, derives its whole--its 
transformed or developed state--from an interactive, but not 
additive, "understanding" of its elementary particles. 
Transformation, in fact, occurs prior to and independent of 
any control exercised by a classical scientist seeking to 
regulate through positivistic laws. In opposition to the 
classical stance, Weyl provides a global depiction of 
quantum theory and its relation to nature and life. Weyl 
suggests: 
It seems therefore that the quantum theory is 
called upon to bridge the gap between inorganic 
and organic nature; to join them in the sense of 
placing the origin of those phenomena which con-
front us in the fully developed organism as Life, 
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nature to which atoms and electrons are also sub-
ject (p. 56). 
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From the above, it can be seen that Weyl was a holistic 
thinker of the 1930s. 
Finally, the third mathematician of importance to the 
emergent Chaos paradigm is Erwin Schrodinger (1945) who 
refers to the transformation from one state to another as a 
"quantum jump" (p. 49). Using mathematical language, 
Schrodinger states: "Considering the entire irregularity of 
heat motion, there is no sharp temperature limit at which 
the 'lift' will be brought about with certainty and immedi-
ately" (p. 51). According to Schrodinger, the "lift" 
(bifurcation) can occur at any temperature other than abso-
lute zero. But the higher the temperature rises, or devi-
ates from zero, the greater the chance of an unexpected 
jump. 
It should further be noted that Schrodinger's reference 
to zero as being incapable of bringing forth a transforma-
tion is because zero is the point at which the system has no 
entropy. Schrodinger states: "At the absolute zero point 
of temperature . . . the entropy of any substance is zero" 
(p. 72). Without entropy, the system is at equilibrium. 
The hypnons ignore not only each other, but also many of the 
fluctuations that could perturb the system (Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1984). 
In sum, Schrodinger, like Weyl and Poincare, recognizes 
the transformative processes of nature's inorganic and 
organic systems. These processes are integrally woven with 
randomness and nonlinearity. Transformations remain uncer-
tain because it cannot be predicted when or how such bifur-
cations might occur; and finally, the transformations are 
irreversible. The following section presents an affirmative 
view of these Chaos assumptions as applied to cosmology. 
Astronomy 
Lovell (1958) states that the universe originated from 
"a dense and small conglomerate" which Abbe Lemaitre 
referred to in 1927 as "the primeval atom" (p. 88). All of 
the material of the universe was originally contained in 
that primeval atom. At some point in time, however, an 
"initial momentum of the expansion dispersed this material" 
(p. 89). This is commonly referred to as the Big Bang! 
Because the "initial impetus of the expansion" nearly 
exhausted the elements of the universe, these entities 
quickly settled down into a "nearly static condition" of 
equilibrium in which the forces of gravity and cosmic repul-
sion were kept in balance. Once the explosion dispersed the 
entities into space, this first state found the celestial 
bodies in balance at equilibrium. 
After a long time of being_ at equilibrium, the primeval 
material began to form into great clusters. Hence the con-
dition of equilibrium changed to a state of near-to-equilib-
rium. 
Then the cosmical repulsion forces "began to win over 
those of gravitational attraction," and this launched the 
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universe into a far-from-equilibrium expansion. At this 
point solar systems and galaxies emerged throughout the uni-
verse. 
The above processes of expansion have brought the uni-
verse to the state that is known today, but the universe has 
only been in its present state for the past nine million 
years. A few thousand million years ago, the universe was 
only about 1/10 of its present size. It is not possible for 
science to know when the condition of the primeval atom 
began. Lovell notes that the primeval atom theory "does not 
determine this with any precision," however, the atom's 
explosion must have occurred "between twenty thousand 
million and sixty thousand million years ago" (p. 90). 
Therefore, this last phase of nine million years which has 
formed the present galaxies has been a relatively recent era 
in the universe's vast history. Most importantly, the Big 
Bang theory illustrates that since the primeval explosion, 
the universe has undergone a series of transformations. 
In The Cosmic Code, Pagels (1982) proposes that today, 
the most widely accepted view of the universe's origin 
is the "big bang model" which "maintains that the entire 
universe originated in an enormous explosion" (p. 279). In 
accordance with Lovell's description of the theory, Pagels 
suggests that all of the universe's matter--today's stars 
and galaxies--was, at one time, combined into a concen-
trated, in fact very confined, region of primordial soup 
(i.e., the primeval atom). The primordial soup underwent a 
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rapid expansion that resulted in a tremendous explosion. 
Pagels continues: 
In so doing it cooled down, enabling nuclei, then 
atoms, and finally much later galaxies, stars, and 
planets to condense out of it. This explosion is 
still going on today, except that the universe is 
much colder now as it expands (p. 280). 
Whereas it was once believed that atoms are stable, 
Pagels asserts that quantum theory has now come to the con-
clusion that "stable nuclei will decay" (p. 284): thus, 
atomic particles are not actually stable. However, only a 
probability for this conception can be given. Even though a 
decay might ultimately take place, Pagels suggests that it 
is still possible to conceive of how a primordial soup of 
atoms, could "spontaneously turn itself into a fireball of 
quarks, leptons, and gluons--the big bang" (p. 284). Many 
scientists hold to the contention that the universe is 
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decaying and will, ultimately, wither away. Even the human, 
after his/her ultimate transformation, is destined to die. 
The second law of thermodynamics provides the basis for 
this rationale (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Pagels, 1982). 
Capra (1982) states that the disorder, or entropy, "will 
keep increasing until, eventually, the system reaches a 
state of maximum entropy, also known as 'heat death'" (p. 
74). It must be noted, however, that the scientists are not 
in agreement over the future of the universe. Many 
proponents of the transformational theory support the 
assumptions of entropy until it reaches the state of maximum 
entropy. At this point, the scientists divide. Capra adds 
that modern biologists often oppose the notion that 
organisms resort to decay; rather, their transformations 
continually lead to "states of ever increasing complexity" 
{p. 74). It must be suggested, therefore, that the notion 
of the universe "running down" to a halt is not a matter of 
congruence, even among modern scientists. 
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Both Lovell and Pagels support the theory that the uni-
verse transformed to an intergalactic field of stars, galax-
ies, and constellations when the heat from its original 
atom{s) surpassed the threshold for stability. In affirma-
tion, Sciama (1959) suggests that the heavy elements {i.e., 
stars) are built up by heat. When the elements become 
unusually hot they are distributed throughout the milky way 
through "varying degrees of violence which these stars are 
known to undergo" (p. 212). 
Once the star has lived so long that it begins to out-
grow its heat and cool down, it is no longer able to hold 
out against its own gravitation. Consequently, the star 
contracts. The system--the star--is once again perturbed. 
This, in turn, causes the star to transform to an even dif-
ferentiated state because its "temperature rises again." 
According to Sciama (1959), the transformations occur as the 
star {the system) cools down and contracts. This creates a 
friction against the surrounding elements which, in turn, 
leads the star to rise again in temperature. As the temper-
ature rises, "thermonuclear reactions" occur. Sciama adds: 
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"These new reactions release so much energy that the con-
traction is stopped" (pp. 213-214). 
Once the contraction has stopped, the density within 
the star becomes greater than the density of the universe 
surrounding the star. Sciama thus proposes: "It is now 
quite a frequent occurrence for two particles to strike the 
helium nucleus simultaneously, so that it jumps the barrier 
at mass 5" (p. 214). When the helium has completely burned, 
the cycle repeats itself by cooking and then contracting. 
At this point, the transformative process has reached 
another bifurcation point (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). 
In continuation, Sciama (1959) notes that the process 
of transformation has not come to an end. As the cycle 
repeats itself from heating, to cooling, to contracting: 
"more thermonuclear reactions can occur, the energy release 
of which stops the contraction." In time the bifurcation to 
a state of far-from-equilibrium emerges. Here Sciama states 
that: "This time the elements are built up all the way to 
iron. The building-up process stops there because iron is 
the most stable of all the elements" (p. 214) . Thus the 
violently exploding stars, called the supernovae, have 
ejected from within themselves elements that are "heavier 
than iron" into the surrounding space. These new stars do 
not turn back into iron (their former state) because: 
to do so each nucleus would first have to pass 
through a configuration of higher energy. When 
the heavy elements are dispersed in space they 
have no means of obtaining this extra energy, so 
they just persist indefinitely (p. 214). 
Whereas Lovell and Pagels emphasize the Big Bang from 
its inception, and briefly discuss the bifurcations, Sciama 
deals in more depth with the universe's present state of 
affairs. It is proposed that in the beginning, the universe 
was confined into the primeval atom (or primordial soup). 
After the explosion, the universe manifested a rapid expan-
sion of intergalactic galaxies, stars, (i.e., systems) which 
have continued to bifurcate and produce new transformations 
on both macroscopic and microscopic levels. 
Sciama's discussion focuses on the smaller systems of 
the universe, the supernovae (stars). It appears that a 
star transforms through cycles of heating, cooling and con-
tracting. When the bifurcations have led the star to such a 
temperature that it explodes and ejects matter to form new 
stars, these newer elements are unable to return to the for-
mer composition that was capable of attaining high tempera-
tures. Thus, the new stars are heat resistant. For this 
reason, they are stable and "persist indefinitely." The 
newly formed stars are, therefore, transformations of the 
original supernovae, but in a higher entropic state. 
Sciama (1971) closes by stating that the "Newtonian 
theory of gravitation" can no longer describe these circum-
stances. However, "most physicists believe that the correct 
theory to use is Einstein's general theory of relativity 
.•• " (p. 8). It can be seen that Poincare's theory of 
jumps--that the system leaps from state to state in a 
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noncontinuous and unpredictable manner--also fits Sciama's 
description of entities transforming in the cosmos. 
Pagels (19~2) concludes that there is no absolute law 
governing the universe and all that exists therein. By 
noting the patterns--the transf ormations--which are 
characteristic of all facets of the universe, a better 
understanding lies close at hand. Because of the 
uncertainty that pervades all of the cosmos, Pagels is 
compelled to state: "Until the final chapter of physics is 
written we may be in for lots of surprises" (p. 287)! 
Biology 
In The New Biology, Augros and Stanciu (1988) relate 
the findings of modern physics to biology noting that a 
chief function of the human sciences is to study the mind. 
In regard to development and the growth of knowledge these 
authors suggest that the building-blocks theory must be 
abandoned. The components of the mind, at each level of 
development, are potential and not actual. According to 
Augros and Stanciu: "The higher form is new and different, 
not a mixture or a compounding of lower forms . . . . The 
higher form actualizes the potentiality of the-lower form 
(p. 38). 
In regard to formulations of developmental hierarchies, 
Augros and Stanciu contrast the living being to an inorganic 
crystal. They note that crystals increase in size as matter 
is externally added on. In the crystal's evolving growth, 
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"no transformation of substance" from the inner being 
exists. A perfect crystal is thus homogeneous. But "living 
things grow from within" (p. 42). Thus the authors propose: 
The key to the living thing is the excellence of 
its agency. An organism can change itself; it 
can act or not act on its own initiative . . . 
(p. 43). 
In contrast, inorganic substances are always at the mercy of 
outside fluctuations; that is, they weather or rust, etc. 
There is no internal activity to set the nonliving thing 
into motion, it cannot choose. 
The importance of this passage rests with the notion 
that human development is internally constructive, and 
largely under the control of the person as he/she chooses 
for the self. Unlike a chemical or fluid system, for exam-
ple, when confronted by fluctuations, or perturbances of 
life, the human need not be at the mercy of a threshold or 
boiling point. Augros and stanciu emphasize that: " 
we ourselves are the key to understanding life and living 
things. Taking man as the exemplar for biology •.. all 
levels of nature are reflected in him" (p. 83). And this 
aspect of self-selection--acting in one's fullest sense of 
agency--is vital to the human. 
Just as the modern physicist supports the quantum the-
ory, the modern biologist proposes the transformational 
theory (i.e., the assumptions of Chaos). This is because 
the transformational theory presents the developing human as 
an agent who grows through purposeful action. The human 
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first sets a goal, knowing that another could be substituted 
in its place (if so desired), and then chooses, as freely as 
possible, the means to achieve the desired end. The will 
is, therefore, the human's primary agent for it sets the 
intellect into a particular course of direction, and even 
overrides emotions that interfere with the attainment of the 
goal. A person will thus ignore basic health needs to sat-
isfy the goal, or dominant will. Only a "nonmechanical 
model" can provide for the full range of developmental 
processes (i.e., sensation, emotion, intellect, will) that 
encompass the human being. 
Whereas will might have much to do with the human's 
road to development, this is not to suggest that random, 
unexpected occurrences do not upset the path, forcing the 
human to explore alternate, nonlinear routes. Neither do 
these theorists suggest that the person, despite his/her 
will, can control or be certain of the destiny--or end--that 
is desired by the goal. This is because development is sub-
ject to the circumstances of randomness, nonlinearity, irre-
versibility, and uncertainty; therefore, development is 
never precisely predictable. 
As emphasized by the physicists, mathematicians, etc., 
development, along with many facets of nature, can be 
approximated. Augros and Stanciu describe a biological path 
of evolution and development that approaches the assumptions 
of Chaos while opposing the Darwinian theory of evolution. 
This path to development is referred to by these authors as 
the "process of systematic differentiation" (p. 184). 
141 
The theory of systematic differentiation first recog-
nizes that change occurs through potentialities that develop 
from within the person. The human is able to grow in 
his/her potentialities because he/she has the capacity for 
being self-directed. It is up to the person to choose. 
When one neglects this vital aspect of life, he/she inter-
feres with the progress of his/her own development. Sec-
ondly, development "operates by jumps." The authors contend 
that these jumps have been substantiated by organisms 
"producing new species immediately" in experimental labora-
tories. The third point is that neither evolution, nor 
development, is perpetuated through the use of competition, 
or "natural selection" as postulated by Darwin. In fact, 
biologists have discovered that evolution occurs through "a 
cooperative effort of the whole population." As the fourth 
point, the authors state that despite the sudden jumps, the 
evolution/development is "a natural, orderly process that 
plays out the possible variations on a theme, nature here 
acting like a creative artist." Fifth, there exists in the 
process a principle of economics that seems to guide the 
evolving/developing being as the individual seeks to proceed 
with "minimum energy, minimum material, and minimum waste." 
Finally, for the sixth point, Augros and Stanciu add that 
"systematic differentiation really produces new species, and 
in a way that can be duplicated in the laboratory" (pp. 185-
186). In this way the authors seek to emphasize that, 
though theoretical, systematic differentiation has been 
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empirically validated through research. Furthermore, this 
"new biology" bears ecological significance finding "unity 
at many levels" (p. 228). Systematic differentiation thus 
brings to the fore an "Anthropic Principle" that nature is 
in harmony with all living systems--human and animal--
asserting purpose through physical, social, material, and 
cultural processes of development. 
The Theory of Evolution 
In systematic differentiation studies scientists have 
worked to adjust a species to a changing environment through 
"polymorphism" to prevent is extinction. The plant/animal's 
color, shape, or metabolism is changed to give it flexibil-
ity in adaptation. In the late 1800s a dark moth was rare, 
but with the advent of industrialization trees became dark-
ened by the pollution, leaving the white moth to be easily 
found by its predators. Now dark moths make up nearly 100% 
of the moths in particular areas. Augros and Stanciu note: 
Polymorphism • • • is not a mechanism of evolu-
tionary novelty; it is a mechanism of stability 
that helps to maintain a species once it is estab-
1 i shed ( p • 179 ) • 
The major events of evolution take place because of the 
programs/patterns built into the regulatory genes. The body 
is built according to these genetic programs that are car-
ried by every cell to each part of the body. However, many 
cells also have particular duties to perform (e.g., muscle 
cell, nerve cell). For these cells, the genetic information 
is suppressed so that the genes can fulfill their needed 
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functions. Structural genes "code for the production of 
single proteins" (p. 180) . It has been found that many dif-
ferent organisms have similar structural genes. The differ-
ence between organisms, then, must rest in how this like 
information from the structural genes is used. Using a 
molecular approach, scientists are studying cells' deoxyri-
bonucleic acid (DNA) regarding the sequencing of the genetic 
programs that are in the regulatory and structural genes. 
The purpose is to uncover what it is that organisms use from 
the codes in the genes. 
Augros and Stanciu note that it has just recently been 
discovered that plants and animals use only a tiny portion 
of the DNA in the cells for building the organism. Most of 
the information is "superflous. 11 The authors suggest: 
It is possible that within this superflous DNA 
some process develops new regulatory gene patterns 
that eventually produce new body plans and hence 
new species (p. 181). 
It is emphasized that species--progenitors--do not 
change into new species; rather, they "harbor superflous 
genetic material" that can serve as the seeds for new 
species to develop in subsequent generations of offspring. 
There is a long developmental period in which genetic 
changes are being made in the coding system, yet no evidence 
is coming forth in the individual's who comprise the parent 
species. Nor is it known how long these developmental peri-
ods exist, how many generations are needed before the 
changed progeny is born. The authors note: 
When a new species finally appears, suddenly and 
fully formed, its progenitor (parent) continues 
without change. Evolution occurs only in species' 
superflous and unexpressed DNA without changing 
the individual organism or the extant population 
(p. 182). 
Pagels (1982) affirms these findings suggesting that 
evolution is part of the indeterminism of quantum theory. 
According to Pagels, " .. a few random changes in a DNA 
chain (are) producing a successful mutant" (p. 112-113). 
Ferguson (1980) adds that because living things strive to 
perfect themselves, it is conceivable that the "cell periph-
ery in a living organism actually feeds information back to 
the DNA at its core, changing the instructions" (p. 161). 
She proposes that evolution is a "re-forming of the basic 
structure, and not a mere adding on." 
In light of these findings, Augros and Stanciu contend 
that Darwin's survival of the fittest model "does not square 
with observation" (p. 89). Numerous documentations describe 
animals in the wild which have actually avoided competition 
to cooperate with other species for survival. The authors 
asserts that while "two species never occupy the same niche" 
(physical space/occupation), in thousands of cases it has 
been found that "similar animal species coexist without com-
peting because they eat different foods or are active at 
different times or otherwise occupy different niches" (p. 
93) . 
The theme that is emphasized by these authors is that 
nature's inhabitants are able to coexist in peace and 
cooperation. Innumerable instances of coexistence and 
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cooperation between different species has astounded modern 
biologists observing the subtle and varied types of 
interdependence that nature's wildlife has revealed. The 
authors state that this phenomenon of cooperation and 
coexistence "constitute(s) one of the most intriguing 
subject areas in all of natural science" (p. 105). 
Animals do not fight over the environment; instead, 
"they work with it or around it" (p. 137). While some ani-
mals seek to evade a drought, others make provisions to sur-
vive through it. In either case, no animal is foolish 
enough to attempt to confront a drought head on. The 
authors continue: "· .. none is foolish or inefficient or 
wasteful in its life plan. Neither do organisms waste 
energy struggling against the wind" (p. 137). Thus from a 
biological perspective, neither animals, nor humans, are out 
to annihilate and conquer the remainder of their species. 
Such behavior is not only highly taxing upon the individual 
being, it is self-destructive. No species can survive for 
very long in total isolation: "No organism, then, contra-
dicts its habitat" (p. 138). 
Furthermore, Augros and Stanciu assert that "· .. the 
paleontological data do not agree with the predictions of 
Darwin's theory" (p. 166). In The origin of the Species, 
Darwin (1936) predicts that the fossil record will find evo-
lution to be a slow and successive progression of changes. 
Though Darwin acknowledges the variations, he does not 
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believe that they can occur in sudden or spontaneous jumps. 
According to Darwin: 
As natural selection acts solely by accumulating 
slight, successive, favourable variations, it can 
produce no great or sudden modifications; it can 
act only by short and slow steps (p. 361). 
In this way Darwin describes evolution's path to transforma-
tion as a sequential (linear) and ordered (with short, 
successive steps) route. To further this argument, Darwin 
adds: 
Why should not Nature take a sudden leap from 
structure to structure? on the theory of natural 
selection, we can clearly understand why she 
should not; for natural selection acts only by 
taking advantage of slight successive variations; 
she can never take a great and sudden leap, but 
must advance by short and sure, though slow steps 
(p. 144). 
Harvard biologist-geologist Stephen J. Gould (1977) 
counters Darwin's stance with the following: 
I want to argue that the 'sudden' appearance of 
species in the fossil record and our failure to 
note subsequent evolutionary change within them is 
the proper prediction of evolutionary theory as we 
understand it (p. 61). 
Gould, therefore, asserts that evolution exists, but not in 
the manner by which Darwin proposed. Sudden leaps do occur! 
Gould continues: "Evolutionary 'sequences' are not rungs on 
a ladder;" rather, the evolution of a species is the sudden 
"splitting of one lineage from a parental stock--not by a 
slow and steady transformation of these larger parental 
stocks" (p. 61). And this bifurcation, Gould adds, is q 
rapid process that can only be understood in retrospection. 
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Two additional points about the fossil record are made 
by Augros and Stanciu. For one thing, "· .. species typi-
cally survive for a hundred thousand generations, or even a 
million or more, without evolving very much" (pp. 169-170). 
It has further been discovered that even those species which 
ultimately became extinct held incredibly long histories in 
the fossil record before dying off. Secondly, once a trans-
formation takes place, its appearance is not only rapid, but 
also nonlinear. Augros and Stanciu assert: 
Whole new orders appear suddenly and simultane-
ously, with no evidence of intermediate stages. 
These sudden burst of flora and fauna, so typical 
of the fossil data, are called radiations since 
the ancestral stock develops at one time many new 
body plans and diversifies in several directions 
at once (p. 173). 
The authors note, for example, that about fifty million 
years ago, mammals suddenly bifurcated into "about twenty-
four different orders ranging from bats to whales, kangaroos 
to elephants, and rodents to rhinoceroses. This pattern is 
not peculiar to mammals" (p. 173). It is believed that 
rapid radiation from the cosmos had much to do with the sud-
den transformations. 
In sum, Darwin's impetus is to promulgate the survival 
of the fittest theory with its implication of competition 
over cooperation. The prediction for evolution is thus pos-
tulated by Darwin (1936): "· .. natural selection acts by 
life and death--by the survival of the fittest, and by the 
destruction of the less well-fitted individuals" (p. 144). 
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For this reason, Darwin is criticized by Augros and 
Stanciu, Gould, and other modern scientists who have come to 
find nature more harmonious, with cooperation being the dom-
inant theme of the world's species. Gould notes: "Natural 
selection is the central concept of Darwinian theory--the 
fittest survive and spread their favored traits through pop-
ulations" (p. 40). But Gould further notes that to Darwin, 
improvement does not mean a higher state in a metaphysical 
sense. The fact that a wooly mammoth grows hair to adapt to 
changing cold "is not progressive in any cosmic sense;" 
therefore, "· natural selection is not a doctrine of 
progress" (p. 45). 
Nor does Darwin's evolution support the assumptions of 
Chaos--transformational theory--which describe the change to 
a differentiated state as a transformation to a higher 
order. It is the principle of entropy that suggests systems 
seek higher organization. 
Augros and stanciu find Darwin's theory to be 
"epitomized by three concepts: competition, inefficiency, 
and gradualism" (p. 177). It has been found, however, that 
nature operates under a uniform principle of economics. In 
reference to quantum physics the authors suggest that water 
flows downhill because inanimate systems seek to expend the 
least possible amount of energy. By the same token, living 
things seek economical ways to survive and develop. Augros 
and stanciu conclude the discussion by asserting that: 
"· .. nature is not wasteful and inefficient. The 
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noncompetitive relation between species observed in nature 
follows from the more universal principle that nature 
operates in the most efficient, economical way" (p. 177). 
And in closing the authors note: "This general premise is 
empirically supported by every natural science." 
The following section looks at the philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead whose writings stem from the early 1900s 
when quantum physics was being introduced to the scientific 
community. Whitehead's philosophy bridges the gap between 
the principles of quantum reality and implications for 
humanity. 
A Philosophy of Science 
Whitehead (1925) describes nature as an "interplay of 
bodies" which remain in flux, "disclosed to us as one com-
plex of things" which constitute a "systematic totality" (p. 
209). The large bodily event of the system is affected by 
the "intimate character" of the relations which reside 
within. Specifically, the outcome is such that the whole is 
affected by the parts. Additionally, the reciprocity that 
exists between the parts and the whole of the human, extend 
beyond the human so that there is also a reciprocity between 
the human, as a part, and nature, as a whole. 
Within the human, molecules modify themselves to con-
tribute to the pattern, or body, as a whole. The parts 
within that pattern "are peculiarly sensitive, each to the 
modifications of the other" (p. 214). Events interact 
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within the body through a process of "emergent enduring" 
patterns; the aim is for growth and stabilization. Modern 
physics provides innumerable examples of this process. 
Because this seems to be a universal principle of interac-
tion, that systems and organisms cooperate to attain a 
higher order of wholeness, Whitehead (1925) states: 
The laws which condition this field are nothing 
else than the conditions observed by the general 
activity of the flux of the world, as it individu-
alises itself in the events (p. 220). 
Whitehead views the functions of an entity within the 
organism as having a substantial role in the body's overall 
health. An isolated entity's mode of activity reveals the 
organism's peculiar, or selected, response to a flux exter-
nally imposed upon that entity in the organism. Though the 
body is confronted by infinite fluxes, it has the possibil-
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ity. of choosing whether, and how, it might respond, depend-
ing upon the modes, or capabilities of the various parts. 
Whitehead contends: "Each individual activity is nothing 
but the mode in which the general activity is individualised 
by the imposed conditions" (p. 255). It is this modal dif-
f erentiation that enables the parts to interact for the good 
of the whole. 
Whitehead (1934) suggests that the internal workings of 
the body's entities function in a nonlinear manner. This is 
because the human's immediate experience is, in part, 
derived from a multiplicity of prior experiences which enter 
into his/her understanding of the present experience. By 
the same token, anticipations of future experiences play 
upon both present and past experiences. The nonlinearity of 
these overlapping processes refutes the notion that nature 
runs on a cause-effect track. Whitehead (1934) asserts: 
" . each happening is a factor in the nature of every 
other happening . . . . no event can be wholly and solely 
the cause of another event" (p. 41). Whitehead (1957) adds 
that the human's present and past lose the "single determi-
nate meaning" (p. 109) that each respectively entails as 
past perceptions and feelings become diffused into present 
durations. 
In sum, the bodily event is such that the whole is 
affected by the parts. Through nonlinear processes that 
enable the human to integrate the past with the present, and 
with anticipations of the future, the human responds to the 
fluxes of the environment with "emergent enduring" patterns 
that stem from the body's repertoire of modal capabilities. 
Because of these inherent attributes, the human can respond 
to the random perturbations of the environment by choice. 
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This chapter has introduced the new science of Chaos as 
an emergent paradigm which actually had its inception in the 
early 1900s with the discoveries of Planck, Einstein, and 
other physicists who introduced quantum mechanics, and with 
mathematician Henri Poincare who introduced the processes of 
transformation. The assumptions of the transformational 
theory were presented throughout the chapter as they pertain 
to the new paradigm of Chaos and the fields of chemistry, 
physics and mathematics, astronomy, and biology. Finally, 
the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead was presented as a 
philosophical integration of science with the human organ-
ism. 
In the following chapter the humanistic paradigm is 
explored in relation to the assumptions of the transforma-
tional theory. It is shown that this perceptual, Gestalt 
philosophy views development accordingly. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HUMANISTIC PARADIGM 
In studying the works of prominent humanistic theo-
rists, the researcher discovered that the humanistic philos-
ophy tends to concur with the transformational theory. It 
was found that these theorists believe that human organisms 
choose to make order out of the disorder of their lives. 
Hillner's (1984) historical description of humanism 
suggests that this "Gestalt-oriented holistic" paradigm 
became regarded as the "third force" of the 1960s and 70s 
because it challenged the prominent paradigms of psychology: 
behaviorism nor psychoanalysis regarded man as unique; and 
each made the organism a prisoner of uncontrollable forces." 
Humanism, on the other hand, "· .• placed man at the center 
of the psychological universe and put man back in control of 
his own destiny" (p. 238). Through this psychology the 
human was made responsible for both the actions and the con-
sequences of his/her choices. In sum, the human became 
responsible for his/her own well-being. 
This emphasis on individual choice and responsibility 
that one must accept in accord with one's choices provides a 
strong link between humanism and existential theory. 
Hillner states that "· .. the American existential 
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psychologist, Rollo May" (p. 234) played a significant role 
in the laying of groundwork for the humanistic paradigm. 
Assisting in this endeavor were "pre-1960 humanists," Donald 
Snygg and Arthur Combs. 
Humanism also developed from a number of psychology's 
specialized fields (e.g., psychoanalysis, Gestalt), as well 
as from philosophy's existentialism, Hillner notes that 
"there is no widespread consensus relative to exactly what 
humanism is." It appears, however, that humanism represents 
a return to the search for consciousness. Although Gestalt 
concepts are included, humanism extends from mere perceptual 
awareness to encompass "the organism's entire personality or 
state of being" (p. 234). 
There is no question as to humanism's roots in existen-
tial theory. Leading existentialist and proponent of human-
istic theory, Rollo May (1983), defines existentialism as 
"· .. the endeavor to understand man by cutting below the 
cleavage between subject and object" (p. 49). The term 
existentialism, May notes, is in reference to the science of 
ontology which is "the science of being (ontos, from Greek 
'being')" (p. 51). 
After recognizing the contributions of Edmund Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Jaspers to the advancement of existential 
thought, May concedes that the basic philosophy which founds 
existentialism is an inherent part of other similar philoso-
phies. According to May (1983): 
There is an obvious similarity between existen-
tialism, in its emphasis on truth as produced in 
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action, with the process philosophies, such as 
Whitehead's ... (p. 55). 
Furthermore, existentialism has a striking resemblance to 
Eastern philosophies such as "the writings of Laotzu and Zen 
Buddhism." May's point is to note the global congruence 
that exists between a number of philosophical orientations 
which are "not at all to be identified; they are on differ-
ent levels." In suggesting that existentialism and humanism 
are attempts to understand the human, May (1983) adds: "The 
present widespread interest in Oriental thought in the West-
ern world is, to my mind, a reflection of the same cultural 
crisis • . . which called forth the existential movement" 
(p. 59). 
It can be seen, therefore, that May acknowledges the 
possibility of developing, or attaining fulfillment, through 
a variety of approaches, with existentialism being only one. 
The implication is such that a wide range of orientations 
(e.g., the assumptions of Chaos, Whitehead's philosophy, 
existentialism, humanism) can all be of one accord when it 
comes to supporting the transformational theory. 
The researcher found numerous occasions when the human-
istic psychologists made reference to randomness, nonlinear-
ity, irreversibility, and uncertainty or unpredictability in 
regard to the fluxes, or processes, of nature. Many such 
citations are presented in this chapter. It will be shown 
that the humanistic paradigm and the assumptions of Chaos 
are theoretically congruent, even if, as May suggests, 
the two perspectives are "on different levels." Some 
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theoretical considerations that, in fact, bear out the 
congruences between the humanistic paradigm and the 
transformationa~ theory follow. 
The Newtonian-Deterministic Rationale 
Allport (1961) asserts that conventional descriptions 
which tend to categorize a person's development through 
stages are mere abstractions which ignore the inner quali-
ties that make humans unique. Such theories ignore, accord-
ing to Allport: 
•.. how John's intelligence is related to his 
dominance, to his values, to his conscience, and 
to everything else in his personality, it is the 
'inside system' that baffles a conventional sci-
ence of universals (p. 10). 
Stage theories ignore the "inside system" and thus can-
not adequately explain development. Instead of seeking to 
understand the dynamic complexities of the human upon which 
development impends, stage theories are invented to identify 
and abstract from the human common characteristics which can 
be used for comparative purposes. Deterministic science is 
baffled by the anomalies of human uniqueness. Kuhn (1970) 
proposes that scientists view exceptions to the rule to be 
"just too problematic to be worth the time" (p~ 37); there-
fore, the anomalies are ignored. 
The Newtonian deterministic science does not address 
the affective nature of the human. By ignoring the complex 
and unique personality of the human, the singular focus 
which frames development into a rational, cognitive context 
157 
allows the human to be defined in a narrow and linear way. 
Allport (1961) surmises: 
We have made some progress in manufacturing build-
ing blocks (traits) and in labeling them, but lit-
tle progress in architecture . . . . as yet we 
have few methods to help us establish these ideas 
on a scientific basis (p. 386). 
But Allport (1955) also notes that "the individual's posses-
sion of multiple possibilities" prohibits the deterministic 
scientist from knowing more than "simplicist" solutions. 
According to Allport: "One-channeled minds can never com-
prehend that truth may have many channels" (p. 85). 
Maslow (1970) affirms Allport's contention, noting that 
"orthodox science ... leave(s) out too much that is pre-
cious to most human beings" (p. 40). Moreover, determinis-
tic science finds ways to classify the human personality 
into any number of artificial routes that might support 
whatever it is that the scientist seeks to verify. Maslow 
(1987) suggests: "Perhaps we shall have to reject atomistic 
classification and look for some holistic principle of clas-
sifying •.• " (p. 229). 
May (1983) asserts that a proponent of the scientific 
method employs "philosophical presuppositions" to serve as 
the "spectacles through which he perceives" (p. 46) the 
object of study. This technique is used regardless of 
whether the determined variables of study even encompass the 
"real problems." The scientific method tends to focus on 
isolated facts "from an allegedly detached base." May con-
tents that this technique: 
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. . . arose out of the split between subject and 
object made in the seventeenth century in Western 
culture and then developed into its special com-
partmentalized form in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (p. 46). 
Furthermore, May admonishes America's preoccupation with 
methodology to the neglect of searching for hidden consider-
ations that impact the bits that are analyzed. Maslow 
(1970) affirms by stating that: "Nineteenth-century objec-
tivistic, value-free science has finally proven to be . . . 
a poor foundation for ... the rationalists, the humanists, 
and other non-theists . (p. 40) 
Rogers (1969) notes that while data collection and the 
ability to "postdict" behavior is possible with the scien-
tific methods, it is "doubtful that it could ever collect 
and analyze the data instantaneously" (p. 292). Because the 
human is continually in flux between the ongoing processing 
of information which must be both cognitively and affec-
tively addressed, it is impossible to rationalize the per-
son's behavioral response. Therefore Rogers (1977) 
expresses concern over the fact that the rationality of sci-
ence is an "attempt to divorce the two actually inseparable 
components of experience, to the detriment of our humanity" 
(p. 50). There must be no distinction between the cognitive 
and affective aspects of the human. 
A New Science Proposed 
Snygg and Combs (1949) point to the fact that the 
"behavior of conscious living organisms is irregular and 
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variable, and relatively unpredictable" (p. 341) . As a 
result, people who experience "the same physical situation" 
do not respond or behave in the same manner. These authors 
add: 
And, what is even more confusing, in the same 
physical situation the same person behaves differ-
ently at different times. In terms of the physi-
cal environment, the behavior of living organisms 
is erratic, irregular, and relatively unpre-
dictable (p. 341). 
This is because behavior is determined not by an objective 
reality, but by one's subjective feelings about the object 
(or objective environment) which is perceived. 
Combs, Richards and Richards (1976) propose: "The per-
ceptions that might be available to a person at any moment 
are practically infinite" (p. 412). However, a professional 
clinician is often able to arrive at an "approximation" of 
one's possibilities for the future by coming to "understand 
the meanings which constitute a person's experience of his 
world" (p. 412). 
The emphasis of the humanistic paradigm, then, is upon 
understanding as opposed to measuring. In affirmation, 
Allport (1955) asserts that "psychology is a nonnormative 
discipline" which must discover an individual's "course of 
becoming" by "dealing with the whole fabric of personality" 
(p. 101). Only then may one's potentialities of greater 
promise be opened for consideration. 
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For the above reasons, Maslow (1987) submits that a new 
approach to science be launched. Whereas the "means-cen-
tered orthodoxy" allows the scientist safety and security 
from challenges of the profession, normal science methods 
force the scientist to participate as a mere "settler." 
Unfortunately, the call is for pioneers, not settlers, to 
explore the "not-yet-known." Maslow reiterates with the 
following: 
The proper place for scientists . . . is in the 
midst of the unknown, the chaotic, the dimly seen, 
the unmanageable, the mysterious, the not-yet-
well-phrased (pp. 192-193). 
Moreover, because science has become so method-bound and 
independent of human values, there is "no way to distinguish 
between an important experiment and an unimportant one 
the most trivial research could demand as much respect as 
the most fruitful one" (p. 193). 
Rogers (1973) affirms the need for viewing the human in 
a nonrestrictive way be describing human evolution as a 
"fluid valuing process" which affords opportunities to 
freely choose "whatever he deeply values" (p. 201). Human 
behavior need not conform to. rigid linear expectations. 
Instead, one will chart his/her own course in accordance 
with the "actualizing and socialized" goals that one 
inwardly assumes in his/her "growth promoting climate." 
Rogers, therefore, proposes: 
. . . when the human being is inwardly free to 
choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to 
value those objects, experiences, and goals which 
make for his own survival, growth, and develop-
ment, and for the survival and development of 
others (p. 201). 
It is assumed that as one develops towards health (the 
actualization of his/her growth needs), the choices that one 
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makes tend to contribute to the health of those around 
him/her. As a result, one's own survival and health also 
enhances the su+vival and development of others. Kelley and 
Faunce (1945) reiterate: "· .. consider the way in which 
we multiply our individual resources when we cooperate with 
others" (p. 26). 
Kelley and Rasey (1952) affirm Rogers' contention about 
the fluidity of development noting that "the human organism 
in its totality and all that it encounters is in flux" 
(p. 20). The complexity of life centers on the fact that 
"there is constant change in relatedness." How individuals 
change in their relatedness to one another and to the envi-
ronment is a concern that normal science cannot approach. 
Because humans "live in a milieu of movement," science must 
consider all the fluctuations that perturb the human as 
he/she attempts to relate to this world of perpetual change. 
To these authors: "Life, then, really means process, move-
ment, flux" (p. 20) . 
Rogers (1969) contends that development is compounded 
by many "irreconcilable contradiction(s)" (p. 274). But 
even in an oppressive environment, a person can draw from 
his/her capacity for "self-understanding" to m~ke meaningful 
choices. 
In an interview with Evans (1970), Allport urges that 
" • all these factors ... be accounted for when we. 
attempt to determine how personality becomes what it is" 
(p. 53). Self-image, maturation, cognition, identification 
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must all be considered in understanding the personality. It 
is added by Allport that self-image is a factor that affects 
development long beyond the years of childhood. 
Finally, May (1975) asserts that a vital part of devel-
opment encompasses the aspect of transformations which must 
not be ignored by science. May first addresses the trans-
formation of the adolescent into adulthood which brings the 
young man/woman to "a new form." It is then emphasized that 
not all transformations are physiological. Here May 
describes a transformation in his own life that completely 
and permanently altered his thinking--his personal theory--
about human nature. 
In this transformation, May came upon an anomaly which 
he first discarded because it did not contribute to the 
hypothesis of his study. Because the phenomenon kept pre-
senting itself, May encountered a period of stress. He 
spent time reading and contemplating over what might be the 
solution to an impossible problem. Finally, one night May 
put away the materials of his study and left his office with 
the intention of thinking of other things. As he allowed 
his mind to roam freely (contemplating the green houses that 
he passed on the way to the train), a sudden insight over-
came May's consciousness. This heightened awareness brought 
May to a different plane of consciousness regarding the the-
oretical phenomenon. 
In this way May became psychologically (as opposed to 
physiologically) transformed. From the moment of that 
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sudden insight (transforming heightened awareness), May has 
approached the subject of human development from a different 
consciousness than that which previously guided his 
research. 
From the above humanistic theorists it can be surmised 
that a new approach to science is needed for endeavoring to 
understand the multi-faceted conditions (anomalies/ 
fluctuations) that intervene in one's course of development. 
Influences of objective and conscious experiences that play 
upon one's subjective and unconscious feelings prohibit 
normal science from approaching reality. The following 
pages illustrate how the theorists of the humanistic 
paradigm recognize that randomness, nonlinearity, irre-
versibility, and uncertainty/unpredictability are implicit 
aspects of development which appear in the dynamics of 
transformation. 
The Humanistic Paradigm 
of Development 
Kelley and Rasey (1952) describe the human as a "unit 
of energy seeking to spend itself" (p. 22). Approaching the 
human from a physics perspective, the authors note that the 
basic unit of all organic and inorganic matter is the atom 
which "is not a solid particle but an organization in which 
energy is locked" (p. 23). Because the smallest unit--the 
atom--is comprised of moving particles, all matter is 
energy. Nonliving matter (e.g., rocks) expend energy in the 
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course of deterioration, withering away. Living matter, on 
the other hand, has a natural tendency to spend energy for 
the sake of self-preservation. The human organism, in par-
ticular, has a degree of control over how its energy will be 
spent. Thus humankind has the inherent capacity for choice. 
Inorganic materials spend energy in such a way as to 
transform themselves from a state or order into pulverulent 
disorder. Humans, on the other hand, transform from disor-
der to order. The authors add that when growth is arrested 
and the transformations cease to occur, development can be 
decelerated to the point at which death ensues. Hence one 
either grows, or one ultimately dies. 
Unlike plants and animals, the human has highly devel-
oped capacities through the refined and complex nervous sys-
tem. Humans thus have the capacity to remember, to foresee, 
and to somewhat create their own destiny. However, the 
authors note: "There are still many conditions which he 
(the human) has not been able to control completely • II 
(p. 26). In continuation, Kelley and Rasey note that the 
weather is an example of one kind of condition which lies 
beyond the realm of human control. Still the human can 
invent such things as heaters and air conditioners to modify 
the effects of uncontrollable phenomena such as the weather. 
Finally, humans have a need for others. It is a mis-
conception to think that competition is the key to survival. 
According to Kelley and Rasey, biological research has shown 
that "the fundamental methods of progress for living things 
is not competition, but cooperation" (p. 28). Just as an 
infant must depend upon its mother for nourishment and sus-
tenance, "an individual life depends upon the cooperation of 
separate individuals" (p. 29) . Humans, as well as plants 
and animals, find symbiosis (i.e., different species living 
together for mutual advantage) to be requisite to survival. 
The authors conclude: "Man, then, is a social creature or 
he is nothing" (p. 30). 
From these considerations of growth and development the 
humanistic theorists espouse a philosophy that seeks to 
encourage humanity on toward psychological health and 
fulfillment. Humanism recognizes that precise measurement 
and prediction impose parameters which restrict the scien-
tist from considering the many unknowns that encompass the 
human's growth and development. The theorists, therefore, 
address issues relative to these unknowns which often paral-
lel the assumptions of Chaos. In fact, the humanistic 
paradigm seems to suggest that development encompasses: 
randomness, nonlinearity, irreversibility, and uncertainty/ 
unpredictability. The following pages present some particu-
lar examples of the apparent congruences between the human-
istic paradigm and the assumptions of Chaos. 
Randomness 
Kelley and Rasey note that humans are continually in 
flux as they experience and interact with constantly chang-
ing circumstances of the environment. These everchanging 
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situations leave the individual feeling "like a fish swim-
ming upstream." Kelley and Rasey explain: 
There is no other fish in the world exactly like 
this one, and the flowing water that he strives 
with carries ever different other fish and debris 
for his attention or for his ignoring. The banks 
and the bottom of the stream, the swiftness of the 
current, the temperature of the water, are contin-
uously different and continuously carry the poten-
tial of 'for better or for worse' (p. 47). 
By the same token, the human strives to develop in 
"this inevitable and inescapable stream of life" continually 
trying to relate to the ongoing changes that exist among the 
people and events. Like the fish in the stream, the human 
is perpetually confronted by the randomness of events and. 
circumstances over which he/she has no control. Many such 
occurrences can be neither anticipated, nor can an internal 
(emotional) response be offered in one situation as it might 
in another. It appears that randomness can be applied not 
only to the external factors of chance, but also to the 
internal response that one might experience on a given day. 
(On any other day, the individual might react in a different 
manner.) 
In addition to the above, the concept of randomness can 
be applied to the context in which May (1975) describes sud-
den insights; thoughts pop into a person's head from, seem-
ingly, out of the blue! May asserts that such bursts of 
insight come from a "breakthrough of ideas from some depth 
below the level of awareness" (p. 55). The heightened 
awareness is thus a coming into consciousness of unconscious 
thought. May adds that this explains why people who share a 
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common experience will have varying ways of interpreting 
that experience. Each individual draws from his/her past 
experience which is often forgotten on the conscious level, 
yet remains alive in the unconscious. 
Maslow (1962) notes that for the person who "becomes 
more stable and autonomous," many of the random occurrences 
of life "will make no change at all" (p. 36). Once a person 
has developed beyond the level of striving to meet basic 
needs (i.e., safety, belonging, love), he/she becomes more 
and more able to reject perturbing fluctuations that upset 
fragile, less developed persons. 
This is not to imply that a person who has developed to 
the degree that his/her potentials are more fully actualiz-
ing ever reaches the point in life that anger, frustrations, 
trials and tribulations do not make some impact. Maslow 
asserts that all people experience pain and conflict. The 
more fully developed individuals, however, often seek to 
grow from such experiences by turning "inward in a medita-
tive way" (p. 35). Thus the actualizing persons tend to 
resolve conflicts through self-searching as opposed to seek-
ing help from others. 
In continuation, Maslow lists the kinds of random per-
turbations that tend to lead less developed persons into 
therapeutic treatment. Traumas and tragedies such as con-
versions, sudden insights, and deaths are often found to 
have "forced change in the life-outlook of the person and 
consequently in everything that he did" (p. 36). It can, 
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therefore, be surmised that random occurrences may be minor 
enough to an individual that the perturbation is ignored. 
Similarly, a random fluctuation might cause a person to seek 
out a resolution through self-reflection, or meditation. As 
Kelley and Rasey, in addition to Maslow, suggest, the 
response to a random occurrence will not be the same for 
individuals who are confronted by even the same situation. 
Because of individuals' differing levels of development and 
unique prior experiences, randomness can describe the anoma-
lies that exist both within and external to the existence of 
humankind in the universe. 
Nonlinearity 
In his interview with Evans (1970), Allport proposes 
that "a direct linear cause and effect relationship" (p. 77) 
between events in one's life and the person's subsequent 
response cannot be made. For example, "there is nothing 
predetermined about what values the child will acquire from 
its parents" (p. 77). Allport attributes this nonlinear 
relationship between the input of parental instruction and 
the output of behavior as being the randomness of life 
itself. Allport expresses this with the following: 
. it seems to me that all the interesting 
things in personality lie in the inferences we 
must make about what's going on in these interven-
ing variables in terms of motivation, interests, 
attitudes, values, and so on (p. 14). 
The unknowns, which implicitly exist in a world of random-
ness, prohibit the legitimacy of conjecturing about cause 
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and effect relationships. Abstracted generalizations offer 
little in regard to indicating the nonlinear possibilities 
that enter into one's behavior. 
Even Maslow (1962), with his hierarchial plan for 
development (which takes one from the gratification of basic 
needs to the healthier state of self-actualization) suggests 
that: "· •. the stepwise, all or none, saltatory concep-
tion of motivational progression toward self-actualization" 
is to be discouraged. Rather than to gratify needs "one by 
one, before the next higher one emerges into consciousness," 
the goal for self-actualization must be viewed as "a dynami-
cal process, active throughout life, Being, rather than 
Becoming" (p. 24). Development is dynamic, and thus, non-
linear. 
Rogers (1977) describes the highly developed person as 
fully-functioning, Maslow (1962) uses the term, self-actual-
ized, and Combs et al. (1976) refer to the person has having 
a positive view of self. In Combs (1982) such a person is 
characterized as: 1) being knowledgeable, 2) seeing him/her 
self in positive ways, 3) having deep feelings of identifi-
cation with others, and 4) being open to experience. The 
concept of openness, in and of itself, implie·s nonlinearity. 
Combs conveys the inherent nonlinearity by stating that: 
~Greater openness . . . to experience means persons have 
more data from which to make choices" (p. 107). 
In essence, the randomness of data is dynamically being 
processed by the perceiver who selects from an array of 
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possibilities a path of choice. As previously stated, the 
dynamics enter into the process on the basis of how the per-
son elects to respond on a given day. (On any other day, it 
is possible that the person might opt to choose differently, 
depending upon other intervening variables that might pre-
sent themselves at that particular time.) Indeed, the more 
open one becomes (in receiving and responding to fluctua-
tions), the more nonlinear the person's processing of the 
information, and active response, turns out to be. 
Combs (1962) adds that persons who have a positive view 
of self "behave in terms of what seems best to do, and let 
the chips fall where they may" (p. 53). A nonlinear 
approach to life thus enables the person "to be creative, 
original and spontaneous." Combs reiterates: 
With a positive view of self one can risk taking 
chances; one does not have to be afraid of what is 
new and different. A sturdy ship can venture far-
ther from port. Just so, an adequate person can 
launch himself without fear into the new, the 
untried and the unknown (p. 53). 
In this context, being "adequate" means having a positive 
view of self, or psychological health. 
May (1969) recognizes the nonlinearity of development 
in the emotional realm of human relations. According to 
May, "in all stages of human development the experiences of 
love and death are interwoven" (p. 103). Caring for another 
human being is a process of being open to feel and identify 
with the other person's pain and joy with empathetic, heart-
felt concern. May emphasizes: "Care is a state in which 
something does matter; care is the opposite of apathy" 
(p. 289). It is paramount that this realm of feelings and 
emotions be included in conceptualizing human development. 
As May points out, "· .. we cannot know except as we feel" 
(p. 303). The affect is, most assuredly, the human's most 
nonlinear area of development. 
But May does not restrict his theorizing to the affec-
tive area; he also addresses cognition. It is important to 
note that the humanistic psychologists do not segment the 
areas of human functioning into categories (i.e., cognitive, 
affective, psychomotor). However, development is often 
viewed as a function of separate entities. Therefore, it is 
being noted here that the humanistic psychologists do not 
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restrict themselves to singular aspects of development. 
(Piaget, on the other hand, considers only the cognitive 
realm of development. And Gesell concerns himself with only 
biological maturation.) 
May (1975) notes the nonlinear fashion by which 
thoughts leap about in one's cognition. According to May: 
The human imagination leaps to form the whole, to 
complete the scene in order to make sense of it. 
The instantaneous way this is done shows how we 
are driven to construct the remainder of this 
scene. To fill the gaps is essential if the scene 
is to have meaning (p. 131). 
An illustration of how the cognitive function is integrated 
with the affect is presented below. First May notes that as 
the human thinks about things of interest, he/she organizes 
those thoughts into a form. It is then pointed out by May 
that the term "form" is problematical. He continues that if 
only the word from were used: "· .. it would sound too 
abstract; but when it is combined with passion, we see that 
what is meant is not form in any intellectual sense, but 
rather in a wholistic scene" (p. 131). Cognition and affect 
are integral to one's coming to make sense of his/her expe-
riences. In sum, cognition cannot be devoid of affect. 
Because thinking and learning are as much affective 
(emotional) processes as they are cognitive, Rogers {1977) 
proposes that education encourage teachers and students to 
participate in discussions that invite open and free expres-
sion of feelings and concerns. This, of course, encourages 
the underlying aspects of randomness (individual thoughts 
and emotions) to surface in a nonlinear fashion. Rogers' 
open format for teaching offers the students opportunities 
not only to express themselves freely, and to choose, but it 
allows each individual the "freedom to be" (p. 74). 
Both Combs (1982) and Rogers (1977) address the impor-
tance of establishing an open climate in the classsroom. By 
facilitating an openness to experience, Rogers (1962) cau-
tions: 
I do not mean that this individual would be self-
consciously aware of all that was going on within 
himself, like the centipede who became aware of 
all his legs. On the contrary, he would be free 
to live a feeling subjectively, as well as be 
aware of it ... (p. 25). 
The point is that one cannot develop fully without the 
removal of inhibitive barriers. Rogers and Combs propose 
that the classroom is one place where such barriers can be 
let down. 
173 
The reader may note that the concepts of randomness and 
nonlinearity do not comply with exclusive categories. In 
fact, the concepts are highly indicative of overlapping. It 
is for this reason that discussions of randomness appear in 
the section on nonlinearity. The following sections on 
irreversibility and uncertainty/unpredictability also illus-




According to Kelley and Rasey, human development is a 
forward-moving process. One might reach a plateau in 
his/her development, but it is impossible to return to a 
former state. These authors propose that in development, 
"the plant, the animal, the human being becomes more per-
fectly that which it already is" (p. 61). May (1969) 
affirms that development must encompass more than just a 
sustenance of life. Using the biological concept of tropism 
which describes an organism's tendency to turn toward life 
sustaining elements of nature (e.g., light, oxygen), May 
asserts that it is not the will, but the wish to live that 
"moves us." In other words, tropism inclines one toward 
life-sustaining elements (e.g., food, light, shelter). How-
ever, the mere sustaining of life, by meeting only basic 
needs, can offer a person no more than a meager state of 
existence until life's inevitable termination comes to pass. 
May (1973) thus projects: 
The human being cannot live in a condition of 
emptiness for very long; if he is not growing 
toward something, he does not merely stagnate; the 
pent-up potentialities turn into morbidity and 
despair, and eventually into destructive activi-
ties (p. 143). 
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) refer to the principle of 
entropy as the "root of nonlinear thermodynamics" (p. 140). 
Forces that perturb an organism prohibit its ability to 
function in a steady, linear fashion. Development is thus 
irreversible as it would be impossible for the organism to 
repeat the dynamics of its growth processes. The authors 
assert: "This change has to define our arrow of time. The 
increase of entropy for isolated systems has to express the 
aging of the system" (p. 258). In Evans (1970), Allport 
proposes that the growth of an open system "obeys the second 
law of thermodynamics" (p. 95). Kelley (1947) then applies 
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this arrow of time to human development by noting that "we 
are purposive organisms" in that the human will take in from 
the environment only that which can be integrated into 
his/her "past experience and purposes" (p. 48). Therefore, 
from all that forces upon and perturbs the human organism, 
the human will seek out options that go beyond preservation 
to the enhancement of self. Finally, Combs et al. (1976) 
suggest that "· .. it is the organism itself which brings 
about the cure through its own return to effective organiza-
tion" (p. 53). In sum, the human, along with other organ-
isms, has an inherent capacity for self-healing through 
self-organization. 
Combs et al. add that the human's capacity for self-
enhancement is the result of the "tremendously complex brain 
and nervous system" (p. 71). One's development is largely 
related to how that person perceives the world and his/her 
place therein. The authors assert that a person's self-con-
cept is based on how the self is perceived by the individual 
in all its complexity. Combs et al. state: "This organiza-
tion is not a mere conglomeration of isolated concepts of 
self, but a patterned interrelationship or Gestalt of all 
self-perceptions" (p. 159). 
Historian Heider (1973) notes that Ehrenfels, author of 
the original paper on Gestalt qualities, viewed the Gestalt 
process as mystical. In 1916 Ehrenfels published a book 
entitled, Kosmogonie, which suggests that: "A creative 
Gestalt principle confronts the formless chaos and imposes 
some order on it" (p. 69). Ehrenfels viewed the Gestalt as 
having a "chaos-kosmos 11 connotation. In seeking to avert 
the "then-prevalent atomistic theory of sensation elements" 
(p. 63), Ehrenfels insisted that the holistic product, or 
meaning, which is derived from a Gestalt experience can nei-
ther be segmented, nor explicitly defined. The Gestalt is 
the order that is both perceived and conceived out of the 
chaos. 
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According to Mahrer (1978), the Gestalt is the person's 
organization of bits and pieces that are perceived to arrive 
at personal meaning. Mahrer describes the Gestalt as a per-
sonal way of processing "intrusive stimuli" from the 
external world. Mahrer emphasizes: "· •. the way in which 
the person receives the very real intrusions from the real 
world depends upon the person, and not on the strength of 
the stimulus" (p. 190). 
Humans are continually bombarded by fluctuations, or 
intrusions, which force changes upon the human organism. 
How that person reacts to the intrusions depends largely 
upon the Gestalt; that is, the way in which the perceptions 
are organized by the individual. 
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As Kelley, May, and other humanistic psychologists sug-
gest, the human will strive for enhancement over the mere 
attainment of sustenance. The person will seek to grow and 
to develop, as opposed to remaining content with an exis-
tence that offers little more than life sustaining things 
(i.e., food, clothing, shelter). By virtue of this desire 
for fulfillment, it can be suggested that entropy--an irre-
versible tendency to move forward--characterizes human 
development, as opposed to tropism, the tendency to sustain 
life through the gratification of basic, "deficiency needs" 
(Maslow, 1962) . 
An additional, but important aspect of irreversibility 
has to do with the fact that the fluctuations can take an 
organism beyond a near-to-equilibrium state, to that of dis-
organization and chaos. Prigogine and Stengers note that 
even at this far-from-equilibrium state, "a coherence quite 
foreign to equilibrium" (p. 181) is introduced. 
The manner by which a Gestalt can transcend from a 
perceptual field of random disorder to a perceptual meaning 
of coherence and order provides an illustration of 
Prigogine's thesis. The synthesis that is created by the 
perceiver brings the person to a higher state of conscious-
ness in regard to the particular phenomenon. 
Another illustration of Prigogine's thesis can be found 
in the context of developmental transformations. It is pos-
sible for an organism--the human--to be transformed into a 
new and differentiated order. Transformation, in this 
sense, implies a personality leap into a higher state of 
consciousness or development. This may include a conversion 
of the affect, a sudden insight of the intellect, or the 
like. In any case, the person undergoes a transformative 
change. 
Maslow (1973) describes the transformation as a "total 
private and personal" (p. 384) revelation, conversion, or 
illumination which he refers to as a "peak experience." 
This is an "intrinsic core-experience" (p. 385) which places 
the person's consciousness into a new context. Transforma-
tions are moving processes in which irreversibility is 
implied. One might reach a plateau, or even digress, but it 
is scientifically impossible to return to a former state. 
Uncertainty/Unpredictability 
Despite the fact that life is entropical, or forward 
moving, there is always an element of uncertainty in the 
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future. Kelley and Rasey express that much of one's 
uncertainty relates to that which is unconscious. These 
authors state that: "We like to think that, as adults, we 
are in charge of all decisions and are the captains of our 
fate" (p. 60). The fact is, however, that to a great 
extent, the human functions "in accordance with a powerful 
unconscious force" which brings a backlog of experience into 
the perceptual process. 
May {1975) affirms Kelley and Rasey's contention that 
much of life remains uncertain because of the human subcon-
scious. There exists within the human an uncertainty fac-
tor, for as one's potentialities remain dormant in the 
unconscious, one cannot know his/her possibilities for 
growth and creativity. May defines the subconscious/ uncon-
scious as the source of experience; the mainspring for free 
creativity. Therefore, May states: "I define this uncon-
scious as the potentialities for awareness or action which 
the individual cannot or will not actualize" (p. 55). 
179 
According to Goble {1970), Maslow's experiences with 
graduate students at Brandeis University led him to see that 
"freedom (permissiveness) could be growth-producing for 
some, but for others seem to produce negative results" 
(p. 62). Those students who appeared already healthy seemed 
to find freedom to be growth producing, others who were 
insecure found freedom debilitating. Maslow discovered, 
however, that "· .. as the individual develops, the need 
for control lessens, and actions beco~e more natural and 
spontaneous" (p. 63). 
Environmental conditions have much to do with one's 
personal dispositions. Allport (1961) defines personal dis-
positions as one's ideas and attitudes, interests and val-
ues, and modes or manners of expression. He adds that the 
dispositions are not identifiable as distinct units. Nei-
ther have they sharp contours or boundaries. Rather, the 
dispositions are indicators of a nuclear quality about the 
individual--his/her goal or meaning--and they "give shape or 
form" to the individual's personality. In essence, the per-
sonality is encompassed by one's dispositions. 
Two major points about the dispositions can be made: 1) 
the dispositions stem from unknowns in the person's uncon-
scious, and 2) one's behavior--the observable characteristic 
of one's dispositions--is not adequately reliable, or con-
sistent, to be determined as predictable. Allport explains 
his position regarding the unpredictability of human behav-
ior with the following illustration: 
A New York executive, almost always decisive, 
orderly, and prompt, may be reduced to virtual 
paralysis when confronted in a restaurant with a 
tray of French pastry. Why? Perhaps it is just 
fatigue at the end of the day; perhaps it· is a 
buried complex traceable to punishment in boyhood 
for stealing tarts (p. 362). 
Allport continues by stating that some psychologists 
assert "that personality has no inner consistency at all" 
(p. 362). However, Allport is of the belief that individu-
als may behave consistently for awhile, or in particular 
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facets of their lives, but even here reliability is not com-
plete. Allport offers the following conclusion: "Since the 
primary principle of behavior is its convergent flow, we 
cannot expect dispositions to be totally consistent and pre-
dictable" (p. 362). Furthermore, Allport holds that "the 
consistency of a disposition is a matter of degree" (p. 353) 
in which the clinician can often find contradiction. 
In affirmation, Combs et al. (1976) point out that 
one's "perceptual field is potentially as infinite as the 
universe itself" (p. 407). This contention suggests an 
environment of randomness. The authors propose that the 
person exists not as a separate entity from that universe, 
but as "a dynamic part of the field" (p. 408), or the envi-
ronment. In this way each person chooses to serve his/her 
own distinct purposes. Behavior is thus individual, and not 
highly predictable. 
Whereas an outside observer might view one's choices as 
being ordered and predetermined by the circumstances of the 
environment (as if the person has no choice but to act a 
particular way), Combs et al. contend that behavior cannot 
be predicted because the person exercises free choice to 
facilitate his/her own self-actualization. Therefore, 
behavior is "totally determined by the dynamics of the field 
especially oriented about the phenomenal self and the need 
of the organism for self-actualization" (p. 408). 
The question is then raised by Combs et al. as to why 
psychology must be approached in a deterministic manner. 
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These authors propose that humanistic psychology is based on 
the tenet that "the feelings, attitudes, hopes, and goals of 
the person--the personal meanings which are the underlying 
causes of behavior" (p. 411) are to be the focus of study, 
not precisely measurable behaviors. For Combs et al. (1976) 
assert: "· .. there is no exact one-to-one relationship 
between the meanings existing for a person in a given situa-
tion and a particular behavior that might follow" (p. 410). 
They add that "behavior is a symptom, not a cause." 
Because personal meaning cannot be operationalized into 
behaviors, predictions based on generalized tendencies fail 
to consider the all-encompassing facets of the unique human. 
Thus, according to the humanistic paradigm, science need 
not--should not--be deterministic. Life is uncertain and 
unpredictable; in Kelley's (1951) words: " .. life itself 
is a process, and will not become static under ordinary con-
crete circumstances" (p. 6). For this reason, Combs (1979) 
urges: "When dealing with the growth and development of 
human personalities, the reverse of the medical model is 
more often required" (p. 235). The time for an alternate 
way of viewing development is at hand! 
Synthesis: A Nondirective Approach 
Rogers (1969) supports the contention of Combs et al. 
that each person chooses from his/her own perceptual field 
those things that appear to be most enhancing. Nonetheless, 
a "quality of courage" is required in the choosing for in so 
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doing, the person "step{s) into the uncertainty of the 
unknown" {p. 269). For all choices are risks, and the out-
come of any choice is received by the risk-taker according 
to his/her personal meaning of the situation. 
Due to the diverse needs and interests of people with 
seemingly common purposes and backgrounds, Rogers advocates 
the setting of meetings with no agendas. In this way dis-
cussions emerge from the participants who are thus free to 
explore possibilities for personal and group problem solv-
ing. Rogers {1977) refers to this as a "person-centered 
approach". in which: "the process is all-important, and the 
changes are only partially predictable" {p. 22). 
Rogers opens the "encounter group" sessions with a 
statement that suggests how long the group will be together. 
He then informs the participants that they can use the meet-
ing time however they wish. Rogers than listens with accep-
tance, "to whatever is expressed". He adds: "I dislike 
using any procedure that is planned" (p. 23). 
Though words such as nonlinearity and randomness are 
not used, Rogers alludes to these assumptions with the man-
ner by which he allows the encounter group meetings to 
emerge from the spontaneity of personal meanings and dispo-
sitions. In essence, Rogers accounts for the anomalies of 
human development. 
Moreover, Rogers rejects the attempt to predict that 
anything predetermined should come from such meetings. 
In seeking to establish a sense of community among the 
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participants, Rogers notes the importance of looking for 
approximations that might point toward new possibilities for 
a brighter future. Rogers suggests: 
The discovery of anything that is approximately 
true has an earthshaking revolutionary power. And 
I believe we are making some such discovery, 
though I can't define it, and can only observe 
some of its characteristics (p. 149). 
In regard to the assumption of irreversibility, Rogers 
(1977) supports the contention of Kelley, Maslow, May, Combs 
and others, that development is directional and self-moti-
vating. Rogers agrees, therefore, that the "organism is 
self-controlled" with a "directional tendency toward whole-
ness, toward actualization of potentialities" (p. 240). 
And, like the natural scientists who explores uncharted ter-
ritories, the "tendency for growth and the direction of 
growth" takes one on toward higher complexities. Rogers 
states: "Life flows into ever more diverse forms, correcting 
its errors, and moving toward its own enhancement" (p. 244). 
Humans do not undo development and return back to for-
mer states. This holds true even when individuals show con-
scious rifts or perversions in the "natural directions of 
the unitary actualizing tendency" (p. 247). It is thus con-
eluded that there is no logical path to understanding. Only 
intuition and a "sympathetic understanding of experience" 
(p. 273) can bring the scientist closer to the nature of 
development. 
Rogers' contention leads to the following implications: 
Life is uncertain. The human is confronted daily by random 
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occurrences from the environment. These external conditions 
initiate behaviors which stem from uncertain (unconscious) 
feelings, attit.udes, and the like. Because humans differ in 
their responses to particular situations, it is suggested 
that behaviors do not follow straight paths; instead, humans 
take nonlinear courses to arrive at their hoped-for destina-
tions. There is, however, a directionality to becoming 
developed (e.g., self-actualized, fully functioning), and 
that aspect of development implies irreversibility. 
Although one may encounter setbacks, or emotional rifts, in 
his/her development, it is impossible to return to a former 
developmental state. 
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In conclusion, the humanistic paradigm appears to be an 
application of discoveries about the nature of the universe, 
as made by physicists, mathematicians, chemists, and other 
proponents of the new science to the nature of the develop-
ing human. In accordance with the Chaos scientists, the 
humanistic psychologists suggest that development is random, 
nonlinear, irreversible, and uncertain. For these reasons, 
the course of one's development cannot be predicted. 
Development encompasses a vast array of anomalies which 
must be considered if the human is to be even partially 
understood. The humanistic paradigm bridges the gap between 
the new science's discoveries of inanimate transformative 
processes and the transformations of human development .. 
CHAPTER V 
A SYNTHESIS 
The nature of human development has been an ongoing 
issue throughout the ages. Just as Newton determined that 
objects and events of the universe operate in standard and 
predictable ways, the social sciences have adopted a mecha-
nistic rationale for defining the human by using terms of 
measurement and prediction. Education has thus come to 
specify behaviors that can provide for the accommodation of 
the human (the child) to the organizational structure (the 
grade level) of the school. Developmental theorists have 
come to be heralded as the support for making such determi-
nations. 
This study explored the validity of Newton's rationale 
in light of more recent discoveries in new science. It has 
been found that scientists from among the different fields 
have discovered that the universe cannot be predetermined, 
nor is it ordered and linear. In fact, as a result of 
Einstein's theory of relativity and the subsequent emergence 
of quantum mechanics, along with the more recent discoveries 
of the Chaos scientists, a new paradigm is emerging which 
promulgates the universe as a flux of random, nonlinear, 
irreversible, and uncertain processes. For these reasons, 
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the outcomes of nature's phenomena are unpredictable and can 
only be estimated by approximation. Whereas Einstein 
asserted that God does not place dice; today, proponents of 
the new science are suggesting that God plays pinball 
(Pagels, 1982). 
Nonetheless, it is argued by Schopen (1989) and Lucas 
(1985) that many members of the natural and social sciences 
are continuing to view the human in accordance with Newton's 
deterministic principles. Across the nation state depart-
ments of education (e.g., Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Oregon) 
are calling for a tightening of policies that will assist in 
decisions regarding grade placements/retentions. Some 
states and districts (e.g., Georgia; Austin, Texas) are 
enforcing the use of measurement instruments as the basis 
for making determinations about a child's school placement. 
In such cases a child's test score is used to predict 
his/her performance potential for a particular grade level. 
Failure to meet the scoring criteria predetermines the 
child's being placed at a lower grade level. 
The researcher of this study has looked to three lead-
ing developmental theorists whose works have impacted educa-
tional decisions and practice in the United States. Bjork-
lund's (1986) survey of research on developmental placement 
includes references to the Gesell theorists. Piaget's 
theory of cognitive psychology has become the dominant the-
ory on development today (Brennan, 1982). And Montessori 
preschools have been established nationwide to facilitate 
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the readiness of preschoolers for meeting the grade-level 
expectations that have become standard throughout the 
public/private schools (Goodlad et al., 1973). Because edu-
cational policies and practices are often linked to one or 
more of these developmentalists, the respective theories of 
Arnold Gesell, Jean Piaget, and Maria Montessori have been 
explored. 
A primary goal for this study has been to see if there 
is a different way that the knowledge base of human develop-
ment can be critiqued. In researching the new science, from 
the findings of Einstein and Heisenberg (that the universe 
is relative and uncertain) to the more recent findings of 
the Chaos scientists (that systems and organisms change 
through processes of transformation), it has been found that 
there is not a linear and reversible--mechanical--order to 
nature as was once postulated by Newton and Descartes. For 
this reason, phenomena such as the weather cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty (Gleick, 1987). Neither can the 
human's development be predicted in a deterministic way. 
Upon studying Gesell, Piaget, and Montessori it was 
discovered that each was a scientist in his/her own right: 
Piaget was a biologist, Gesell and Montessori were medical 
doctors. As scientists, it was presumed that each would 
have his/her own philosophy of science, and that this 
philosophy would be incorporated into each scientist's 
theory of development. In the course of pursuing this 
research, it was discovered that Gesell's phylogenetic 
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emphasis of development was strongly influenced by Darwin's 
theory of evolution and G. Stanley Hall's recapitulation 
theory (Gesell, 1968). On the other hand, the ontological 
philosophy of Piaget and Montessori, that development occurs 
both through evolution and one's construction of knowledge, 
can be gleaned from the biographies of these two theorists 
(Lillard, 1972; Piaget, 1968). In sum, it was found that 
the developmental theories of these three individuals 
parallel their respective philosophies of science. 
It was further discovered that the developmental theo-
ries espoused by Gesell, Piaget, and Montessori do not tend 
to be in accordance with the assumptions of randomness, 
nonlinearity, irreversibility, and uncertainty as now pro-
posed by new science. Instead, these theorists tend to sug-
gest that the natural processes of development encompass: 
invariance and order as opposed to randomness, linearity as 
opposed to nonlinearity, and predictability as opposed to 
unpredictability and uncertainty. 
Piaget (1928) emphasizes reversibility in regard to 
thoughts. The goal is to go from transductive (ego-centric) 
reasoning to that which is inductive-deductive. Specif i-
cally, Piaget defines development as cognitive growth. 
Because one's cognition is more fully developed when the 
person can reverse his/her thoughts, Piaget holds that one 
has progressed in development when one understands the back 
and forth nature of operations (e.g., 2+2=4, 4-2=2), and can 
conceive of things from the other's point of view (e.g., 
189 
sharing with Sue will cause Sue to want to share with me). 
Piaget adds: "The essence of thought is the attempt to make 
reality itself reversible" (p. 18) . In general the philoso-
phies of these developmentalists conflict with the nondeter-
ministic assumptions of new science. 
Development: A Classical Perspective 
In this section, some ways in which Gesell, Piaget and 
Montessori cling to a Newtonian world view are highlighted. 
The respective theories of these developmentalists will be 
integrated for a discussion of the following issues: stage 
development, the learning process, the curriculum, affective 
development, patterns and predictions, diagnosis, and grade 
placement/retention. Not all of these topics are addressed 
by each of the theorists, therefore, the topics are dis-
cussed only as they have appeared in the literature. 
Stage Development 
Each of the developmentalists proposes that development 
progresses through stages. According to all three, the 
stages are sequential and invariant, thus every child must 
pass through each stage in the order proposed as the route 
to adulthood. Invariance refers to the fact that there are 
no other paths to development, and no stages can be skipped 
along the way. According to these theorists there are no 
exceptions to the laws of stage development! 
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Gesell and Ilg (1946) refer to the stages as growth 
gradients and present the life cycle as a series of 
"maturity traits" encompassing seventeen age levels in ten 
major fields of behavior. Ilg et al. (1981) note that the 
progression through the stages does force the child to con-
front fluctuations, or periods of disequilibrium. However, 
these are not "random" occurrences. They come upon the 
child "in a lawful and patterned way" (p. 7). 
Montessori's (1967) stages are referred to as sensitive 
periods which are necessary for both growth and "psychic 
development" (p. 96). The reference to "psychic" develop-
ment is in regard to the child's intellectual functioning. 
According to Montessori, certain learnings are more easily 
undertaken in particular stages, or sensitive periods, than 
in others. Thus an infant in the first sensitive period 
finds the learning of language to be less troublesome than 
does an older person trying to learn a second language. 
An interesting aspect of Montessori's (1967) theory is 
that she criticizes Darwin for having put forth such a 
"linear" description of evolution (which Montessori views as 
nonlinear) • Her reference is to the fact that the organism 
is a dynamic system always in flux with the world. Its 
agents have unique tasks to fulfill. As the heart performs 
one function, the lungs do another. Viewing the organism 
from an ecological perspective, Montessori holds that the 
trajectories from all of these parts would indicate a non-
linear flowing of trajectories to an end of one's life. 
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Because of the inherent dynamics that comprise the organism, 
the path to development must be nonlinear. 
Nonetheless, Montessori postulates the stages as 
ordered and invariant sensitive periods. Other aspects of 
her theory lean toward linearity: 1) she singularly focuses 
on cognitive growth to the neglect of the affect, and 2) the 
manner by which the learning tasks must be approached is 
sequential and ordered. It is, therefore, difficult to 
classify Montessori as a proponent of nonlinearity despite 
her claim to be so. 
Piaget (198lb) specifically describes his stages as 
"constant and sequential" (p. 205) in the order by which 
they are met. He continues that while children may differ. 
in their rates of passing through the stages, and to the 
degree that their development might lead them, there is no 
escaping the fact that all growth is ordered, sequential, 
and invariant. 
The Learning Process 
Gesell (1945) holds that intelligence is innate; the 
ground plan of which is laid down by the genes. Gesell and 
Ilg (1946) hold that intelligence is a function of growth, 
and the tissues of the mind develop in the same way as the 
tissues of other organs. Furthermore, the development of 
thought is lawfully patterned. In sum, the Gesellian theory 
finds learning to lie within the organism; it cannot be 
externally controlled. As a result, Ames et al. (1972) 
192 
assert that.there is no point in trying to teach a child 
before he/she is maturationally ready to receive the teach-
ing. 
In contrast, Piaget (1981a) contends that intelligence 
is neither innate, nor is it hereditary. Learning is con-
structed. Piaget (1977) describes the learning process as 
the construction of knowledge. In the process, the child 
cognitively acts upon objects and events in the world with 
"continuous and laborious effort" (p. 31). In describing 
Piaget's theory, Furth (1981) notes that this construction 
is an active, not passive, internal process. 
Piaget's {198lc) equilibration theory describes how the 
construction of knowledge occurs through: 1) physical 
knowledge, 2) innate or hereditary factors, and 3) social 
knowledge. He holds that the innate/hereditary factors 
merely govern the regulatory functions of the self, and the 
social knowledge is a processing of social-relations in the 
same manner by which physical knowledge is processed. (The 
emphasis then is not on how one feels about social relation-
ships, but on how they are processed/understood.) The con-
struction of physical knowledge is, therefore, the crux of 
Piaget's theory. 
Piaget (1981a) notes that for the very young, physical 
knowledge rests with sensory-motor actions upon objects or 
things in the world. As one develops, however, the cogni-
tive processes of adaptation (i.e., assimilation and accom-
modation) and organization are used by the individual first 
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through concrete operations, and then in abstract reasoning. 
It is at the level of abstract reasoning that the operations 
are internally combined into structures. The importance of 
physical knowledge is, however, that all learning must start 
here; for every abstraction there is a material or physical 
root. Hence, one cannot get to the level of abstract rea-
soning without first passing through the cognitive process-
ing of physical (sensory-motor, preoperational) and concrete 
operational experiences. 
In sum, Piaget's (1981c) equilibration theory suggests 
that all learning encompasses: 1) physical knowledge, 2) 
heredity, and 3) social knowledge. Whereas both physical 
and social knowledge are dependent upon the functions of the 
intellect, the hereditary factor is not. Heredity is not an 
important part of learning, according to Piaget, because it 
does not satisfy our yearning for a logical understanding of 
the world (i.e., logical necessity). 
Montessori (1967) shares a comparable learning theory 
to that of Piaget, asserting that the child "bears within 
him constructive possibilities" (p. 57), but Montessori does 
not attempt to explain the cognitive processes. She empha-
sizes that learning is purposeful interaction with the envi-
ronment in the same way that building a structure with 
stones or bricks is purposeful and unique construction. 
Just as buildings differ in their shape and ornamentation, 
children differ in what and how they learn. The process is 
dependent upon the goal (purpose) and the implementation 
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(choices and actions) of the builder. Though there is an 
inherent "natural unfolding" in the course of development, 
the child's learning is also characterized by "spontaneous 
manifestations." 
The Curriculum 
The Gesell theorists do not concern themselves with the 
curriculum per se, only that the child be held back until 
maturity provides him/her the capacities for handling what-
ever might be expected of children at the differing grade 
levels (Ames et al., 1972; Ames, 1967). Piaget, similarly, 
has little to say about how a child should be educated. 
The proponents of Piaget, and Montessori herself, have 
much to say about such things as the way a child should be 
taught (i.e., the methods and materials), and the learning 
environment or climate (i.e., the noise level, amount of 
freedom, etc.). The following sections deal with these 
aspects of the curriculum. 
Methods and Materials. According to Kamii and Declark 
(1985) a Piagetian classroom does not impart learning 
through social transmission. Instead, children learn by 
being actively engaged in learning tasks. These authors 
suggest that the curriculum focus on activities that can 
model situations in daily living with the use of games. All 
mathematics texts, for example, should be done away with in 
the primary grades for the use of games and projects that 
force the children to problem-solve through action, as 
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opposed to passive abstraction on paper and pencil tasks. 
Furth (1970) affirms this contention noting that social 
activities develop the intellect. He recommends field trips 
and role play. 
Montessori began her work with materials she specially 
created for mentally retarded children. Her first school 
was initiated to see if the materials would be successful 
with normal children (Lillard, 1972). Throughout her 
career, Montessori developed materials that would enhance 
children's learning. Montessori (1956) emphasizes the 
orderliness of the tasks, that they are to be approached in 
the manner by which they were intended. Montessori Jr. 
(1976) adds that his mother planned the materials with 
"built-in controls" (p. 69) to insure that the child would 
have automatic feedback regarding the correctness of his/her 
procedures with the tasks. 
In sum, both the Piagetian and the Montessorian class-
rooms find children actively engaged in the learning. In 
both cases the tasks are designed more for instructional 
gain than for social growth (Furth, 1970). Montessori, in 
fact, prefers the children of her classrooms to work in iso-
lation, being totally free of distractions so that they 
might become absorbed in the learning (Montessori, 1967, 
1966, 1956). 
Climate/Environment. It can be surmised that the envi-
ronments of both classrooms (i.e., the Piagetian and the 
Montessorian) find children pleasantly about the business of 
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learning. The proponents of both curricula describe the 
classrooms as such. One reason for the pleasantness is 
because an inherent aspect of these programs encompasses 
self-direction. The child may freely select from the array 
of activities what he/she chooses to do. There are parame-
ters, regarding the self-selection, -for the tasks are 
designed to facilitate cognitive-intellectual skills. The 
Piagetian curriculum seeks to advance operational thought, 
the Montessori curriculum seeks to advance academic skills 
(e.g., reading, mathematics). 
Proponents of Piaget (Kamii and Devries, 1980) assert 
that children do not distinguish between work and play. 
Montessori (1956) insists that if the materials are used 
incorrectly, in that the children are socializing with them 
as opposed to staying on task, then the teacher must inter-
vene and break up the disorder. Whereas the Piagetian 
classroom may be filled with talk, movement, and noise, 
Montessori's classroom finds children engaged in activities 
and movement, but with minimal talk or noise. In this way 
Montessori counters Kamii and Devries' contention with the 
assertion that children do distinguish between work and 
play! Only work is appropriate for the classroom, and chil-
dren are happiest when they are working (Montessori, 1949). 
Another point of contention between the Piagetian and 
Montessorian classrooms rests with the fact that the Piage-
tian theory holds that children should not be taught certain 
concepts uhtil they have reached a stage of understanding 
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(Piaget, 1976). Mario (Montessori Jr., 1976) asserts that 
the use of his mother's curriculum worldwide has repeatedly 
shown that very young children can be taught reading and 
mathematics when absorbed in the learning. The teacher 
should take advantage of the child's high interest rather 
than holding back until he/she becomes ready. 
In sum, the Piagetian curriculum allows for talk and 
movement as the children work together on the learning 
games/activities. Because the goal is for discovery, little 
explanation is offered by the teacher. The Montessorian 
teacher, on the other hand, demonstrates the tasks offering 
instruction, at least, in the initial phase of learning. 
Even then, talk is to be kept at a minimum because children 
can derive more from the visual/tactile than the auditory 
mode of learning. In both curricula, the children are free 
to select from that which is laid out in the classroom. 
Affective Development 
None of the developmental theorists put much emphasis 
on affective development. Piaget in the Bringuier (1980) 
interview states pointedly that he has no interest in that 
area of development. It is for this reason that the Piage-
tian curriculum focuses on activities that promote intellec-
tual growth. Furth (1970) makes this point very clear even 
though he promotes excursions outside of the school, simula-
tion games, role play, and the like. The entire focus is 
for cognitive (intellectual, operational) growth. The 
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active social experiences are thus for the purpose of 
attaining knowledge. The aspect of finding meaningful 
social relationships for the development of affect is not 
addressed. It is not what the child feels that matters, it 
is what he/she knows. 
Montessori concerns herself with the social aspect of 
development even less that Piaget and his constituents. 
School is for learning; therefore, work is good, but 
"aimless wanderings" of the mind (e.g., fantasizing, play) 
are evil (Montessori, 1966; 1956). 
Proponents of the Gesell Institute concern themselves 
so much with the child's academic performance that any 
affective concerns relating to grade retention are mini-
mized. Ames et al. (1972) oppose social promotion on the 
grounds that placing the child's emotional needs over 
his/her need for academic success is more damaging than 
tending to the real issue, his/her academic success. Ilg et 
al. (1981) affirm, noting that fears over the harmful 
effects of grade retention are "largely groundless" 
(p. 240). 
It can be surmised that each of the developmentalists 
prioritize the growth of knowledge--intellectual, academic 
learning--over all other aspects of development. In this 
way developmental theory is narrowly focused on linear. In 
accordance with normal science, a set of criteria concerning 
intellectual growth is abstracted from the child so that 
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his/her development can be defined in measurable and pre-
dictable terms. Whereas the humanistic psychologists hold 
that the facets of development are integrally woven and, 
therefore, must not be dissected for analysis, the develop-
mentalists rely upon the scientific method to guide their 
determinations about the nature of development. 
Patterns and Predictions 
Each of the developmental theorists predicts that 
humans develop according the patterns of his/her respective 
stage theories (e.g., growth gradients, sensitive periods). 
Piaget holds that a child cannot be taught operations until 
the child has reached the stage of operational thinking; 
Montessori contends that a child can be taught to reason 
linguistically or mathematically as long as the child is 
highly absorbed, or concentrated, with keen interest. It 
happens, however, that the keen interest is likely to corre-
spond to a sensitive period in which the learning of a 
particular task comes more naturally for the child. In 
these ways Piaget and Montessori use patterns and predic-
tions to determine the course of development. 
The researchers of the Gesell Institute have much more 
to say about patterns and predictions. Ames (1967)· notes 
that girls mature faster than boys. Ames et al. (1972) 
affirm stating that of the children who use the Institute 
for remedial purposes, the gender ratio is 5:1 in favor of 
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the boys. The major point, then, is that the gender problem 
is predictable. 
Ilg et al. (1981) discuss the swings in development 
from disequilibrium to equilibrium which correspond to par-
ticular levels of development as specified on the growth 
gradients charts. In sum, it can be predicted when the 
child will hit the "terrible twos" or any other difficult 
stage of development. 
Finally, all the researchers of the Gesell Institute 
propose that a child's success in school can be predicted. 
Ames et al. (1972) declare that early tests are predictive, 
and the Gesell Institute is acclaimed for its readiness test 
used by districts nationwide. 
Diagnosis 
Only Gesell and his proponents address the subject of 
diagnosis directly. The Piagetian tests were instruments 
used for research purposes. Devries (1978) criticizes the 
use of Piaget's tests for placement or instructional pur-
poses. And Montessori's diagnosis was conducted informally 
through observation of a child's performance on a task; 
thus, it was not diagnosis, but teaching! 
Ames (1967), on the other hand, recommends the use of 
tests to determine a child's readiness for schooling. She 
adds that intelligence testing should be a part of the diag-
nosis, though not the main emphasis. It matters, therefore, 
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what the child innately brings into the· learning. In accor-
dance with the Gesell's phylogenetic emphasis, the heredi-
tary factor of intelligence will bear upon the child's 
development. 
Ilg et al. (1981) caution that the intelligence test 
not deter the diagnostician from considering the rest of the 
web, the intelligence aspect is only one factor. Nonethe-
less, ''individual behaviors develop predictably" (p. vii). 
The focal point, therefore, is to use whatever information 
that might be available for painting a diagnostic picture of 
the child. The portrait can then be mirrored against the 
growth gradients for predicting the child's future in 
school. 
Grade Placement and Retention 
In sum, it is only Gesell and his proponents who 
address the issue of holding a child back a year until 
he/she becomes ready, or retaining a child in the same grade 
for another year. Ames (1967) asserts that in the schools 
of today there is a "tremendous amount of overplacement" (p. 
5) . She adds that nearly all children who are brought to 
the Institute seek out the remedial help because they have 
been overplaced. 
The reader is reminded that recent reviews of the lit-
erature find the research data to be inconclusive on whether 
or not grade placement, or retention, is a viable option in 
terms of contributing to children's overall development 
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(Bjorklund, 1986). It is for this reason that state depart-
ments suggest that districts offer options in establishing 
promotion/retention policies (Pennsylvania, 1985; 
Connecticut, 1984; Oregon, 1985). Because the data are 
inconclusive, placement/retention is a controversial issue; 
agreement cannot be reached. 
Even though Piaget and Montessori do not address the 
issue of school placement, it can be seen that all three of 
the developmentalists lean toward the Newtonian (classical) 
theory that nature is ordered, linear, reversible, and pre-
dictable. In a nutshell it will be shown how the develop-
mentalists view the nature of development from a classical 
lens: 1) The stage theories in general (i.e., the growth 
gradients, sensitive periods, and even Piaget's equilibra-
tion theory which encompasses the construction of physical 
and social knowledge as well as the hereditary factors) sug-
gest that development is ordered and not random. There is a 
definite pattern to the way in which development occurs, and 
these theorists postulate that the pattern is invariant, 
thus no anomaly, or exception to the rule, can be found. 
Montessori furthers the conception of order in that she 
requires that order be maintained in the external learning 
environment because the route to learning (constructing 
knowledge) is an internally ordered process. 2) Similarly, 
linearity is a factor of the developmental theory, not only 
in regard to the stages (which are sequential as well as 
ordered and invariant) , but also in the sense that all of 
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these theorists view development according to the narrow 
line of cognitive, or intellectual, advancement. For Piaget 
and Montessori this is obvious. Gesell philosophically ties 
the intellect up into a package with the entire being, as 
phylogenetic theorists do, but the Gesell Institute propo-
nents place academic success over all other aspects of 
development to the neglect of affect. 3) Reversibility is 
mentioned only by Piaget who suggests that the progression 
from ego-centric thought (transductive reasoning) to decen-
tering (developing social reciprocity) requires a 
reversibility in one's thinking process, being able to think 
through operations and social events from their diametric 
positions. For example, the conservation of Piagetian tasks 
requires that a child be able to reverse operations. Key to 
the theory is the construction of logical thought, and this 
comes about only by developing to the stage of concrete, and 
then formal, operations when the child becomes able to 
decenter and reverse his/her thoughts. And 4) the assump-
tion of predictability is implicit in all of the stage theo-
ries suggesting how the human is destined to develop. This 
assumption is paramount to the diagnostic/prescriptive 
philosophy of the Gesell Institute. 
From the above it can be concluded that the dominant 
thought on developmental theory draws from the same assump-
tions that new science has now abandoned. The following 
section presents a discussion of development in accordance 
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with the assumptions that found the emergent paradigm of 
Chaos. 
Development: Transformational Theory 
In contrast to dominant theories of development as pos-
tulated by the above theorists, Chapter IV presented devel-
opment as being nondeterministic. The preceding chapter 
(Chapter III) introduced twentieth century scientists who 
paved the way for transformational theory with discoveries 
that the universe is comprised of randomness and nonlinear-
ity, irreversibility and uncertainty. The paradigm is now 
promulgated by chemists, physicists and mathematicians, 
astronomers, and biologists. Taken together, these scien-
tists support the contentions made by the humanistic psy-
chologists of the 1960s and 70s that development occurs 
through a series of transformations which are neither lin-
• 
ear, nor predictable because development is fully-encompass-
ing, not restricted to only cognitive growth. Chapters III 
and IV suggest that development takes into account every 
minute fluctuation that might set any one of a multitude of 
responses (feelings/sensations) into motion, or en route to 
a bifurcation. This is not to suggest that a flux would 
necessarily even create a perturbation in the organism, and 
that fact of uncertainty is what makes development unpre-
dictable! But once the organism has chosen to respond with 
a primary, or initial, bifurcation, the occurrence of this 
shift paves the way for other such bifurcations until the 
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organism (person) has undergone a major transformation in 
his/her life. This, in a nutshell, is the transformational 
theory. The following sections explore the theory according 
to its basic assumptions. 
Randomness 
Rogers (1973) describes evolution as a "fluid valuing 
process" (p. 201) in that intervening variables--fluxes--
continually affect one's choices, and thus, the course of 
his/her development. Development is compounded by 
"irreconcilable choices" (p. 274). Kelley and Rasey (1952) 
add that the organism is in perpetual flux as it lives in "a 
milieu of movement" (p. 20). Combs et al. (1976) note the 
"practically infinite" perceptions that a person will 
experience at a given moment. People do not respond in the 
same way to a shared experience, according to Snygg and 
Combs (1949), because of the inherent differences among 
them. Therefore: " .• the behavior of the living organ-
ism is erratic, irregular, and relatively unpredictable" 
(p. 341). 
Nonlinearity 
Allport, in Evans (1970), asserts that there is no 
cause-effect connection between events and one's response. 
Also, nothing can be predetermined about what a child will 
value despite his/her parents' teachings. This nonlinear 
relationship between the input of parenting and the output 
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of behavior supports the contention that life is both random 
and nonlinear; there are too many intervening variables. 
Combs (1982) refers to the openness of the organism as 
the human in flux with things of the world. Because of this 
openness, the human is: 1) more open to experiences, 2) 
able to identify with others, 3) more knowledgeable, and 4) 
able to view the self in more than one way. Through each of 
these, the human is able to develop a more positive sense of 
self. 
Humanistic psychologists do not dissect the human into 
categories of cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor 
domains. Instead, these aspects of the human are seen as 
integral processes that are continually in flux, or move-
ment, in the organism on nonlinear trajectories. The human 
is all of these at once. Thus May (1969) notes the integra-
tion of the cognitive with the affective processes as he 
states: " . we cannot know except as we feel" (p. 303). 
Additionally, May (1975) asserts that humans combine passion 
with their need for organization (which he refers to as 
form) , to arrive at a "wholistic scene" for understanding 
the world. 
Irreversibility 
May (1973) proposes that the human cannot last in the 
condition of maintenance for very long. Humans have a need 
to grow toward something and not stagnate. Combs et al. 
(1976) add that humans seek self-organization when changes 
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are imposed. One looks for coherence out of the conglomera-
tion of random, isolated, bits of information; thus, one 
seeks the Gestalt! 
Heider (1973) notes that Ehrenfels created the concept 
of the Gestalt in 1916 with the idea that humans have a need 
to make sense out of the "formless chaos" (p. 69). Rather 
than to be confused by the atomistic sensations, humans seek 
a holistic meaning that will bring the chaos to a higher 
order. 
This notion of order out of chaos leads back to the 
importance of entropy. Entropy surpasses the life-sustain-
ing connotation of tropism in that entropy, being messy, 
seeks a rejuvenation to a higher order. The concept implies 
a desire to create something new out of that which exists. 
In viewing development from the lens of transforma-
tional theory, as opposed to that of the classical theo-
rists, the human seeks not merely to construct knowledge--to 
learn--and grow cognitively; instead, it is enhancement and 
fulfillment toward which the human aims. It is a higher 
consciousness, peak experiences, the actualization of one's 
potentials--all that transforms the human into a new and 
differentiated being, all that takes the person from chaos 
and turmoil to a higher place of inner peace and serenity--
that is sought by the developing human. Maslow (1973) 
describes the transformation as a "total private and 
personal" revelation which places his/her consciousness into 
a new context. 
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Though Prigogine and Stengers (1984) do not make a 
direct application of transformational theory to the human, 
they state: "On the human level irreversibility is a more 
fundamental concept, which is for us inseparable from the 
meaning of our existence" (p. 298). It is further noted by 
Prigogine and Stengers that irreversibility "· .. is the 
mechanism that brings order out of chaos" (p. 292). 
Uncertainty/Unpredictability 
Rogers (1966) contends that collecting data is a futile 
means of determining how a person will perform in the 
future. It is impossible to "postdict" because data can 
never be instantaneously collected from all of the facets 
that pertain to a human's behavior. There is too much 
changing in the flux! 
Much of life remains uncertain because of the human's 
ability to choose. Underneath all those choices lie uncon-
scious forces which remain unknown, yet they add to the com-
plexity of one's behavior and choices (Kelley & Rasey, 
1952). May (1975) proposes that for the human, the dimen-
sion of unconsciousness is the root of the uncertainty fac-
tor. 
In discussing Maslow's teachings, Goble (1970) notes 
that the healthier humans become less perturbed by their 
unconscious. Allport (1961) argues that one's dispositions 
are behaviors which stem from the unconscious, and these are 
completely unpredictable. He uses the illustration of a New 
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York executive falling totally out of his typical nature, 
being "reduced to virtual paralysis," when confronted with a 
tray of French pastry in a restaurant. The point is that it 
can never be predicted how a person might respond to even 
the most insignificant of perceptual stimuli. As a result, 
Allport concludes that while there may be consistency on the 
surface, the unconscious prevents human behavior--disposi-
tions--from ever becoming reliable. Human nature, there-
fore, remains uncertain and, thereby unpredictable. 
Conclusion 
Kelley and Rasey (1952) discuss the processes of 
organic development in a way that bridges the gap between 
transformational theory with inanimate objects that bifur-
cate as a result of "sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions" (Gleick, 1987), and the human organisms that bifur-
cate as a result of choice. This is an important issue 
which, ultimately, distinguishes the difference between 
Darwin's theory of evolution and the new biology as 
postulated by Augros and Stancui, and Stephen J. Gould. 
According to Kelley and Rasey, all systems (organic and 
inorganic) expend energy. Nonliving matter spends its 
energy by withering away; that is, a rock erodes. Organ-
isms, on the other hand, spend energy for self-preservation. 
Thus the plant chooses to turn to the sun (tropism), whereas 
the rock's erosion is beyond its control. 
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Choice is an inherent part of transformational theory. 
Humans have a degree of control over how their energy will 
be spent in that they can choose. Kelley and Rasey also 
state that the nonliving (inorganic) matter transforms from 
order to disorder; the rock may wither away into dust, a 
disconglomeration of particles. The living (organic) being, 
however, transforms from disorder (chaos) to order. 
Because of the human's capacity for choice, the trans-
formational theory assumes that the choice is always for a 
higher order; the organismic system transforms from disorder 
to order by choice. According to the law of entropy 
(irreversibility), change is always bringing "order out of 
chaos" (Prigogine and Stengers, p. 292). And once the 
transformation has taken place, the organism cannot return 
to a former state. 
It might be argued that humans do digress in their 
development; that they lose ground and forget what had pre-
viously been learned. In transformational theory, however, 
the act of forgetting would be comparable to a system 
encountering another flux which throws the trajectory off 
course. When one forgets, he/she digresses (i.e., roams or 
wanders off course), the pers~n does not regress (i.e., 
return to the past) . It is impossible to break the entropy 
barrier and relive the past. 
It should also be noted that a bifurcation is not, in 
and of itself, a transformation. Therefore, when one for-
gets prior learning and his/her trajectory is thrown off 
211 
course, the bifurcation means that a new course has emerged. 
Transformational theory holds that a person will continually 
be in flux with changing circumstances and conditions. It 
is because of these random occurrences that one is continu-
ally making choices. 
Whitehead's (1934) philosophy suggests that as the 
organism responds to the random fluxes of the world (and 
this can include the occurrence of forgetting something), 
the person will simultaneously probe into the past 
(triggered by unconscious associations) , and into the future 
(anticipating possibilities), and simultaneously integrate 
these processes to make a choice for the present. Using 
these processes, then, the human makes a choice. It remains 
uncertain, however, as to whether this bifurcation will be 
manifested into a transformation. 
Finally, Kelley and Rasey (1952) assert that the living 
matter, the organism, has an innate need for others. The 
infant is born with a dependency upon its mother, the plant 
and animal have a mutual dependency upon each other in terms 
of how they use the air, and the human and animal have a 
dependency upon each other, as do all the entities of our 
ecological world. Therefore, Kelley and Rasey assert: 
"Man, then, is a social creature or he is nothing" (p. 30). 
From Kelley and Rasey's discussion it can be seen that 
the living organism, unlike the inorganic, has a choice in 
its development. Moreover, the human chooses in accordance 
with what one believes will lead to the reaching of a higher 
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order, a transformation. As one develops, setbacks are 
encountered. But these do not return the human to a less 
developed state. The setbacks (fluctuations) are merely 
digressions that force the human to select alternate paths. 
These, too, may lead one to a transformation, for the path 
therein remains uncertain. 
The key point of the theory is that the person does not 
seek transformation from a vacuum. Humans are social crea-
tures and cooperation is vital to survival. This brings the 
discussion to the new biology and its opposition to Darwin-
ism. 
Changes do not occur in the organism through slow and 
successive accommodations to "favourable variations" as 
Darwin (1936) postulates. Neither do they occur through 
competition. Augros and Stancui (1988) emphasize the coop-
erative nature of the inhabitants of the earth. Further-
more, Gould (1977) affirms these authors that evolution is 
not slow and successive, but spontaneous and sudden. 
Darwin's theory has simply not held out against the findings 
of modern science and the fossil record. 
Humans do not succumb to a state of preservation 
(health) by making slow adaptations to the fluxes of life. 
The fact that a mutant may emerge, changing a species every 
several thousand years or so, says nothing about the devel-
opment of a human being. Darwin asserts that "· natural 
selection acts only by taking advantage of slight successive 
variations; but she can never take a great and sudden lead 
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.•. " (p. 144). May (1975) describes the transformation 
that occurred in his own life as an event which came upon 
him suddenly as a burst of insight that changed his entire 
philosophy of life and human development. This sudden 
insight came upon May unexpectedly and was irreversibly 
life-changing. 
Although the transformation impacted May in a sudden 
and unexpected way, many years of choice-making (in May's 
case, studying) led to its emergence. The human has the 
capacity for choice and can, thereby, have a part in the 
creation of his/her own destiny. At the same time, however, 
it is futile to think that the human has control in the 
course of his/her development. The importance of choice, 
however, is that it implies opportunity. And it is only 
opportunity that one can be guaranteed. One cannot presume 
that certain events will take place. One can, however, con-
tinue choosing, through approximation, paths that might 
bring one closer to higher planes of actualization, or ful-
fillment, that is intrinsically sought. 
Whitehead (1925) acknowledges that the organism changes 
over a "lapse of time." According to Whitehead, there is a 
reciprocity between the parts and the whole of the organism. 
The whole is affected by the modifications that are made by 
the body parts. These parts are peculiarly sensitive and, 
therefore, easily thrown into instability. But because the 
organism has an "emergent enduring" pattern that seeks 
growth toward higher states of wholeness, the fluxes of the 
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world serve to help the organism individualize itself. But 
Whitehead (1932) adds: "· .. no event can be wholly and 
solely the cause of another event" (p.41). 
The child is a whole being comprised of an infinite 
number of dynamic parts. As Whitehead suggests, these parts 
are peculiarly sensitive and a fluctuation touching any 
small part of the child's life can throw his/her entire 
being into instability, even chaos. To complicate the mat-
ter even further, the dynamics that play among these various 
perceptual/unconscious parts of the child can be so intri-
cately woven that a concerned caretaker (e.g., parent, 
teacher) may have difficulty knowing what is really wrong. 
Whitehead continues that the causes among events cannot 
really be known. Thus even the child cannot understand 
where the turmoil comes from, and how things might be made 
better. 
The transformational theory suggests two implications, 
one in the form of a caution; the other, an offering of 
hope. In closing, this study leaves these thoughts for con-
sideration: 
The first implication, the caution, goes out to policy-
makers and adults who impose conditions on children without 
knowing what impact the child will receive from the deci-
sion. It should be remembered that large-scale decisions 
often appear as viable solutions to problems until such 
decisions are brought home, or translated as a determination 
of a particular child's future. There often seems to be a 
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discrepancy between what is deemed as worthwhile for the 
masses in comparison to what is believed to be the best for 
a single child. 
The second implication, the offering of hope, can be 
extended to one and all. For though transformational theory 
provides no controls that guarantee a desired future, the 
human is promised a lifetime of opportunities to choose. 
While the fluxes of life may be random, the choices are 
intentional. Although the human can never lay claim to a 
predictable tomorrow, through approximations, one can sense 
possibilities for attaining desired goals. Therefore, 
courses can be charted, one foot can be placed before the 
other. When fluctuations, or intervening variables (as the 
humanistic theorists would say), alter one's perceptions/ 
feelings, etc., and ability to proceed on with the original 
plan, other options become available. 
This attribute of choice is no way to suggest that the 
fluxes, or the recovery processes, are painless. Instabil-
ity, chaos--pain--is an inherent aspect of transformational 
theory, and an unavoidable part of life. The hope rests 
with the fact that: 1) the pain is not forever because 2) 
humans are entropic beings, always striving to attain a 
higher order. 
Finally, transformation is available to all. It cannot 
be predicted as to when or how it might appear. Nor can it 
be known how many transformations a person might encounter 
in a lifetime. Rollo May and Poincare both experienced 
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their significant transformations after they were grown 
(May, 1975). But because humans are entropic beings, con-
tinually striving for enhancement and actualization (Maslow, 
1973), transformations are impending! 
Recommendations 
This study addressed the state of the field in regard 
to policies and decisions that affect children's placement 
in school. It was determined by Bjorklund (1986), Pain 
(1981), and the Pennsylvania (1985) state department hand-
book on promotion/retention policies that the literature is 
inconclusive on whether such decisions are developmentally 
sound. Developmental theory was researched from two per-
spectives: 1) that of classical science from the viewpoints 
of Gesell, Piaget, and Montessori, and 2) that of transfor-
mational theory from the viewpoints of the emergent Chaos 
paradigm, and humanistic psychology. It was discovered that 
transformational theory can offer no more information 
regarding the placement/retention question than can the 
classical paradigm which has dominated education for the 
past two centuries. 
Although new light could not be shed on the placement 
issue, the study has provided greater insight into the pro-
cesses of transformation which encompass human development. 
It was particularly noted that development entails many 
unknowns; moreover, it was discovered that development is a 
lifelong process. All facets of one's perceptual, emotional 
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and constructive realities are integrated into one's past 
and anticipated future as the human chooses for the present 
(Whitehead, 1925). Additionally, the only certainty that 
exists for the human is his/her capacity to choose, and the 
opportunity to make new choices when previous choices have 
led to chaos. 
These findings appear theoretically sound and in accor-
dance with the discoveries of new science. Further research 
in the form of case studies would offer greater insight into 
the bifurcation processes, and how they emerge in people's 
lives. Rollo May (1975) has offered a detailed account of 
not only his own transformation, but also that of Henri 
Poincare. These examples helped the researcher to under-
stand better how bifurcations such as unexpected bursts of 
heightened consciousness, sudden insights, and the like are 
irreversible and significant parts of one's growth and 
development. 
Theoretically, processes of randomness and nonlinearity 
are ongoing occurrences in a person's life which lead to 
transformations. It is recommended that the social sciences 
embark on case studies with humans of all ages to arrive at 
a better understanding of the human and his/her needs for 
healthy development. Perhaps through the reporting of such 
studies in the literature more care might be taken in regard 
to establishing large-scale policies that predetermine con-
ditions to be imposed upon children whose needs remain 
uncertain and unpredictable. 
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Theoretical Conflict 
The researcher has taken the position that humans 
transform to higher, as opposed to just differentiated 
states. Borrowing from Prigogine and Stengers' (1984) con-
cept of "order out of chaos," and their association of 
entropy with the "arrow of time," the researcher has inter-
preted the transformation as being both enhancing (by the 
establishment of order) and forward moving (with the one-
directionality of the arrow of time) . 
Relating this to Kelley and Rasey's (1952) discussion 
of tropism (a plant's movement toward light for self-suste-
nance), the researcher has considered entropy to be a conno-
tation of a higher plane of existence that surpasses the 
maintenance of tropism. Additionally, Kel·ley and Rasey' s 
description of inanimate objects transforming from order to 
disorder (e.g., a rock's transformation into dust), sug-
gested to the researcher a diametric relationship. If inan-
imate things transform to disorder, then living things must 
transform to higher orders of enhancement. 
The conflict in taking the position that development is 
forward-moving rests with the fact that linearity can be 
implied. It can be argued that: 1) Maslow's hierarchy is 
another stage theory, 2) entropy is nothing more than a mea-
sure of messiness (Pagels,1982), and 3) most of the humanis-
tic psychologists infer that development implies progression 
and improvement which, again, suggests linearity. 
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In regard to Maslow's theory being a "stage theory," it 
appears that his thinking transformed over the years from 
the linear stance to nonlinearity. Maslow (1962) states 
that the step-wise conceptions are to be discouraged, and 
that self-actualization is "a dynamic process" (p. 24). It 
can, therefore, be argued that Maslow broke away from his 
earlier, linear postulates. 
From a physics perspective, the assertion that entropy 
is merely a measurement device for estimating the messiness 
of a system alludes to the fact that entropy is value-free. 
In a purely scientific context, entropy cannot be concerned 
with the highness, or improvement, of a system's state. The 
entropy measurement only indicates the degree to which the 
system has undergone change. 
Finally, in regard to the humanistic theorists being 
linear in their thinking, it is true that nearly all tend to 
speak of higher states. Rogers (1977) describes the highly 
developed person as fully-functioning; Maslow (1962) uses 
the term, self-actualized. Combs (1982) refers to the 
transformation as a new state of heightened consciousness. 
As the study has shown, each of the humanistic theo-
rists seems to support the assumptions that development fol-
lows random, nonlinear, irreversible and uncertain pro-
cesses. Yet only May (1975) describes the transformation in 
a way that parallels how a chemist, or a physicist, might 
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describe the bifurcation process. And Rogers (1969) encour-
ages a "no agenda" meeting. This leaves the meeting totally 
at the mercy of randomness and nonlinearity--chaos! 
In sum, it must be noted that the researcher's conclu-
sions state that, when applied to the development of humans, 
entropy refers to bifurcations which are rejuvenating and 
enhancing, not merely self-sustaining. Paradoxically, how-
ever, it can be asserted that entropy is a neutral means of 
measuring change which has noting to do with attaining a 
higher, more refined state. Finally, depending upon how 
May's and Rogers' theories are interpreted, it can be said 
that these theorists are in agreement with Maslow, Combs, 
Allport, and Kelley. Or it can be said that May and Rogers 
are theorizing out of a different conceptual base. 
This study provides enough evidence about the theories 
of these men to postulate an argument either way. This can 
also be said for the issues of Maslow's stage theory and the 
researcher's application of the physics term, entropy. 
Because these issues can be argued in different ways, they 
remain paradoxical. However, paradox seems to be a charac-
teristic of transformational theory since it holds that phe-
nomena of the universe cannot be known with certainty. 
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